Marine Corps Gazette



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

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a pictorial history
By Lynn Montross

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Marine Corps 1961

The Marine Corps Association Newsletter

An unofficial digest of news of interest to our members

Volume 45, Number 6 — Marine Corps Gazette — June, 1961

MarDiv Preview



ITEMS OF NEW EQUIPMENT
Quantity per Unit

ITEM	Inf Regt	Hq Bn	AmTrac Bn	Eng Bn	Tank Bn	D/S ArtyBn	G/S ArtyBn
Rifle, M14	2493	668	1167	741	411	457	489
Rifle, M14 (mod)	216			72		32	40
M60MG w/tripod	99		6	32	22	14	26
M60MG w/bipod	111						
M79 GL	252						
M72 LAW	216						
HowTar						8	
Redeye	30						
AN/TPS-21	6						

Proposed FMF: 1965

You can look ahead to a sharply improved Marine division in 1965. That's the outlook from MCLFDC's consolidated recommendations based on FMF Troop Tests in Phase I (Combat and Combat Support). Still perking: FMF Troop Tests of Logistics, Intelligence, and Air Support.

If HQMC buys proposals (final decision will have to wait other test results, may come in 1962), you can expect something like this:

- A 30% jump in small arms firepower. Infantry units would add 822 M14 rifles, 309 M60 MGs, 756 M79 grenade launchers and return 693 pistols to storerooms.
- A major improvement in anti-tank protection. Fireteams would have the M-72 Light Assault Weapon (LAW); division would add an organic tank battalion with 70% more tanks than M-series Bn.
- A 54% jump in weight of artillery rounds that could be fired per minute. All direct support battalions would use 105mmHow, be dual-armed with HowTar; general support battalion would have 155mmHow, with 32% increase in maximum range.
- Better mobility. Mechanical Mules would cut Marine-load in infantry to about 35 lbs; organic AmTrac Bn in division would provide 5,400 boat spaces.
- Air defense capability. Redeye would be organic to InfBn, under control of FAC's who could be attached to each Rifle Co.

Here's a unit-by-unit rundown of proposed changes:

√ **Rifle Squad.** Goes to 14 men, extra man under control of squad leader would carry M79 grenade launcher—new "squad artillery." Third fire-team has M60 MG with bipod instead of M14 (mod). Further tests to place M60

(See FMF next page)

HQMC Reorganization

It's question time on the Potomac. With Congress in session there are always lots of questions to be answered right now. Then SecDef McNamara added a list of 123 searching queries about basic defense matters. SecNav Connally added a number of others.

And now the Marine Corps is asking questions about the Headquarters staff that answers those questions. A three-officer board (**LtGen R. H. Pepper,** Ret; **MajGen A. L. Bowser;** and **Col N. J. Anderson**) has the project with a deadline of 1 Aug.

Basically, they're looking to save money, Marines, time—and paperwork. The precept from CMC specifically asks a study to see if functions can be deleted, consolidated, or removed from HQMC.

From past CMC statements, you can also expect attention to "one Personnel department," supply, and R&D; also, systems for both minute-to-minute and future planning.

HQMC was organized into a general staff system in 1952. Before that, there were many departments and divisions which had grown up during the years. Many were consolidated. How can there be further reduction?

That's for the Board to say, but speculation is that they'll at least consider the "directorate" system which is growing in DoD. Such a system provides a means of joining departments or divisions, as, for example, G-4 and the Supply Department, or even G-3, G-2, and DivAv.

Before this key assignment, General Pepper had been serving on active duty with the Bolte committee.

General Material?

Mike McCorps flunked last month's test on who is general officer material. And he won't make admiral, either. Especially in the Coast Guard.

United States Code, Title 10, Sec 101 (4) reads "'Armed forces' means the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard." That makes five. Fact remains, however, that in peacetime Coast Guard is not so frequently affected by DoD or joint command directives.

FMF 1965 Contd

in each fire-team are recommended. Squad leader turns in his rifle, carries the M79 launcher. One man per fire-team is the LAWman; all are trained to fire it. M-17 LAW will be carried by Co, issued as an extra weapon when needed.

√ **Rifle Platoon.** Adds a tactical radio net. Transistorized helmet-mounted receivers are hoped for eventually.

√ **Rifle Company.** Gets one Mighty Mite ¼-T 4x4 and seven Mechanical Mules (two for Hq, two for WpnsPlt, one for each rifle plt).

√ **Infantry Battalion.** Would keep 81mm mortar, not HowTar or 4.2" mortar. Would incorporate Redeye in a TACP/AA section with four Forward Air Controllers. The FAC's would be *ground* officers, form nucleus for all-purpose observer teams to be further studied. Bn would have two AN/TPS-21 surveillance radars, with Marines to man them. Does NOT get FSCC section.

√ **Infantry Regiment.** Would remain, with no major change in staff organization. May be affected by Phase II tests on reconnaissance and logistics. Does NOT get FSCC section.

√ **Artillery.** Would get back names of "direct" and "general" support, along with 105mm and 155mm howitzers. D/S Btry would have eight 105's; would also carry and train with eight 4.2" HowTars. Both D/S Btry and Bn CO's get a break—a liaison officer to let them cut out of the FSCC. G/S Bn would turn its countermortar radars over to Arty Regt.

√ **Tanks.** It's proposed to add a MedTkCo (making three) and boost both Med and Heavy Tk Cos to four 5-tank platoons each. This adds 35 tanks. The Tank Bn becomes organic to MarDiv.

√ **AmTrac Bn.** Division gets organic amtracs, including 12 105mm-firing LVTH, 12 mine-clearing LVTE. Tractors provide 5,400 boat spaces—enough to carry assault elements of three BLT with their D/S artillery or four without.

√ **Engineers.** Would drop "Pioneer" title, pick up gear to do full scale engineer tasks. There'd be three EngCos, an H&S Co, an EngSpt Co. They'd be able to supply water for a MarDiv.

√ **HqBn.** FMF preferred a battalion organization, wants to scrap A-B CP setup, go to one CP which displaces by echelon. Tests involving this level aren't complete.

√ **CommBn, FMF.** Recommended: three similar CommCos, each capable of supporting a field headquarters.

√ **Force Artillery.** Loses 155mm howitzers, keeps the third Heavy Artillery Rocket Btry (HARB) just added.

Will this exact organization actually be adopted? Probably not. Availability of Marines, equipment, and money will force some changes. Further troop tests will recommend others. Troop Tests have already stimulated new ideas, more will come. But at this stage these proposals provide solid basis for discussion of FMF many Marines will be seeing on their next tour. Also, for more Troop Tests Marines now in the FMF will be conducting this year and next.

Because these ideas are such important professional material, the GAZETTE will in future issues devote major attention to them. Beginning next month, a series of comparisons between proposed T/O and provisional and M-series T/O now in effect has been scheduled.

Members are invited to consider carefully impact of proposed new weapons and organization. They provide material for professional articles in future issues. More, articles based only on current organization and equipment will be of limited use.

Budget and development process requires that Marine Corps begin buying equipment for 1965 very soon. Amounts to be bought depend on T/O. T/O depends on ideas about how Marines will need to fight. To change any of these now costs little; to change them after the money is spent costs too much.

Remember: 1965 is just one tour away.

Promotion? See MarCorMan

"Promotion" tests for Capts, 1stLts next year will be administrative, not tactical, cover Marine Corps Manual, PRAM, and Supply Manual.

New MarCorMan, now being printed and distributed, will follow Navy-Marine Corps standard classification system in numbering both chapters and paragraphs. Thus, it will have Chapters 10 and 11, but not 8, 9. 12 or 13.

MCO 1520.7 outlines test program, sets up these zones for 1962:

Capts — Unrestricted/SDO w/ date of rank prior 2Jul58; Woman Marines w/date of rank prior 15 Jul59.

1stLts — Unrestricted/SDO w/ date of rank prior 15Dec59; LDO prior 1Feb59; Woman Marines w/rank prior 15Dec60.

Exempt: Retired officers on EAD, officers on promotion list or due to retire, revert or released from active duty prior 1Sep62.

Test dates: First Friday in Feb; alternate: third Friday in Mar.

Bulk of the new Manual is in Chapters 1—*Military Personnel* (37%). Next is Chapter 4—*Logistics* (11%). Shortest Chapter: Ch 6—*Medical and Dental* (3%).

Possible test question: To whom does this manual apply? Answer: It is "Binding on all persons in the Department of the Navy in matters concerning Marines and the Marine Corps." That's because it's approved by SecNav as a supplement to Navy Regs.

Manual is new, but preserves (Para 5060) the Birthday message originated by 13th CMC, MajGen J. A. Lejeune, in 1921. Also preserved: Gen Lejeune's views on leadership (Para 5390).

Hurry-Up Supplies

Need a pencil in a hurry? A carburetor? A trunnion bolt?

Getting supplies at MCAS, CherPt is a breeze. In April a fleet of trucks began making door-to-door deliveries of Navy Supply items direct from warehouse to customer. Two types of service are offered:

- SNAP Express (Supplies Now, All Places) makes routine deliveries throughout working day.
- PAL Express (Priority Air Logistics) delivers all AOCP (Aircraft Out of Commission, Lack of Parts) items direct to customer any time and anyplace.

Service will soon be extended to MCAF, New River.

Homes For Marines

Special Report

Heavy summer transfers often mean light housekeeping throughout fall and winter. Why? There just aren't enough houses to go around.

Housing budgets are too slim to build a roof over the head of every Marine—or sailor, soldier, airman, for that matter—probably always will be. But how big a gap is there between military housing assets and eligible tenants? Figures below tell the story.

Service	Housing Assets	Eligibles	Pct. Housed
Marine Air	6,305	15,278	41.3
Marine Ground	9,549	38,037	25.1
Army	135,305	263,100	51.5
Navy	89,682	279,963	32.0
Air Force	135,892	387,710	35.1
Totals	360,879	930,773	38.8

These figures show a house for about 1 in 3 eligibles, include government quarters home and abroad.

Naturally, as a Marine, you're more interested in housing at CamPen or CherPt than at Camp Dix (see chart).

Also, how planners go about getting houses for Marines. Right now new construction is possible only via Capehart Housing Program. Look for a change. For a base to qualify under any housing program a housing deficit must first exist. Here's formula for determining a housing deficit:

Gross need, i.e., number of Marines w/dependents, minus all housing assets.

There's another formula for figuring housing assets; Count:

- Public Quarters
- Wherry Housing
- Capehart Housing

} Base Housing

- Adequate civilian (private) housing costing about same as BAQ (Basic Allowance for Quarters).
- 20% of sub-standard civilian housing.
- 40% of adequate civilian housing remote from base or costing more than BAQ.

Let's figure housing deficit, if any, at CamLej, projected through FY '62 when 800 new Capeharts will be completed.

Right now there's a gross housing need for about 8,000 officers and SNCOs.

Base housing, including 800 authorized Capeharts, totals 3,015.

Adequate civilian housing in line with BAQ totals 2,534.

522 Marines are living in civilian housing considered substandard. 20% of this is 105.

1,929 Marines are living in civilian housing considered adequate but costing more than BAQ or are located more than 15 miles from base. 40% of this is 772.

Add these figures to get total housing assets, 6,426.

Difference between gross need and total housing assets is 1,574. This is housing deficit at CamLej.

Odds on getting adequate housing at CamLej: 80-20 in your favor. At CamPen these odds are reversed.

For aviation Marines, housing odds are better. Housing at air stations is programmed by BuWeps, mostly runs a considerable higher percentage of Marines for whom base housing is available.

Base	*Military Housing Units	Housing Units Approved/Building	**Private Housing	***Eligibles	Base Housing Percentage	Net Housing Deficit (Units)
CamLej	Off: 712	123	467	1811	.46	509
	Enl. 1503	677	2067	6302	.35	2055
CamPen	Off: 785	None	328	1388	.58	275
	Enl: 886		1726	4550	.19	1938
MCSQuant	Off: 597	280	199	1470	.59	394
	Enl: 523	170	126	1392	.50	573
PISC	Off: 218	None	15	201	100.08	0
	Enl: 372		319	732	.50	41
Albany	Off: 46	None	7	98	.47	45
	Enl: 225		61	545	.42	259
Barstow	Off: 83	None	29	116	.71	4
	Enl: 156		79	416	.37	181
29 Palms	Off: 199	20	9	293	.74	65
	Enl: 297	130	51	871	.49	393
CamSmith (Hawaii)	Off: 75	None	17	145	.51	53
	Enl: 102		17	245	.41	126
New River	Off: 110	None	59	283	.40	114
	Enl: 325		47	451	.77	79
CherPt	Off: 611	None	80	712	.85	21
	Enl: 1706		500	2193	.77	0
El Toro	Off: 229	None	142	814	.28	443
	Enl: 464		491	1627	.28	672
Beaufort	Off: 184	None	8	211	.86	41
	Enl: 687		43	597	100.00	0
Kaneohe	Off: 229	None	52	434	.52	153
	Enl: 532		215	1396	.38	649
Yuma	Off: 1	20	15	85	.23	49
	Enl: 0	60	200	306	.19	46

*Includes PubQtrs, Wherry rentals. **Rents approximate BAQ. ***Officer/SNCO w/dependents

Corps' mid-range attack plane, A2F Intruder is big, fast—and powerful. Here it's holding up seven and one half tons of TNT.

Tactical Firepower

One word critique on naval tactical air firepower show (NavTac) at Cam Lej: Superb. Opinion was unanimous among top Army, Navy, Marine observers; participating commanders.

Col S. S. Nicolay, G-3, 2dMAW, was NavTac coordinator; practically all of **MajGen R. K. Rottet's** 2dMAW was involved.

► Act one: SATS operation at New River by **Col E. J. Doyle's** MAG-14 went off without a hitch. **BGen L. F. Chapman's** ForTrps laid aluminum runway; A-4D, F8U (from **Col D. A. Bangert's** MAG-32) and F-4D made JATO takeoffs, MOREST landings. Grand finale: A short field landing by newest refueler/transport GV-1, flown in from El Toro's VMGR-353.

► **Col D. H. Stapp's** MAG-24 and **Maj Hal Vincent's** Det ALPHA from OPTEVFOR (Operational Test & Evaluation Force), Norfolk, provided the fireworks, came up with the kind of jet close air support **Capt J. M. Verdi** extols on page 32. Firepower, accuracy, precision of CAS missions were awesome. Some samples:

- A pair of A4D carrying three 19-shot rocket pods each attacked fortified MG position.
- Four A4D carrying 18 250-lb GP bombs each hit enemy OP.
- Bullpup performed heroically, gobbled up a heavy tank on first and only try.
- All-weather A4D2N carrying 18 250-lb bombs flew blind to enemy artillery battery position, had its load dropped by versatile TPQ-10, new radar directing central (GAZETTE: May '60) operated by Marines of **Col M. R. Yunck's** MAD, NAMTC, Pt Mugu, Calif.

Prime attraction: preview of future firepower, F4H carrying 22 MK-82 500-lb bombs. Pilot was **LtCol T. H. Miller,** BuWeps project officer for Phantom 2, announced mid-range fighter plane follow-on.

And like the ringmaster said: "You ain't seen nothin' yet." Already such devastating firepower in tactical aircraft has been topped. CAS planners have hung 30 MK-82 500-lb bombs on A2F-1, an attack counterpart of FH4 (see cut). This adds up to 15,000 lbs, same bomb load carried by B-47.

Shooting Fronts

Aiming at a bigger bullseye (12in vs 10in) Division Rifle Match shooters this year scored bigger right down the line. Top man among all shooters was **WO E. D. Duncan,** MCAS, El Toro, who dropped four points in two day's shooting (at 600 yards). His 596/600 won Western Division Individual Rifle Match, set a new high record for annual Competition-in-Arms shooting. Previous high was **Capt W. W. McMillan's** 589/600 set in 1959. Seven Western Division shooters beat that score this year. Other winners:

FAR EAST DIVISION

Individual Rifle
GySgt O. T. Napper
3dMarDiv 587

Individual Pistol
GySgt A. Froede, Jr.
1stMAW 559

Lloyd Trophy
Mixed Bns, 3dMarDiv 1160

Shively Trophy
Mixed Bns, 3dMarDiv 1045

WESTERN DIVISION

Individual Pistol
Capt B. P. Phillips 572
USNB, Coronado

Bear Trophy
Force Troops, 29 Palms 1166

Wharton Trophy
MCAF, Santa Ana 1140

Holcomb Trophy
1stMarDiv (Blue) 1114

PACIFIC DIVISION

Individual Rifle
GySgt B. L. Harshman 589

Individual Pistol
SSgt W. K. Jones 557

Smith Trophy (Team Rifle)
1/4, 1stMarBrig 1163

CG, FMFPac Trophy (Team Pistol)
SerBn, 1stMarBrig 1067

EASTERN DIVISION

Individual Rifle
SSgt D. S. Wagner
MCS, Quantico 586

Individual Pistol
Capt W. W. McMillan *583
MCS, Quantico

Elliott Trophy (Team Rifle)
MCS, Quantico *1178

Wirgman Trophy (Team Rifle)
MCAS, Beaufort *1141

Edson Trophy (Team Pistol)
MCS, Quantico *1098

*New Record

Stay in Shape

A summer flirtation with physical fitness—shaping up only long enough to make out with Physical Readiness Test—won't do. This is the word contained in revised MCO 6100.3B (Physical Fitness and Weight Control).

In a nutshell, CMC is saying "Stay in Shape," that the spirit of his conditioning program requires Marines to be able to pass test anytime, anywhere. Finding out if they can is COs' job—and Inspector General's.

IG already has taken a sample of physical fitness at many post and stations, (Permanent Personnel, all grades) Marines picked at random to take test during FY '61 military-type inspections. Here are some results:

Base	Tested	Passed	Failed	Pct. Failed
MCRD, San Diego	252	203	49	.19
MCB, CamPen	133	106	27	.20
MB, Long Beach	30	24	6	.20
MCS, Quantico	240	196	44	.18
MCB, CamLej	77	43	34	.44
MCRD, PISC	111	85	26	.23
MB, Norfolk	43	32	11	.25
MB, Yokosuka	19	13	6	.31
MB, Guam	46	38	8	.17

How does your outfit compare? (MB, Seal Beach, Calif. passed 100%; Capt D. L. Mahan's D/HqBn, MCS, Quantico passed 90%.) Figures though show more than 20 per cent non-FMF Marines failing one or more of the five test events. Any one event in particular? Matter of fact, yes.

Young Marines find rope climb troublesome; old Marines are put out by three-mile forced march. Surprisingly, some of each miss jump over eight-foot trench. IG testers believe there are two reasons why: trench is simulated, Marines aren't trying as hard as they would if trench were real and deep; are expending too much energy during first 135 yards of course.

One solution: take time to catch breath before starting run at trench. There's enough time for a 30-second rest. Most Marines are running Event #4 in two minutes. New time limit for entire 175-yard course is three minutes, cut from three and one half.

Other changes to MCO 6100.3B:

Rope Climb—Time limit to ascend is 30 seconds. No time limit coming down.

Evacuation—Assistance by casualty permitted.

Forces Afloat

Maj H. R. Kurth and his original SOLANT AMITY Marines, G/2/6 and detachment of HMR-262, are back at CamLej, New River after six-month cruise in African waters. On station relief was made 3May in Bathhurst, Gambia, by **LtCol R. M. Hall** with more HMR-262 helicopter Marines and F/2/2.

Last days of cruise were brimful, far reaching. After short visit Ghana, SOLANT AMITY force stopped Canary Islands, hosted Spanish Marines under **LtCol Manuel Conde,** 1958 SenSch grad. Next came Cadiz, Spain, a small scale amphibious landing, bullfights, then back to Africa for Independence Day celebration at Sierra Leone.

During cruise, Pathfinders made 102 jumps, helicopters flew 1000 hours; cruise covered 32,000 miles, 10 Equator crossings, made stops on four continents.

Homecoming for Seventh Fleet afloat battalion, **LtCol H. F. Painter's** 1/9 was held 18 May at CamPen. Battalion spent 13 months in Far East, split between Okinawa and aboard *Paul Revere* and *Monticello* in South China Sea. Transplacement Bn was 1/5 commanded by **LtCol J. D. Lines, Jr.**

Guessing Game

Viewers of "I've Got a Secret" 10 May learned that two MAG-26 helicopter pilots had a big hand in Project Mercury. They are **Lts W. E. Koons** and **G. F. Cox,** pilots who retrieved America's first astronaut after his short journey to inner space. Even more of a secret was the fact the Marines have been working closely with NASA for two years to develop a foolproof pickup technique.

Division Reunions

Annual reunions of Marine Division Associations promise to be usual rousing affairs, are slated for both coasts and Middle West. When and where, who to write for reservations:

1stMarDivAssoc

10-12 Aug, Benjamin Franklin Hotel, Phila., 17-19 Aug, Marine Memorial Club, San Francisco. Contact: **Capt E. C. Clarke,** Box 84, Alexandria, Va.

2dMarDivAssoc

21-23 Jul, Holiday Inn, Madison, Wisc., **H. V. Genge,** 4545 S. Christiana Ave., Chicago, Ill.

3dMarDivAssoc

20-23 Jul, Roosevelt Hotel, NYC; **Tom Stowe,** 3427 Valley Drive, Alexandria, Va.

4thMarDivAssoc

22-24 Jun, Waldorf Astoria (that's right, *The* Waldorf Astoria), NYC, **GySgt Ace Herwick,** SerBn, MCS, Quantico, Va.

5thMarDivAssoc

29Jun-2Jul, Pick-Congress Hotel, Chicago, Ill., **G. W. Nicol,** 5630 N. Sheridan Rd., Chicago, Ill.

Top Squads

Top squads of the Marine Corps will once again fight it out for the Marine Corps Association trophy 18-23 Sept at Quantico. Winners of the 4th Annual Combat Marksmanship Competition will receive awards at the 8th and Eye evening parade on 22 Sept. Each infantry regiment will send one 13-man squad, no alternates.

Competition was held by divisions last year to save travel funds. Commanders made strong recommendations to renew the only Corps-wide competition that honors the combat Marine. More emphasis expected this year on correct actions, although hits on targets will still count high.

Marines at Work

Gen D. M. Shoup, CMC, making working inspections of Midwest, West Coast commands, told MCROA members in Seattle that the Corps "is ready to take any damned island the government wants taken."

So they are. Sample:

SPECIAL TO GAZETTE—**LtCol D. L. Faw's** 2/2 made night landing on Vieques Island (Puerto Rico), thrust inland, by dawn controlled critical terrain. Emphasis was on small unit control, anti-guerrilla operations. **Capt J. W. Davis** led guerrilla forces. **Maj J. F. Conroy,** S-3, considered primary value of exercise was improving tactical control, fire support coordination.

Ed: For more island-taking Marines see special reports, page 72.

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Professional Magazine for United States Marines

Published by the Marine Corps Association in order to provide a forum for the expression of matters which will advance knowledge, interest and esprit in the Marine Corps.

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Free *Writers Guide* on request.

POSTMASTER: **Forward to U.S. servicemen when address changed by military orders (except to FPO) per section 157.4 Postal Manual. Send Form 3579 to Marine Corps Gazette, PO Box 1844, Quantico, Va.**

CHANGE OF ADDRESS: **must be received by 10th of month before publication. A complete military or home address is required. Duplicate copies cannot be sent.**



This is one weapon we're trying to help you do without

Gunning for the grease gun is a full-time activity at Sikorsky. Just a few months ago, for example, if you looked at the rotor head of the S-61L, you would have found many grease fittings, all requiring daily lubrication. Lubrication is time-consuming, as you know. And grease fittings can be easily overlooked.

Today, half these grease fittings have disappeared. Soon, they will all be gone. In their place will be oil-sealed or Teflon bearings, tested during an extensive Sikorsky program that began in 1958. The military aircraft of this Sikorsky twin-turbine family will shortly reap the benefits of this campaign, too.

At Sikorsky, we're as much occupied with adding to the usefulness and effectiveness of our present aircraft as we are with creating the VTOL flight systems of tomorrow.

SIKORSKY AIRCRAFT
STRATFORD, CONNECTICUT • DIVISION OF
United Aircraft Corporation

MESSAGE CENTER

For letters of professional interest. Length: up to 250 words. Rates: up to $25.

Marksmanship For Pilots

► Fitness reports in the case of Capt/Lt now carry a notation as to marksmanship proficiency of the officer concerned (MCO 1611.3B).

Why not go a step further and make another notation on the report in the cases of naval aviators, a statement as to aircraft weapons proficiency of each naval aviator Capt/Lt assigned to a tactical aviation outfit? Maybe even stretch that to field grade officers in these squadrons.

Every fighter and attack pilot in tactical squadrons and in support squadrons of the Marine Aircraft Groups has an annual aviation munitions allowance. He uses this to accomplish his training. And he uses it to determine his individual and squadron combat effectiveness through the medium of the Operational Readiness Inspection (ORI).

When the aviator straps the iron bird on his rear end, and he turns on the master armament switch, he's armed with another basic weapon. When he makes hits with his guns, rockets, bombs or missiles he's also showing proficiency with his basic weapon to insure the combat effectiveness of the air-ground team.

In the same vein—selection boards for officer promotions do not have the flight records of naval aviators at hand during their deliberations. That flight record should go into the board room for each aviator, just as do the fitness reports and health records.

Col Fred J. Frazer
G-3 MCAS, CherPt, N. C.

Realistic Maneuvers

► The Commandant's request for a "do-it-yourself battlefield" is a step in the right direction.

An Air Force sergeant related to me how his unit requested the British Home Guard (comparable to the U. S. National Guard) to attack his Air Force Base. This they did, by hiding within fire fighting equipment, and believe it or not, the Home Guard were passed through the gates with the blessings of the Air Police on duty. A bit unorthodox, but what war isn't?

I suggest Marine Corps Schools, Quantico attack Fort Belvoir, Virginia, and vice versa, during a given quarter. Only the aggressor would know when, where and how the attack would come. Not only would infantry units participate but also the cooks and bakers, supply, clerical, motor transport, etc. "Marine first—specialist second."

The experience gained from such an exercise would far outweigh any inconvenience caused.

SSgt F. E. Ulrich
MARTC
Norfolk 11, Va.

Back to the Old Blackboard

► Attached is copy of message from COMSOLANT (RAdm Allan L. Reed) to *USS Duxbury Bay* chiding that ship on an error in its current history. Copy of reply also included. Perhaps GAZETTE has a jingle to explain what *New Yorker* might call the "neatest trick of the week."

Maj H. R. Kurth
Commander, Landing Force
Operation SOLANT AMITY

COMSOLANT TO DUXBURY BAY:
YOU'VE TRAVELED FAR AND WIDE, IT'S CLEAR
AND PLACES BLUR THROUGHOUT THE YEAR;
BUT LEST YOU BE THOUGHT QUITE A DOPE,
SUGGEST CAPE HORN BECOME GOOD HOPE.

USS DUXBURY BAY TO COMSOLANT:
AROUND CAPE HORN WILL SAIL THE DOPE,
WHO COPIED THE CORN THAT SAID CAPE HORN.*

Ed.: A proofreader addicted to naps
Was afraid of security wraps
Since this tour of good will
Was just told *Jack and Jill***
He didn't dare look at his maps

*MCA Newsletter: Mar '61
**MCA Newsletter: Jan '61

How's That Again

► Re Col Prickett's *Quien Sabe* in March GAZETTE I pose a new question; *Para donde vamos ahora?* Note these various references on subject:

Navy Regulations—". . . remain at the salute until the last note of the anthem."

Landing Party Manual, Marine Corps Drill Manual—"The salute and present arms terminate with the sounding of *Carry On.*"

Guidebook for Marines—"Hold the salute until the last note of music is sounded."

Bluejackets' Manual—". . . and render the appropriate salute until *Carry On* is sounded.

Marine Officer's Guide—"Hand salutes . . . terminate on the last note of music, after which *Carry On* is sounded."

To further confuse matters, in *Manual for Field Musics*, bugle calls, such as *Carry On* are considered to be music!

1stLt W. H. Barnard
1st HARB
29 Palms, Calif.

Ed: *Landing Party Manual* (Revised, 1960) says, "During Morning Colors and Evening Colors, salutes [by individuals] are rendered in accordance with chapter 21, U. S. Navy Regulations." *Amen.*

Mine Clearing

► Has anyone ever thought of using helicopters to clear mine fields? This may possibly be done by attaching strong steel matting to a cable and dragging it through areas to be cleared.

GySgt William Hodapp
673 S. 38th St.
Louisville, Ky.

OS (Old Salt) vs NM (New Marine)

► Old salts may be familiar with your military abbreviations but for new Marines like myself abbreviations cut comprehension. I suggest that abbreviated terms be spelled out the first time used in a particular article.

PFC (Private First Class) H. (Horace) Alston, Jr. (Junior)
MAG (Marine Aircraft Group) 16 (Sixteen)
1stMAW (First Marine Aircraft Wing)
AirFMFPac (Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific)
FPO (Fleet Post Office) San Francisco

Read Up, Keep Up

► A special pat on the back for your inside cover (Apr '61) on "Keeping Up With Your Changing Corps." Your past issues have beat the FMs (Field Manuals) by weeks and months. We in the field can keep up by reading up in GAZETTE.

Sgt E. D. Grantham
MCRS, Birmingham, Ala.

Little S-2 That Could

► As a Marine's wife I've often enjoyed less technical articles in GAZETTE. However, two articles in March issue I found insulting to the intelligence of anyone who might read them.

First was *Mr. Gish, You're the New S-2;* a more imaginative title would have been "The Little S-2 That Could." Article reads like a report in a children's magazine: a few mild instructions—just enough to interest a not too intelligent child without confusing him. It leaves one with the heartwarming picture of the happy little S-2 knowing that whenever the going gets tough "Dad will be there with a reassuring pat on the shoulder."

Second, *Base Plate McGurk.* It's not Base Plate at all, but return of *Salty Skipper* which failed the first time. Not only have you insulted your readers by trying to fool them, but also by absolute lack of substance in the article.

Elizabeth C. Albans
Rte 3, Box 80A
Jacksonville, N. C.

Ed: Difference of opinion makes a horse race. Our March survey showed this: "Mr. Gish" was among the nine articles voted "best" by readers; also among the eight voted "worst." (We printed only 10.) Better than half our readers said they usually or always read "Base Plate." The author wrote all the old Base Plates and did NOT write "Salty Skipper." *He'd* be insulted but has to rush to a meeting of Ale and Quail Club. New Subject: Should the ladies (Bless 'em) be allowed at the *Gazette* before husbands have finished?

(Continued on page 10)

Question of the Month

On P. 32 in this issue *(The Case for Jet CAS)*, Capt J. M. Verdi says today's jet attack aircraft have got it all over prop-driven types like AD and F4U. There's another side to the picture. Some say modern jets are too fast, too complex for effective close support of ground forces. What do you think? What type attack aircraft (prop, jet, or what-have-you) is best for CAS in today's Marine Corps? We'll pay $25 for best answer received by 1Aug61.

"WEATHER EYE" IN SPACE



RCA-NASA Development of TIROS Advances Progress in Worldwide Weather Forecasting

From its vantage point in space, TIROS is sending down to earth new, more definite pictures and data of the world's everchanging weather patterns to aid man in his ageless efforts to control the elements.

Incorporating revolutionary and advanced electronic equipment, TIROS was designed, developed and built by RCA's Astro-Electronics Division for National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Within its small circumference are miniature TV cameras, tape recorders, TV transmitters, command receivers, timing mechanisms, beacons and telemetry equipment. In addition, it carries new scanning and non-scanning Infra-red Sensing Devices, developed by NASA, to measure and record the heat radiation of the earth and its cloud cover, and a revolutionary new Magnetic Orientation Device to capitalize on the effects of the earth's magnetic field and maintain favorable orientation of the satellite for long periods.

RCA developments in miniaturization, reliability, computing and overall electronic activities are contributing to many of the nation's leading space and missile projects. For information describing new RCA scientific developments, write Dept. 434, Defense Electronic Products, Radio Corporation of America, Camden, N. J.

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The Most Trusted Name
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(Continued from page 8)

A Hunting We Will Go

► Although I actually do not disagree with Col J. A. Donovan in his stand to remove the emblem from the utility uniform (MESSAGE CENTER, Feb '61), I do wish to toss in my sentimental, nostalgic two cents worth concerning the statement: "Marines with pride in their appearance are usually unhappy when they see civilians or indigenous personnel wearing discarded Marine uniforms, WITH THE EMBLEM RECOGNIZABLE."

I am sure many Marines who have served with the 3d Division remember Blackie the Photographer's famous photo of "Papa San," clad in utilities with a caption that read something like: "The only clothing he had was what the American forces gave him." The eye immediately spotted a rather faded and what some would call shameful Marine Corps emblem. I saw it with pride.

On the other hand, when certain civilians wear the old or discarded uniform I must admit I have qualms about their appearance. However, I recall one small cousin of mine who refuses to go hunting without his faded salty Marine utilities. His father's old uniforms will not do. Why? My cousin's utilities (formerly mine) have the Marine Corps emblem on them—and that makes a world of difference to him . . . and me.

1stLt C. P. Roberts

MCLFDC
MCS, Quantico, Va.

Guerrilla Knowhow

► With President Kennedy's statement on conventional warfare, and more specifically on counter-guerrilla operations, articles like Maj Bruce Meyers' *Malaya Jungle Patrols* (GAZETTE: Oct '60) take on more significance.

The need to fight guerrillas on their own terrain, at a time of their choosing, fighting their style is the only way to suppress terrorist operations.

USMC began developing counter-guerrilla operations in 1912, used them through the 20's in Haiti, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic. Now is the time to re-energize our Corps through special schools, training, and application of anti-guerrilla warfare tactics; to again demonstrate Marine versatility and flexibility in becoming America's counter-guerrilla experts.

Capt A. E. Anderson

MOQ 3229
CamLej, N. C.

Information, Please

► Marine Attack Squadron-242, recently re-commissioned, is in request of any information on the Squadron (formerly VMTB-242) to aid in compiling and keeping an up to date squadron history.

Since written history of the squadron is scanty, any information from former members would be greatly appreciated.

Of special interest would be pictures, squadron patches, names of former Commanding Officers and members of the squadron, engagements, etc.

All pictures, patches, etc., will be gladly returned, after copies are made.

Please send all information to: 1stLt L. C. Pritchett 069913/7331 USMC, VMA-242, MAG-14, 2dMAW, FMFLant, MCAS, Cherry Point, N. C.

1stLt L. C. Pritchett

MCAS, CherPt, N. C.

Question of the Month Answered

GAZETTE, Mar '61 asked, "How, in 1961, can the GAZETTE get (and deserve) more support?" We say thanks to more contributors than we had space to print.

► In preparing training material on anti-guerrilla and jungle warfare for 1/9 our S-3 section relied on a particularly good book, *The Marauders* by Charlton Ogburn Jr.

While reading the book vagrant thoughts crossed my mind: "Why haven't I read this before" and "Wouldn't this be an excellent addition to a professional library."

Our Bn S-3 section has a good cross-section of rank and experience which often is of assistance in judging worth of any one course of action.

In a discussion of buying books and building up a professional library, it was soon apparent that although we all made pious avowals of interest in having a professional library, we were all seized with gross inertia when it came to getting off the dime and buying a book. Cause of intertia: lack of some stimulus greater than simply presenting certain books for sale via GAZETTE Bookshop in each monthly issue.

Why not launch (with tremendous fanfare) a Professional Book of the Month Club? Implications are obvious:

- Such a club creates stimulus. Once a month the member has to make a choice, "either" or "or" and not "if."
- Marines of all ranks will join willingly.
- Professional knowledge will certainly be increased.
- GAZETTE makes money, books become cheaper for members.

Members of this command have been sounded out and are practically standing in line to join. Please reserve membership cards #1 through #10 for:

Maj F. S. Knight, Capt R. E. Miller, MSgt M. P. Wonson, Cpl D. E. Kraus, Cpl F. M. Hambleton, Capt E. H. Toms, Capt R. J. Hinchcliff, SSgt S. G. Taylor, Cpl J. R. Leonard and Cpl B. L. Tucker.

Maj F. S. Knightt

Hq, 1/9, 3dMarDiv
FPO, San Francisco

Ed: Maj Knight's hard-charging S-3 shop wins the $25.00 this month.

We run the book shop as a service to members, make almost no profit. A Professional Book of the Month Club could work only if several hundred of you members would be willing to buy the same book. Then we could offer a bigger discount.

We're going to study this one carefully. We'll receive new circulation machines soon, which may make such an offer possible. If so, we'll announce it in a few months. Meanwhile, we'd appreciate hearing from members who'd like to have such a service to add two to four standard professional books to their libraries each year. We'd also appreciate nominations on books which might be offered.

► First you need desire on the part of the Marine to buy the GAZETTE.

To create desire the Marine must know how he will benefit, what his money will be used for.

Publicity in base newspapers should not be overlooked. Getting out the word is a must in realizing full success in any kind of a drive.

Each member as well as MCA representative should be sent a pamphlet on history of Marine Corps Association and benefits derived from being a member.

SSgt N. M. Radel

H&S Co, Camp Butler
FPO, San Francisco

Ed: We've adopted all these suggestions. However, official Marine Corps publications are limited in what they can do to plug our Association. But we are placing *takusan* pamphlets in the hands of both members and non-members. What's the money used for? A better GAZETTE, that's all. And when you talk to that friend be sure to explain that the money comes from our Association, not Uncle Sam.

► We have "Toastmasters," "Sojourners," and the like, so why not local chapters of MCA? Eventually it might produce articles or ideas for them as a result of discussions at the meetings.

Capt P. E. Wilson

1stHARB, 1stFAG
MCB 29 Palms, Calif.

Ed: The Board of Governors discussed local chapters last year, decided against them.

► I'm prompted to write this letter not by the incentive offered by GAZETTE but by the sincere concern shown by the staff of the GAZETTE to improve this magazine.

Target for further subscriptions should be SNCOs. However, they should not be enrolled by officers, but by SNCOs who are already members of the Association. (Same should apply to officers.)

First suggestion: Send each SNCO member, a personal letter with his next issue. The objective of enrolling SNCOs would be explained, and several enrollment forms furnished. An incentive could be offered. Example: for three new subscriptions, one laminated Marine Corps print; for five new subscriptions, a Marine Corps GAZETTE binder.

Second suggestion: Introductory offer. Once the SNCO sees that the GAZETTE is different, and is a better magazine, he wil enroll voluntarily.

GySgt G. G. Pendas, Jr.

NCO Leadership School
2dMarDiv, CamLej, N. C.

Ed: We'd like to have more SNCOs belong and contribute to our pages. We cannot offer incentives, as that might lead to undue pressure. However, see inside front cover for an extraordinary introductory offer. And we'll send a sample copy, with your compliments, to anyone you think might be interested.

► Slant a larger portion of the fine trade publication towards SNCOs. We're professionals too, as interested as any commissioned officer in a better Corps and a better way of airing our views.

GySgt B. D. Dryden

Officer Selection Office
110 Union St, Seattle 1, Wash.

Ed: We now have 2,000 SNCO members, of whom 67 expressed opinions in the 1960 *Gazette*. The latchstring is out for SNCOs, as it has been since 1916.



BOEING-VERTOL 107...

THE WORLD'S ONLY "MISSION MODULE" HELICOPTER

SIGNIFICANT FACTS ABOUT THE 107's WATER CAPABILITY

In the 107 helicopter, water landing capability has been achieved without special flotation equipment or the weight or drag penalties of floats or boat hull. Thus over-water operation can be carried out in full confidence that, should it be necessary, water landings and take offs can be made safely. The helicopter's fuselage possesses good water-taxiing characteristics. Flotation is assured by a factory-sealed fuselage of unique, flexible design; and a remarkable degree of lateral stability is provided by extended stubs on either side of the fuselage that house landing-gear support structure and fuel tanks. Elevated mounting of the rear rotor permits descent and landing in a nose-up flared attitude of as much as 30 degrees with no change in fuselage attitude required before touchdown. This is important in water landings at night, in low visibility or on glassy seas.

The "mission module" versatility of the Boeing-Vertol 107 means a high potential of all-around usefulness in operations. For example, pre-packaged, "plug-in" modules for anti-submarine warfare, minesweeping and rescue missions can be installed internally in a matter of minutes between flights. In addition, the same aircraft can tow, lift or carry heavy or bulky loads externally. Cargo of more than two tons can be speedily loaded or unloaded in the fuselage via the full-width rear ramp.

Along with its water landing capability and "mission module" versatility, the 107 offers the reliability of twin-turbine power. All in all, it is one of the most tactically and logistically useful aircraft available to the Armed Forces.



VERTOL DIVISION
MORTON PENNSYLVANIA
BOEING

Extension School CHALLENGE

BASIC

1 When armored amphibians are used to support the initial landing, they normally are scheduled to land:

a. With the first troop wave.

b. With each scheduled wave to provide supporting fires.

c. With the battalion reserve company.

d. Just prior to the landing of the first troop wave.

2 You are embarked aboard an assault transport. A general quarters drill is conducted. As a Marine, you will

a. Continue your normal activities, since you are not affected by the drill.

b. Be assigned specific duties by the troop officer of the day.

c. Move to and remain in your berthing compartment, keeping ladders and passageways clear.

d. Don a life jacket and move to your abandon ship station.

3 In angular measurement, which of the following is the correct relationship between degrees and mils?

a. 40 mils = 2 degrees 15 minutes.

b. 40 mils = 2 degrees 25 minutes.

c. 40 degrees = 2.25 mils.

d. 40 degrees = 225 mils.

JUNIOR

4 During the early phases of an amphibious assault, provisions are made for the request of small numbers of helicopters for on-call missions. Over which radio net would a helicopterborne assault unit make this request under *normal* circumstances?

a. Unit tactical or command net to their tac-log representative aboard ship.

b. TAR net directly to the TACC afloat.

c. HST logistic net to their tac-log representative aboard the LPH.

d. Helicopter request net directly to the Navy air controller in the HDC.

5 Because of increased unit separation, the artillery regiment requires radio relay equipment. The only radio relay link installed, operated, and maintained by personnel of this regiment links the:

a. Division secondary/artillery regiment CP to division main CP.

b. Division main CP to service battalion main CP.

c. Division secondary/artillery regiment CP to intermediate support artillery battalion CP.

d. Intermediate support artillery battalion CP to supported close support artillery battalion CP.

SENIOR

6 Compared to the Marine division, the Marine aircraft wing has an organic logistic support capability which is (Select those applicable.)

a. More dependent on augmentation by supply, transportation, and engineer types.

b. Centralized in one major logistic agency rather than being functionally decentralized into several units.

c. More closely tailored to fulfill all requirements under all conditions.

d. Less dependent on existing facilities in the objective area.

WHAT IS IT?



(Answers on page 16)

★ ★ ★ ★



A Marine captain summed up his opinion of the Officers Junior Extension Course:

"A great amount of material excellently condensed."

For easy to understand instruction,

enroll NOW!

THE MARINE...THE MISSION...AND TPS-34

When minutes count, the call is traditionally for the Marines. And no matter in what atmosphere Marine combat units operate, they will soon be able to count on a new, versatile weapon—the TPS-34 ground controlled intercept radar.

Developed for the Marine Corps by Sperry, TPS-34 can be strategically transported in the thick of action by helicopter, cargo plane, truck or amphibious craft. A small crew can have it operating in less than eight hours . . . detecting both close-in and distant supersonic aircraft with but a single operator. Radar console and rotating antenna are housed in an inflatable radome, with the interceptor control shelter located nearby. The radar performs reliably even in the presence of hostile environments.

SPERRY

SURFACE ARMAMENT DIVISION, *SPERRY GYROSCOPE COMPANY • DIVISION OF SPERRY RAND CORPORATION, GREAT NECK, N.Y.*

PROFESSIONAL SCRAPBOOK

This department aims to present briefly ideas of wide or lasting use. We want: professional tips, quotes, reprints, digests of articles from professional journals, translations—all of interest to Marines. We'll pay for your help in finding old, new or original material of professional value.

Problem: Trafficability

By Carl H. Strandberg

Assume you are the S-2 of a battalion scheduled to attack an objective on the other side of a wide river valley. The general climate in the region resembles Virginia.

The area is partially marshy, partially forested, and brush covered. Several small streams flow through the area. Some of the area is cultivated.

Your maps are old, and previous unfortunate experience has convinced you they are unreliable.

In addition to your maps, you have recent relatively small scale aerial photography, a stereoscope, and a tube magnifier for measuring small features. You determine the scale of the photography roughly, by the focal length-flight altitude method (divide the focal length in feet into the flying height in feet. The result is the scale factor.) You find that the scale is 1/20,000. Much too small for most of your requirements, but usable for trafficability studies—with care.

You decide that four principal factors govern your selection: thickness of forest cover, steepness of slopes, locations of walls, ditches, rivers, and so forth, and nature of the soil. This last factor includes nature of the ground both before and after rains.

But how do you identify these conditions?

Density of forest cover is sometimes a problem, depending upon the season. Foliage may obscure the ground in the summer season. But for other purposes foliage may aid you, by facilitating identification of different kinds of trees.

If trunks of individual trees can be seen, randomly selecting distances between their bases, measuring them, and averaging the distance, can give you a potentially usable figure for estimating troop and vehicle movement difficulty.

Steepness of slope is sometimes difficult to determine also. Both percent of grade and angle of slope can be calculated precisely, by measuring horizontal distance, and calculating vertical distance, photogrametrically. But this is more a task for a trained photo interpreter, if one is available. If none is available, reliance should be placed on the map.

Ditches, walls, gullies, and similar features impeding overland movement should be annotated on the photographs by outlining them in ink or grease pencil.

The nature of the soil is indicated both by the type of vegetation, and by the shape of the gullies. Basically, this is a matter of determining the "internal"

Terrain analysis—key to decision

drainage of the soil. Sandy soils are usually more trafficable than clay soils.

A proven method of determining soil conditions is to delineate each area and determine its nature. To do this, draw lines around areas of different tone—general areas showing differences in vegetation and soil moisture content—with a grease pencil or drawing ink. Then study each area carefully, and identify the different types of vegetation and other features present in it.

Rocky outcrops are quite easily identified. These are usually irregular bare areas, easily recognized.

Alluvial fans are also usually quite easy to identify. These are the pie-piece shaped areas at the foot of draws, gullies, and streams where running water has deposited mud and gravel washed from hillsides. Trafficability across them depends on the kind of soil comprising the hills, although as a general rule they are quite sandy, affording good trafficability.

Swamps and marshy areas, of course, are quite easy to identify. They frequently have irregular patches of open water visible in them. Small, dark patches of brush along streams and the margins of marshy areas are usually alders, which indicate mucky soil.

Ridges forested with pine or mixed forest that is predominently pine usually indicate that the ridges are comprised of sandy soil. The amount of pine on them, understandably, is usually more easily determined in winter than in summer.

There are several excellent references available to help in making specific identifications. Called "Key," these texts are published to aid intelligence personnel in specific identifications.

A tried and true technique for identifying type of soil is "gully analysis." "U" shaped gullies indicate clay type soils; "V" shaped gullies indicate sand and gravel. Most gullies fall somewhere between these two, and only practice will enable positive identification.

After you, as the S-2, have marked off and identified specific areas on the photographs, transfer the data to your map.

Sounds easy, doesn't it? With practice, it is.

There is no short cut to competence in this field, however. Actually doing the job, and checking your work is required.

10303 Haywood Drive
Silver Spring, Md

Rig It Right

By Majs T. H. Galbraith and R. N. Good

REMEMBER THE LAST TIME YOU PERFORMED SOME first echelon maintenance on your sword? If you did a thorough job, one of your final tasks was to re-attach the knot to the sword. We're sure you had no trouble at all—your knot came out just the way paragraph 49063, MCM, said it should: a neat double half-hitch around the crossguard of the hilt. Or did it? If, instead, it looked more akin to a can of hungry worms, read on. We may be able to help.

Step number one in the assembly of the knot is, of course, to reeve its small end through the eye of the "pommel," slip it back through the two keepers, and hook it to the small metal eye adjacent to the large end. Draw one keeper tight against the pommel, the other over the hook and eye, and you're ready to tie the knot.

Now loop the large end of the knot under the cross guard of the hilt and tie a hitch as shown in *Figure 1*. Discerning eyes will notice that the knot shown is a clove hitch rather than the specified double half-hitch, but the fact is that a double half-hitch won't hold the knot tight to the crossguard whereas a clove hitch will. When the hitch is tied, draw it taut and, at the same time, work the knot in such a way that the large end doesn't hang below the upper ring mounting on the scabbard. Depending on the overall length of your particular knot, the portion of it from the eye of the pommel to the crossguard will possess some degree of looseness. This is proper; the determining factor is the length of the knot hanging free below the crossguard. If it hangs down farther than it should, you'll find yourself being clouted in the eye every time you present sword.

Fine, you may say, but what about the mourning knot? How do I go about bending it onto the sword next time the IG has me fall out in funeral dress? No trouble at all. Just secure it to the leather sword knot between the pommel and crossguard by (1) doubling the mourning knot in two, (2) passing its two free ends together around the sword knot and through the middle bend, and (3) drawing it taut. *Figure 1* (*4*) shows how it should look.

Attaching the knot may be the most disconcerting part of rigging the sword, but the nomenclature of the various accessories is also a source of confusion to hands both young and old. (*See Figure 2.*) What with two slings and a frog to contend with, perhaps this perplexity should be expected. It's this way. The sword and scabbard are suspended from the *sword sling* regardless of whether your outside garment is a coat or shirt. If you're wearing a coat, the sword sling is attached to the *shoulder sling;* if you're without coat, the sword sling is attached to the *frog* on your belt. The frog and shoulder sling, then, serve the single purpose of providing a D-ring to which you attach the sword sling.

The only problem remaining is how to attach the scabbard to the sword sling properly. One easy way to do it is depicted in *Figure 2*. With the sword sling on and its straps hanging free, simply attach the sling strap snaps to the scabbard rings. Holding the scabbard by its upper ring, give the scabbard a half twist toward the body (clockwise) and hang the upper ring on the sword sling hook.

Now you have it rigged right. Jack up your Zorro quotient with a fast perusal of Chapter 2, Section III, Paragraph 2-18, LPM, and you'll be ready to face either drill field or formal ceremony with confidence. USMC

Junior School
MCS Quantico



FIGURE - 1



FIGURE 2

THE SCHOOL SOLUTION

(Answers to questions on page 12)

Note: References designated as TIP (Tentative Instructional Precis), SM (Supplementary Material), and MCS (Marine Corps Schools Publication) are manuals written by the staff of Marine Corps Educational Center as texts for MCEC schools.

BASIC

1 d. Reference: LFM-6, "The Battalion Landing Team," paragraph 211b. The timing is designed to obtain the best effect of the shock and firepower of the armored amphibians and to provide the infantry with protection during the initial assault. Placing armored amphibians in a wave ahead of the first troop waves allows them to place direct fire on the landing beaches during the critical time period in which troop waves are proceeding from the line of departure to the beach.

2 c. Reference: LFM-18, "Troop Life and Training Aboard Ship", paragraph 414d. With the exception of special details, such as the guard and antiaircraft watches, troops must move to and remain in berthing compartments during general quarters, keeping passageways and ladders clear for personnel engaged in the drill.

3 a. Reference: FM 21-26, Appendix V. 1 degree equals 17.8 mils, or 40 mils equal 2 degrees 15 minutes.

JUNIOR

4 c. Reference: TIP (EC)2 (1961), App. B., 2b. Requests for on-call missions during the helicopterborne assault phase are usually entered at the helicopter support team, transmitted over the HST logistic net to the tac-log representative on LPH, then to the HDC over the helicopter administrative request net or by messenger if the HDC is on the same ship. The HDC in turn approves the request dependent upon the tactical situation and the availability of helicopters. Stations on the HST logistic net include all HSTs, all tac-log groups of the helicopter landed units, the division shore party commander, and the tac-log group of the senior unit making the landing. The approval of an on-call helicopter mission is not a close air support decision; therefore, only under unusual circumstances would the TAR net be used since its primary function is to provide operational communications for close air support requests. The methods described in choices b and d have been used in Atlantic and Pacific fleet exercises; however, they are not approved as doctrine by the Marine Corps Schools.

5 c. Reference: TIP (CO)2. 49a, 57a. Normally a radio relay link using AN/TRC-27 or AN/MRC-59 equipment is installed between the artillery regiment and the intermediate support artillery battalion. This link also serves any attached artillery units operating under the control of the intermediate support artillery battalion. The division communications company provides an 8-channel radio relay link between the division CP and the division secondary/artillery regiment CP.

SENIOR

6 a, b. Reference: TIP (LOG)2, 5. The logistic support capability of the Marine aircraft wing is centralized in the Marine wing service group. Possessing little motor transportation and only a small engineering capability, the service group is dependent on augmentation to handle the large quantities of supplies it requires and to build or repair air base facilities. To be displaced ashore, the wing must depend on existing air base facilities or have them constructed by other units of the landing force.

WHAT IT IS

This is a formidable strong point, under construction, which contains air warning and fire control electronic equipment.

Barbwire entanglements are located at A and B. A warning fence is at C, and a mine field can be distinguished at D. A buried cable trench, marked E, is readily identifiable.

With proper camouflage, items noted in this aerial photograph would not have been as obvious.

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"Air born" of experience in brushfire war...

The A2F-1 Intruder

◀ *Illustration shows artist's conception of Grumman F9F Panther operating in Korea.*



▼ *A2F-1 Intruder with total of thirty 500-pound bombs in clusters of three from wing stations.*

This is the Grumman A2F-1 Intruder attack aircraft—an airborne weapons system developed for the basic purpose of fighting a limited or brushfire war. It was based upon limited war combat experience gained in Korea.

The A2F-1 Intruder "sees" in total darkness, "sees" through foul weather, to search . . . detect . . . track . . . and kill . . . a pinpointed target. Safeguarding our freedom cannot wait for clear weather or daylight. In fact, the crew of the A2F-1 can destroy this pinpointed target in any weather or darkness without ever having to see it.

Operated as an air-to-ground, missile-carrying aircraft, or equipped to carry conventional weapons of all types as well as nuclear weapons, the A2F-1 Intruder provides the U.S. Navy with an all-weather attack aircraft with extended range and heavy weapon capacity. In nuclear attack, the aircraft can come in low under enemy radar . . . too low for effective interference by enemy aircraft and ground fire.

The Intruder provides a new capability in close support missions—provides the nation with a powerful deterrent to prevent war and preserve peace.

GRUMMAN

AIRCRAFT ENGINEERING CORPORATION

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ADMINISTRATIVE TIME

Being a few words by the editors about the magazine you write

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WORDS & PICTURES

• Our cover . . .

. . . is dedicated to the memory of 1stLt Harold J. Oehl, killed flying a MABS-14 A4D. Lt Oehl was the youngest of five brothers, all Marines. Artist is Capt Mike Leahy, USMCR. Formerly with HMX-1, Mike is now studying commercial art in Philly, but remembers the HR2S-1 cockpit from 225 hours behind the stick.

• Frustrating . . .

. . . that's what it is. This issue salutes the 1stMarDiv-3dMAW team. But Mike had such a good point in wanting to dedicate his first published cover to Lt Oehl, we couldn't resist. Now the reason that Cherry Point-based HMR-461 is shown is a lulu—Mike used HMR-462 on the September 3dMarDiv-1stMAW cover! It's already engraved, so if poison-pen messages are being hatched in Laguna and Iwakuni, we'll give you the artist's address.

• Frustration . . .

. . . doesn't come only from artists. We were excited when we got Major Peterson's translation of the notorious Che Guevara Guerrilla Manual (p. 36). But our good friends at Army had the idea first, beat us into print. It's still important, we think.

WRITER'S CORNER

• Speaking of frustration . . .

. . . a while back we coaxed a special article out of a professional writer. Then we made him rewrite it. Thought it was great, but it got disapproved along the line and—guess who?—Army grabbed it. Actually, we were glad the author got his money. For real frustration, a Marine used our Writer's Guide, conferred with us for some time, and came in with a gem of an article. We were about to publish it when—oops—he blandly told us he'd sold it to Naval Institute Proceedings.

• Consternation . . .

. . . set in. After all, it isn't ethical to offer material to two magazines at once. But the snapper was when Irate Reader wrote in to inform us that he thought that piece in the Proceedings was better than anything we had in that month's issue! Anyone want to go halves in a putty knife factory?

• Writer Incentive Awards for March

$100 monthly prize and eligible for $500 annual prize: Tie (Split Prizes) Characteristics of Leaders by Col W. E. Barnes and This is BuWeps by LtCol Mark Jones.

Nominated for annual $100 prize: Mr. Gish, You're the New S-2 by Maj W. J. Davis

The President:



On the "Deeper" Struggle

Para-military operations and guerrilla warfare are the hottest military subjects these days since the "A" and "H" bombs. In this issue you'll find two timely articles dealing with the problem: *Sticks, Stones, and Atoms* (p. 20) and *La Guerra de Guerrillas* (p. 32). And here, in the President's own words, is the national philosophy behind it all.

IT IS CLEARER THAN EVER THAT WE FACE A RELENTLESS struggle in every corner of the globe that goes far beyond the clash or armies or even nuclear armaments.

The armies are there, and in large numbers. The nuclear armaments are there. But they serve primarily as the shield behind which subversion, infiltration and a host of other tactics can steadily advance, picking off vulnerable areas one by one in situations which do not permit our own armed intervention.

Power is the hallmark of this offensive—power and discipline and deceit. The legitimate discontent of yearning people is exploited. The legitimate trappings of self-determination are employed. But once in power, all talk of discontent is repressed—all self-determination disappears—and the promise of a revolution of hope is betrayed, as in Cuba, into a reign of terror.

Those who staged automatic "riots" in the streets of free nations over the effort of Cubans to regain their freedom should recall the long rollcall of refugees who cannot now go back—to Hungary, or to North Korea, or to North Viet-Nam, or to East Germany, or to Poland, or to any of the other lands from which a steady stream of refugees pours forth, in eloquent testimony to the cruel oppression now holding sway in their home lands.

We dare not fail to see the insidious nature of this new and deeper struggle. We dare not fail to grasp the new concepts, the new tools, the new sense of urgency we will need to combat it, whether in Cuba or South Viet-Nam. And we dare not fail to realize that it is this struggle which is taking place every day, without arms or fanfare, in thousands of villages and markets and classrooms all over the globe.

The message of Cuba, of Laos, of the rising din of Communist voices in Asia and Latin America—these messages are all the same. The complacent, the self-indulgent, the soft societies are to be swept away with the debris of history. Only the strong, only the industrious, only the courageous, only the visionary who determine the real nature of our struggle, can possibly survive.

No greater task faces this Nation or this Administration. No other challenge is more deserving of our every effort and energy. Too long we have fixed our eyes on traditional military needs, on armies prepared to cross borders or missiles poised for flight. Now it should be clear that this is no longer enough—that our security may be lost piece by piece, country by country, without the firing of a single missile or the crossing of a single border.

We intend to profit from this lesson. We intend to re-examine and reorient our forces of all kinds, our tactics and our institutions here in this community. We intend to intensify our efforts for a struggle in many ways more difficult than war. But disappointments will often accompany us.

For I am convinced that we possess all the necessary resources, and all the skill, and all the added strength that comes from belief in the freedom of man. And I am equally convinced that history will record the fact that this bitter struggle reached its climax in the late 1950s and early 1960s.

Let me then make clear as the President of the United States that I am determined upon our system's survival and success, regardless of the cost and regardless of the peril. USMC

Sticks, Stones & Atoms

Re-published from the Jan-Feb 1961 issue of ORDNANCE, bi-monthly journal of the American Ordnance Association, Washington, D. C.

By James Burnham

NOT LONG AGO AFTER THE UNITED NATIONS patchwork expeditionary force was rushed—or, perhaps better, sucked—into the Congolese maelstrom, a striking news photograph was widely printed in the American press. It showed a truckload of soldiers about to start off for the Léopoldville suburbs. The men were part of a crack, British-trained unit of the Ghana army.

As displayed in the picture, they were standing at attention in the truck, in two close smartly drawn ranks. Suspended from the left arm of each soldier was a round shield, looking as if it had been snatched from a museum's medieval armor collection or from the prop room of a grand-opera company.

A friend of mine, an able and hardworking officer now at the Pentagon, noticed this picture and smiled. "The Sir Galahad weapon system! How's that for defensive armament in the nuclear age?" he asked sarcastically. He was much surprised when I commented: "It's not too bad, as a matter of fact. Better than most."

In these Ghanian shields, a light, strong aluminum alloy has replaced the wood, leather, brass, and iron of ancient bucklers. Their purpose is protection against the sticks, rocks, and stones thrown by rioting mobs. In the nuclear age, stones function as weapons a good deal oftener than nuclear bombs—and have won many more battles.

On both sides of the Iron Curtain many strategists believe that a curious law applies to the quantum jumps in firepower that have marked the weapons development of the past two decades. Beyond a certain limit—already passed by H-bombs—the more powerful the weapons become the less chance there is that they will be used. The reason for this is that fewer and fewer occasions would be taken to justify their use.

This is true even if one side had a monopoly. You are not going to start throwing H-bombs around to halt a border skirmish in the Cameroons or to block a change of government in Paraguay. When both sides possess the superpowerful weapons, the appropriate occasions are reduced to the brink of zero.

Indeed, many analysts are convinced that the only event that would be taken by either side as a sufficient motive for launching the most powerful weapons would be an attack with such weapons by the *other* side. If this puzzling conclusion is true, then an all-out unlimited war can take place *only* through faulty intelligence or an accidental launching.

Hurl an Invective, Not a Nuke

In practice there seems to be a still more paradoxical corollary to this law of the inverse relation between the power and use of modern weapons. The more powerful the new weapons that *exist*, the more primitive the weapons that are actually *used*. Castro conquered Cuba with small arms, mimeograph machines, and portable radio transmitters.

The rioting mobs of Tokyo, Seoul, and Ankara that overturned governments and forced the cancellation of the visit of the head of the most powerful nation in the world were armed with nothing more than their fists, the staves used to raise their placards, and paving bricks, plus a few knives and revolvers. In the Congo, we have gone back to clubs, rocks, blow guns, and magical spells.

It is terribly hard for Americans to understand some-

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thing so simple. In uniform and out, we have been dutifully trying to learn about grandiose "weapons systems" made up of infinitely complex aircraft, bases, carriers, nuclear devices, ballistic missiles, nuclear submarines, electronic computers, inertial navigators, and what not.

On a single system of this sort—for example, Polaris, Titan, Minuteman, or the B-52 complex—we are ready to spend five, eight, or ten billions of dollars as well as immense quantities of manpower, effort, technical ingenuity, and scientific intelligence.

It is well and good and necessary that this should be. But at the same time we seem to have difficulty in focusing our attention, not to speak of our brains and dollars, on the weapons systems by which the struggle for the world is in fact being fought.

We should more frequently remind ourselves that only two nuclear devices—crude, relatively low-power types at that—have ever been used for combat purposes. In the fifteen years since that parenthetic employment there have been many victories and defeats vast in scope and lasting in consequences. Power over many nations, whole regions of the earth, hundreds of millions of human beings, has changed hands—all without benefit of direct nuclear leverage.

Those rioting mobs of Tokyo, Seoul, and Ankara needed no A- or H-bombs, or planes or tanks or even guns to topple governments. Gandhi and Nehru had no strategic air force to help them drive the British Raj out of the Indian subcontinent.

Indonesia, Iraq, Cuba, Bolivia, Egypt, Guatemala, Vietnam, Cambodia, the Congo, the Rhodesias. . . . It is mostly sticks and stones, rifles and submachine guns—and the mobs of course: the mobs are a primary element of the weapons systems that have been deciding most battles and campaigns of the struggle for the world.

Words also, of course—the words of agitation and propaganda, zeroed in on minds—for in these battles of our age, unlike the old nursery rhyme, words as well as sticks and stones can break our bones.

From 1945 until some time after 1950 we possessed a monopoly in operative nuclear arms and thus overwhelming superiority in over-all firepower. But it is in those same years that our enemy made his greatest con-

"How's that for defensive armament in the nuclear age?" a Pentagon officer scoffed when he saw the primitive weapons of the Ghana soldiers in the photo above. "Not bad," says the author—and tells why

Wide World

Expensive weapons are no good against a mob like this, but the mobs have been winning all the battles

quests since 1917, seizing eastern Europe, with 100 million inhabitants, and mainland China, with 600 million.

The weapons systems that he employed for these achievements were based, not on physical firepower, but on psychological and political warfare methods, both defensive and offensive.

Defensively, it was necessary for him to counteract, negate, and sterilize our nuclear capability. Communist reasoning never forgets that a weapon—any weapon—is only a powerless bundle of matter apart from human minds and wills.

Shoot at the Minds and Wills

The biggest bomb ever built or building is less than David's slingshot without a mind and will and arm able and ready to use it.

With atomic capability added to our force already in being in 1945, we were in a position, materially speaking, to enforce our views, to reduce the Soviet threat to manageable proportions, and thus to guarantee for a reasonable future both national security and world peace. This possibility conflicted with the Communist objective of world domination, so the Communists struck back, hard, brilliantly, and successfully. The main impetus of their strike was directed against the minds and wills of men.

Their agents, dupes, and ideas were already present in many strata of American life, including scientific circles, the institutions that affect public opinion, and certain of the agencies of government. They were thus in a position from the very beginning to counteract our nuclear projects and capability—from the inside as well as through external pressures and diplomacy.

The main thrust of the first Communist reply to our nuclear weapons monopoly was thus psychopolitical, against the minds of the men who were making the weapons (technicians and scientists) and the men who controlled it (the leaders of government and public opinion).

The Communist objective was to deprive the United States of the political benefit of its nuclear capability, to "denature" the bombs, not by the physical process described in the textbooks, but by political, psychological, and moral means. In this case, as more generally, the Communists acted to confuse and disorient their enemy, to entangle him in contradictory policies, and to destroy his will to resist.

Under this defensive psychic screen, which successfully counterweighed their enemy's material superiority, the Communists went ahead systematically with the phased subjugation of the east European nations. At the same time, in a theater still more vast, they carried through the conquest of mainland China and its absorption into an expanded Soviet Empire.

Although there was, of course, fighting, some of it rather large-scale, the China campaign was essentially a political-warfare operation. (I am using the term "political warfare' in its most general sense, as covering all types of agitation, propaganda, subversion, economic manipulation, rioting, terror, diversionary diplomacy,

guerrilla and paramilitary actions, etc.: everything, in sum, short of the employment of the main formal armed forces.)

The Communists' polwar campaign for the conquest of China opened in 1920. It was completed in 1949 without the mass intervention of the main armed forces and with a total expenditure of probably less than half a billion dollars.

Although most professional military men, unlike their civilian counterparts, know that we are in a fight, I get the impression that very few of them can take a weapon system seriously unless it comprises a lot of firepower. They can analyze learnedly the merits of strategic manned bombers vs. submarine-carried Polaris vs. railroad-borne Minutemen.

They will thoughtfully debate the role of conventional limited-warfare forces. They can envisage, without qualms, spending ten or twenty billion dollars to develop weapon systems based on one or another or all of these concepts, together with the assignment of personnel and time and resources that go with money of that order.

But if you suggest—as I have often done in lectures at the various war colleges—spending any such sum, or a tenth such a sum, for systems based on Blanquist cadres, crowd manipulation, guerrillas, psychological warfare, paramilitary operations, subversion, bribery, infiltration, with specialized, mobile, ranger-type units in active supporting reserve—in short, if you suggest all-out political warfare (polwar)—the best response you can ordinarily hope for is a skeptical smile.

Yet it is the polwar weapons systems that have been winning all the battles. What good are Atlas and Polaris in Laos, Cuba, Algeria, the Congo, or in the swarming streets of Tokyo, Ankara, Jakarta, and Budapest?

It has been demonstrated over and again in the past fifteen years—indeed, since 1917—that modern polwar systems can smash governments and armies, and take over territory, peoples, and nations. Isn't a weapon system that can defeat the British, Dutch, and French armies, that can seize Czechoslovakia, China, and Cuba, worth spending a few billions on? The real worth of any weapon system, in the last analysis, should be measured by what it can accomplish, not by its size, complexity, cost, or physical firepower.

The Objective is Power

Naturally I am not suggesting that a polwar system should operate in a military vacuum. B-52's, Atlas and Polaris missiles are not being used, but the fact that they might be is a solid foundation for every kind of conflict operation. And effective limited-warfare arms, present always as a threat and ready for appropriate use, naturally strengthen any sort of political-warfare campaign.

A conflict apparatus adapted to the mid-twentieth century struggle for the world consists of three primary forces, elements, or arms:

1. The massive retaliatory ("deterrent") force, which remains the ultimate reserve.

2. The mobile, limited-warfare ("brush-fire") force. This, too, remains normally in reserve but in more active posture than the retaliatory force, ready for quick

Firepower is not the answer in the war of the two ideologies. Wordpower incites the mobs who win all the battles in "Polwar"



UPI

Swedish soldiers with UN forces in the Congo used primitive but practical armor—shields and clubs

intervention in any area where security or interest requires the direct presence or use of military power.

3. The political-warfare force. This force—which by its nature includes a multitude of activities and agencies, both governmental and civilian—is the active vanguard. Under the shield of the retaliatory force, and backed up by the limited-warfare force, with which it collaborates, the polwar force continuously engages in the day-by-day operations of the protracted conflict.

True political warfare, as understood and practiced by our enemy, is not mere rivalry or competition or conflict of some vague kind. Political warfare is a form of *war*. It is strategic in nature. Its objective, like that of every other form of war, is to impose one's own will on the opponent, to destroy the opponent's will to resist. In simplest terms, it aims to *conquer* the opponent.

Within the frame of that general objective, the specific objective of each specific polwar campaign is always defined in terms of *power*. The purpose in conducting polwar operations is always to increase one's power in some definite way or to decrease the power of the opponent. In either case, positive or negative, the aim is to alter the power equilibrium in one's favor.

The power objective may be grandiose—conquest of a nation, disintegration of an empire; or the minor takeover of a trade union, scaring a parliament into defeating a bill, or the sabotage of a factory. But whether big or small, the objective is always power.

These are the principles in terms of which our enemy has planned and mounted his polwar operations since the summer of 1903 when, through the founding of the Bolshevik faction, he launched his enterprise for the conquest of the world. Moreover, although he realizes that polwar in some instances may not be able by itself to reach a decision and may have to be supplemented by full-scale military measures, he is convinced that in at least some cases political warfare alone *can* bring the decision.

By now he has ample evidence to support this belief. Czechoslovakia has been conquered twice in this century—once by Hitler and once by Stalin—by a purely polwar campaign, without the commitment of major armed forces. China also, as we have noted, was won essentially by polwar methods. By these same methods American nuclear testing has been stopped dead for more than two critical years.

Not a year passes but that these methods do not smash several governments. And right now they are swinging an island at our strategic doorstep into our enemy's power system.

Although we are in fact spending several billion dollars yearly on nonmilitary phases of the cold war, very few of these go for what can properly be called "political warfare" in the true sense—the sense accepted by our enemy. Our professional military leaders have traditionally regarded political warfare (or "psychological warfare," as it is more usually and inadequately termed), as being merely an auxiliary and relatively minor supplement to military operation.

The cold-war activities of nonmilitary agencies—"foreign aid," "truth (or information) campaigns," "student (or cultural) exchange," even much of the clandestine

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Mob action has played a big role in overthrowing eight governments friendly to US in last two years

activity of CIA—are for the most part not true polwar operations. They are not political warfare because we do not really think of them as literally *war*.

We are trying to get the better of a competitor and opponent, certainly; to block certain of his moves, divert others, influence him to make certain changes in his behavior and policies. But we are not trying to impose our will on him in any general way, and certainly we are not trying to defeat him.

Foreign Aid Only a Key

In other words, we do not conceive our cold-war operations *strategically*. Often they have no clearly defined objective at all. When they do have an objective, this is seldom understood in terms of power.

In a genuine polwar system, foreign aid is only a key to open a national door for the conduct of field operations; information and propaganda are not a school to teach pale truths about how nice one is, but a psychological weapon to undermine, divert, and injure one's enemy; student scholarships are not a charity handout to the needy, but a cover for training activist cadres.

Because we decline to fight genuine, strategically conceived political warfare, a considerable part of our billions in foreign-aid dollars has been wasted, squandered on useless projects, filtered into the pockets of corrupt local residents, or used to build up industry for the enemy or his friends to inherit.

Let me point the contrast by returning in conclusion to the specific matter of riots and mob action, bearing in mind that this is only one of a hundred polwar fields. How many men and women (women are exceedingly important in crowd management) do we have in training today for the mission of exploiting crowds, mobs, and street riots to our political advantage? Do we have *any?*

How many persons in the agencies of our Government have ever made a thorough study of the historical, psychological, and technical problems of handling mobs and mass riots? Is there even a single one?

The Bolshevik approach to mobs, riots, and "command of the streets" is very serious indeed. In his design for the revolutionary party—the conflict apparatus—Lenin, like Bakunin and Nechaev before him, incorporated the ideas of Louis Blanqui, a French revolutionist who lived from 1805 to 1881. Blanqui first became prominent in the 1830 revolution and devoted the rest of his life, in and out of prison, to revolutionary conspiracy.

He believed that the key to successful revolt was the development of a small, secret "cadre" organization. Normally the cadres would remain underground, abstaining from political affairs. They were to be trained in the manipulation of crowds and the use of small arms and improvised weapons (sticks and stones) accessible to crowds.

In the 1848 and 1870 revolutions in France, the practical cogency of Blanqui's ideas was proved. In 1870 it was his cadres who were primarily responsible for the overthrow of the Third Empire and the establishment of the Paris Commune—the first revolutionary, proletarian-led dictatorship.

During the past two years there have been mass riots in the streets of many major cities of the non-Communist world: Caracas, Montevideo, Lima, Baghdad, Havana, Capetown, Léopoldville, Algiers, Seoul, Ankara, Tokyo, Vientiane, San Salvador, and Saigon, among others. Nearly all have been directed against political friends of the United States or against policies favorable to the United States.

Besides promoting fiercely anti-American attitudes, these riots played an essential part in the overthrow of no less than eight governments that were firm allies of the United States: in Venezuela, Iraq, Cuba, South Korea, Turkey, Tokyo, El Salvador, Laos. The governments were overthrown just as thoroughly as by outright military defeat. Unguided mobs may shake but they do not overthrow regimes. They do not spontaneously produce consistent slogans and select strategic targets.

Cinderella Politics Out

The coordinated operations of these recent riots, and their high measure of success, are the product of trained Bolshevik neo-Blanquists.

In the next year or so the Communized government of Cuba will either be overthrown, or the enemy will move on to the staged take-over of Central and South America. In the next year or so, non-Communist regimes must retain power in the Indochinese successor states, or the enemy will move on to the staged take-over of the entire Southeast Asian peninsula.

For both operations, H-bombs are useless. Is it not obvious that we are not likely to meet either of these challenges unless we decide to lift our Cinderella political-warfare system from the scullery floor where we have so far left her in rags and tatters? USMC

★ ★ ★ ★

Well Oiled

BUSY SHINING our rifle stocks in preparation for the IG my bunkie and I were startled to hear the squad bay sergeant shout "Rank hath its privileges!" Thereupon he seized the pint bottle with the bourbon label on it that was setting between us and took a long deep draft of our linseed oil.

$15.00 to Capt Jack L. Cole

ROMMEL: FOX

By LtCol L. Gordon Hill, Jr., USA

"HE WAS A COWARDLY, UNPRINCIPLED MAN WHO achieved notoriety because of luck, fervent devotion to the Nazi Party, and his arrogant and autocratic activities as Hitler's top-drawer hooligan."

"He was a great general who turned ordinary troops into ferocious fighting machines. He accomplished more with limited means than any other military leader, and finally sacrificed himself because of adherence to professional principles."

Either of these evaluations of German Field Marshal Erwin Rommel can be amply documented with "facts" from reputable articles, books, and periodicals. Why is this so? What caused it? Which version is nearer the truth?

Rommel was world-famous by 1942 but the first detailed information about him was to the American people by the news magazines in July of that year. *Time's* cover story, for example, pictured Rommel as a die-hard Nazi and attributed many of his victories in North Africa to luck and the ineptness of the British. This sketch traced Rommel's rise from the early 1930s when he grabbed onto Hitler's coattails, became his chief bodyguard, and finally regained the Army commission he had held in World War I.

Record Distorted in WWII

The Afrika Corps was described as an elite group, especially selected and trained for desert combat. The story was embellished with details on how the Afrika Corps trained in Germany in hothouses equipped with huge wind machines to simulate sandstorms, and said the Corps had the best equipment Germany could produce. When Nazi Germany announced in late 1944 that Rommel was dead, his obituaries in the American press described him as "arrogant and ruthless," and reported that he was Hitler's "top-drawer hooligan" in the 30s.

In the rush to get back to normal, the US apparently tried to forget WWII when it ended. But by 1948 war memoirs and analyses of military leaders began appearing on the scene. In *Crusade in Europe,* Eisenhower,

Some say he was Hitler's top-drawer hooligan, others regard him as a truly great general. Which view is right? Here's an evaluation by a writer whose aim is to separate fact from fancy

X OR FAKE?

in reference to the final phase of the North African campaign, gave this implied opinion of Rommel: "Rommel himself escaped before the final debacle, apparently foreseeing the inevitable and earnestly desiring to save his own skin. The myth of his and Nazi invincibility had been completely destroyed."

A member of Eisenhower's wartime headquarters seemed to say that Rommel either was a coward or was emotionally unstable. He wrote in *Harper's* that Rommel *knowingly* was not present at his headquarters at the most crucial times during his career—when the British launched their offensive at El Alamein and when the Allies invaded Normandy. In explaining Rommel's death, another writer said in the *Yale Review*: "Caught in the web of conspiracy [to assassinate Hitler, Rommel] tamely submitted and took his own life."

To confirm these views, one but needs to adopt the thesis that everything the enemy says is false. Paul Goebbels, Hitler's propaganda chief, held this opinion: "If all our marshals were cut out of the same cloth as Rommel we would need to worry no longer about our military leadership. Unfortunately, however, Rommel is not the rule, but the exception to the rule."

But by the late '40s some of the "facts" began to change. One writer, even while castigating Rommel, did point out that contrary to legend Rommel "did not become a beerhall brawler in the early days of the Nazi movement but remained in the Reichswehr as a regular officer." Many of the facts completed the about-face in 1950 with publication of Desmond Young's *Rommel: The Desert Fox* and Gen Hans Speidel's *Invasion 1944: Rommel and the Normandy Campaign.*

The following year a former member of the Afrika Corps, Heinz Werner Schmidt, added to the human side of Rommel with his small volume, *With Rommel in the Desert.* Then in 1953, *The Rommel Papers,* edited by B. H. Liddell Hart, gave us a keen insight into Rommel's character and personality.

We know now that many of the wartime falsehoods about Rommel can be traced to an anonymous article in 1941 in *Das Reich,* Germany's propaganda newspaper. Presumably Goebbels attempted to create a success story greater than the truth itself. When this issue of *Das Reich* passed over Rommel's desk in North Africa, he wrote "Nonsense" in the margin. Rommel's adjutant recorded at the time that "all Germany knows of the tremendous achievements of [Rommel], and there is no need for a paid hack to write untrue statements about them."

Goebbels nothwithstanding, Erwin Rommel was born in 1891, graduated from Tuebingen University, entered the German army, and in less than two years received a regular commission. In WWI he received Imperial Germany's highest decoration, the *Pour le Merite.* After the war he settled down to the peacetime duty of teaching military tactics at Dresden Military Academy. Hitler held some attraction for Rommel, who thought that Hitler could lead Germany back to her pre-war eminence. However, Rommel remained a regular officer throughout his life and *never* belonged to the Nazi Party and was *never* a storm-trooper.

He Got a Division in '40

Because of his outstanding military record, Rommel was selected to comand Hitler's headquarters in the Austrian, Sudetenland, and Czech operations, and during the Polish campaign of 1939. With no previous experience in armored warfare, Rommel was given command of the 7th Panzer Division in the French campaign of 1940. In 1941 he was transferred to North Africa where he and the Afrika Corps won world fame.

Wide World

The "Desert Fox" inspects. Critics say he spent too much time sightseeing, not enough in his CP

Rommel: A Quick Quiz Index

Whether Rommel was fox or fake, a great general or merely a Nazi opportunist, he was a military leader. FM 22-100 measures leadership in terms of 11 principles. To arrive at your estimate of the man, ask yourself the following questions based on those 11 principles:

Did Rommel . . .

√ Set the example?

√ Know himself and seek self-improvement?

√ Become technically and tactically proficient?

√ Train his men as a team?

√ Look out for the welfare of his men?

√ Keep his men informed?

√ Insure that the task was understood, supervised, and accomplished?

√ Develop a sense of responsibility among subordinates?

√ Make sound and timely decisions?

√ Employ his command in accordance with its capabilities?

√ Take responsibility for his actions?

In the author's judgment, Rommel passes the test with flying colors. How does he make out in your book? Fox or Fake?

For a time in 1943 he was German commander in northern Italy and then in 1944 became an Army commander in France.

He finally lost faith in Hitler and joined an opposition movement that developed among top professionals in the German army. Following the attempt on Hitler's life on July 20, 1944, Rommel was implicated and was caught up in the purge that followed. He was visited by two high-ranking officers who told him he had two choices. He could commit suicide—his name would remain an honored one and he would be given a military funeral; or he would be tried for treason and executed —all his possessions would be confiscated and his family rendered penniless. Rommel chose suicide and the two officers politely allowed him to tell his family goodbye.

What Kind of Leader Was He?

With the false legends out of the way and the facts of Rommel's life established, the path is clear to consider Rommel as a leader. But first some definitions of leadership should be examined.

The US Army defines leadership as "the art of influencing and directing men in such a way as to obtain their willing obedience, confidence, respect, and loyal cooperation in order to accomplish the mission." But a more direct determination of leadership has been pointed out by Liddell Hart: "One of the clearer ways in which comanders can be measured is by the extent to which they impress the opposing side."

The extent to which Rommel impressed British forces in North Africa was rather obvious when the British commander found it necessary to publish an order to his major units stating:

> "There exists a real danger that our friend Rommel is becoming a kind of magician or bogeyman to our troops, who are talking far too much about him. He is by no means a superman, although he is undoubtedly very energetic and able. Even if he were a superman, it would still be highly undesirable that our men should credit him with supernatural powers. I wish you to dispel by all possible means the idea that Rommel represents something more than an ordinary German general. . ."

This single example will not serve as an overall evaluation of Rommel's leadership, so additional means are required. FM 22-100, *Military Leadership,* considers leadership in terms of 11 principles. Keep these principles in mind as we consider several segments of Rommel's life that seem to best illustrate his qualities.

Distinguished Himself in WWI

Rommel was a member of the 14th German Army in 1917 when it was sent to the Italian front to assist the Austrians. On the first day in the area, Lt Rommel, with a force of two companies under his command, attempted an envelopment of the Italian line. He ran into an Italian battalion and captured it intact after maneuvering it between his two companies. To proceed with his operation, Rommel was given four more companies—now six in all, which he led single file through mountainous terrain to a point behind enemy lines which was astride the Italian main supply route.

Despite the legend, the author says, Rommel didn't command an elite corps of volunteers. He took average German soldiers, built a superb fighting force

Wide World

With Luftwaffe Chief Kesselring on the desert. Unlike some German officers, Rommel was never a Nazi

And as they came along, his force captured a ration column, a staff car, 50 officers, and 2,000 men.

Next, selecting a small mountain some distance away as the decisive objective in the area, Rommel fought his task force toward it the rest of the day and all night. Early next morning he, with two other officers and several riflemen, came up a large enemy bivouac. They walked straight to the center of the area and Rommel demanded a surrender. After brief hesitation, 43 officers and 1,500 men stacked arms, probably out of sheer surprise. When Rommel eventually reached his objective and signaled his success with flares, he had been continuously on the move for 50 hours, had covered 12 straight-line miles in mountainous country, had climbed up to 7,000 feet elevation, and had captured 150 officers, 9,000 men, and 80 field guns.

Moving on to early 1940 we find a Rommel who was a master at infantry warfare. Most of his military life had been spent learning it, fighting it, and teaching it. But realizing the potential of fast-moving armored warfare, he asked for such an assignment and was given command of the 7th Panzer Division. In less than three months, Rommel mastered the principles of tank warfare and panzer tactics.

Spearheaded Attack on Belgium, France

His division was one of several units that spearheaded the German attack against Belgium and France. In the six-week campaign from the Meuse River to Cherbourg, Rommel's division covered 500 miles, captured 97,000 prisoners (including a corps commander, four division commanders, and *five admirals*), 300 field guns, 450 tanks, and 7,000 other vehicles, at the relatively small cost of 682 killed and 1,646 wounded. This was not achieved by chasing a beaten, inferior enemy. It was achieved by fire and movement against—though it has almost been lost in history—a numerically superior enemy who most of the time had superior armor and equipment.

During this period Rommel personally enhanced the fast-moving tactics of armor employment with the thought that "the officers of a panzer division must learn to think and act independently within the framework of the general plan and not wait until they receive orders."

Jumping on to mid-February 1941, we find the British had North Africa well in hand. The Italian element of the Axis forces was disorganized and the few German units suffered from sagging morale. Rommel arrived in late February and additional German units—the equivalent of two divisions—landed by mid-March. The British commander and his intelligence experts estimated that Rommel could not attack before May. However, Rommel attacked the superior Commonwealth forces with everything he had on March 31. His success resounded around the world. At least two full Commonwealth divisions were destroyed as fighting forces. The North African campaign did a complete about-face and the global strategy planners of both sides went back to their drawing boards.

Despite the legends, the Afrika Corps was not an elite corps of volunteers but was made up of ordinary German soldiers in the same manner as any German unit.

Wide World

Rommel with two Italian generals. He had a knack for appearing at the right place at the right time

It was Rommel who in a matter of weeks instilled in the Corps the superb discipline and training which was to carry it to so many successes. This training welded all of the elements—the tanks, the artillery, the infantry, and the logistical support units—into a single fighting force.

Observed Conventions

Rommel was proud of the clean record of both sides in the North African campaign; he held strong views on proper conduct and observance of the "soldier's code." He not only insisted that prisoners he captured receive proper treatment but he also kept a close check on the British. At one time the British published an order that prisoners would not be fed until they were interrogated. The order assumed that interrogation would take place within an hour or so after capture. Rommel found out that British troops were following the order to the letter and that this sometimes meant a 36-hour delay before prisoners were fed. He got word to the British commander, pointing out the weakness of the order and implied he would have to do the same unless the order were canceled. This the British did without delay.

Such a small incident serves to illustrate what Gen Speidel had in mind when he wrote that Rommel "insisted that international conventions were to be kept to the letter, and he upheld a code of chivalry that had become strange in our day and age and was regarded by Hitler as a sign of weakness."

One other important aspect of Rommel was his plans and orders. He has been criticized by some military experts for "dashing about the battlefield," away from his headquarters. Though there is some truth to this, his knack for appearing at the crucial time at the vital place probably made up for it—and then some. He frequently revised plans on the spot—to the consternation of his staff. This flexibility, however, was a prime reason for his successes. His orders, even verbal ones, invariably were short and unequivocal. Brig. Young's conclusion is: "Rommel never had any doubts about what he wanted and left none in the minds of his subordinates."

Now check the 11 leadership principles again. Would you say that Rommel practiced them?

It would be false to claim that he followed scrupulously every one of the principles all the time. But a detailed study of Rommel shows that he habitually followed them most of the time. Therefore, we can conclude that Rommel was a successful leader. But every successful leader more or less follows these principles, so this in itself does not mean that the leader has achieved greatness. It is necessary, then, to show that Rommel did more than follow a set of principles—something above ordinary success—if he is to be considered truly great.

Rommel and Hitler

Upon reflecting on the required duties and loyalties of a military professional, it becomes evident that he must, above all things, carry out the will and policy of his government. That is the very reason for his existence. It therefore follows that a military professional should never be in a position to question the military and political objectives assigned by his government. His duty is to carry them through to a successful conclusion. If the occasion arises when the professional is faced with

a task he violently opposes, what should he do? Rommel faced such a situation.

In the 1930s, Rommel held the view of most of the German military professionals: Hitler was "the new hope of Germany." Perhaps an intelligent person with an objective view of Hitler and Germany in the late '30s could predict the inevitable course of events. But Rommel's view was not objective. With about 25 years of rigid discipline inculcated in him, he was completely immersed in his work. His distrust of Hitler and the German high command (which was made up mostly of political appointees and some weak, rubber-stamp military professionals) began late. It may well have started when he received in North Africa an order signed by Hitler to execute summarily all British commando-type raiders captured. Rommel burned the order upon reading it and did not even consider putting it into effect.

Rommel's eyes were really opened after he returned from North Africa. Brig. Young describes it like this:

> "He had long disapproved of the Nazi 'scum.' For the first time he now learnt at first hand from German officers what the Gestapo and the S.S. had done in Poland and Russia, what they were still doing there and in occupied countries of Western Europe. For the first time he learnt of slave labour, of the mass extermination of Jews, of the battle of the Warsaw ghetto, of gas-chambers and the rest of it. In North Africa it had been assumed that Germany was fighting 'a gentlemen's war.' "

Rommel protested directly to Hitler about all of this but with no success.

Atlantic Defense Role in '43

In November 1943 Hitler gave Rommel the job of inspecting the Atlantic defenses and of advising the senior German commander, von Rundstedt, on means to improve them. Rommel was amazed at how little work had been done. Undoubtedly he had believed Goebbels' propaganda of the "Atlantic Wall," as did the Allies. Rommel became convinced that the main line of resistance must be the beach. He felt the first 24 hours of an invasion would be decisive. Hitler and his personal advisers took the view that the invading force could be defeated by a massive counterattack at some time after the beachhead had been established. Rommel's plan was not approved. Later events proved his concept would have been preferred, though it is doubtful (and Rommel himself doubted) that it would have been successful.

LtCol Hill, commissioned in the US Army via OCS in '43, is close to attaining his goal—a MA Degree in Journalism. He will complete a course at the Univ of Wisconsin in June '61. Returning from a year in Korea, he was assigned duties on the Faculty, US Army Command and General Staff College, '56-'58. LtCol Hill assesses Field Marshal Rommel with objectivity; brings to light Rommel's "true image" vs his "wartime image." An avid Civil War buff, he will serve with the Office, Chief of Information, Dept of Army, commencing June '61.

Nevertheless, Rommel frantically set about improving the defenses when he became commander of the German army which was to bear the brunt of the Allied invasion. A few days after the invasion Rommel told a friend, "Better end this at once, even if it means living as a British dominion, rather than see Germany ruined by going on with this hopeless war."

On June 11, five days after the invasion, Rommel became convinced that Hitler would "fight, without the least regard for the German people, until there isn't a house left standing in Germany." a few days later, Rommel told Hitler that Germany's defeat was a matter of time. He implied that Hitler should negotiate an armistice. Few other German generals at that time would have dared utter such an estimate to the fanatical Hitler. Of course, Hitler ignored the proposal.

Thus the accumulation of many unsavory and visionary actions by Hitler finally broke Rommel's iron loyalty to him. Rommel had performed his lifetime duty with all the zeal and energy he could muster. There is little question that he was an outstanding tactical commander. But true greatness came only when he decided that his loyalty to the German people was greater than his loyalty to Adolph Hitler.

The fact that Rommel preferred suicide to a public trial for treason, apparently out of regard for his family, deserves little more than a footnote in history. The climax of his life came when he decided on a magnificent display of moral courage in the direction of his loyalty.

For this, Field Marshal Erwin Rommel should be remembered as a truly great commander. USMC

★ ★ ★ ★

Unnecessary Advice

AN OLD MARINE FIRST SERGEANT was walking down the street one afternoon in Quantico, Va., during WWII, when he passed an irate Colonel "reading off" three Marines. Unfortunately, the Marines had failed to measure up to the Colonel's standards, based upon his pride in the "Old Corps." One wore his cap askew. Another had his hands in his pockets. The third had failed to salute.

Farther on, the Sergeant met a Pfc who wore the stamp of OCS. Stopping the boy, he pointed to the Colonel who was some distance down the street.

"See that old so-and-so? Well, you'd better salute him, son, or he'll give ya' hell!"

The Pfc nodded his thanks for the advice and proceeded up the street. When he approached the Colonel, he gave him his snappiest salute. As he went on his way, the Pfc wore a grin of vast proportions. He had just saluted his own father.

$15 to Nancy P. Honeycutt



By Capt J. M. Verdi, USMCR

MORE THAN ONE VOICE HAS BEEN RAISED IN RECENT years to bemoan the passing of the propeller-driven AD and, less recently, the F4U/AU. Many of us in the flying and air-control end of this Marine Corps find such talk a little tiresome. If we have seldom made our voices heard on the subject, it's because we find it hard to believe those who argue for the retention of these aircraft have got all the facts.

Both domestic and foreign references to the undiminished merit of the AD and F4U usually attribute to these aircraft the following "advantages":

- Controllability
- Bomb load
- Endurance

By-passing "controllability" for the moment (we'll return to it later), let's take a fast look back at the Corsair and the AD.

First, the Corsair. In 1943-45 this was a great airplane for the mission requirements of the day. As an attack airplane in Korea in 1950-53, it was a real dog. There are plenty of people whose eyes fill with tears of nostalgia at the mention of the F4U. Some even get violent when anything is said against it. Bomb load? Sure. Depending on model, there were ten to 12 stations on the U-bird, but you couldn't operate with more than 3,000 to 3,500 pounds. Endurance? The boys from K-6, which was 70 miles back of the Division in 1952-53, would give you 50 minutes.

The F4U had several unpleasant characteristics. Asymetric stall with little or no warning made heavy takeoffs from operational airstrips difficult. High-speed rudder trim reversal and aileron snatch often occurred in high-angle bomb runs. This, of course, compromised the accuracy of the bomb drop—and incidentally terrorized the pilot.

The R-2800 engine and associated systems were exceedingly vulnerable, as anyone who ever took a .30 caliber in the oil cooler will testify. The airframe included such structural curiosities as wooden ailerons and fabric covering for outer wing panels, elevators, and rudder. These veritable antiques could be traced back to the F4U's ancestor, the V-143, conceived in 1935.

Corsair Was Unsat

Well, we could go on but why beat a dead horse? The Corsair, in any form, was an unsatisfactory attack airplane. And while up-dating eliminated some of the structural oddities and produced a thing called the AU, performance was unchanged.

The AD began life in 1945 as the XBT2D-1. It was built to meet WWII operational requirements and with WWII design concepts. By 1950 the AD was no longer a modern airplane either.

Bomb load? By all means: 15 stations. Twelve Antitank Aircraft Rockets (ATAR) or 250 pound General Purpose (GP) and three 1,000 pound bombs or NAPALM tanks added up to an operational bomb load of 6,000 pounds. (Yes, we remember the pictures showing 9,000 pounds of external stores. Not in the field though, men, and certainly not from a carrier deck.) Endurance? You could count on up to two hours on station.

All this sounds great until those who were part of the program during the "Police Action" start remembering. One item: The half ton of armor plate that had

to be added to this "attack" airplane to bring its loss ratio down to that of the F4U (which, as we have intimated, was pretty poor to start with). Those who believed that 15 bomb stations and two hours on station were equivalent to 15 bomb runs were suddenly disillusioned. The AD with full load had neither rate-of-roll for evasive action after pull-out, or rate-of-climb for return to the roll-in point for the next run. In actual practice, ADs seldom made more than four runs.

It happens that in 1950-53 Marine Corps Aviation *did* have a modern airplane which represented a preview of today's and tomorrow's attack aircraft. This was the F9F.

The F9F began life in 1948 as a fighter, but proved most effective after bomb stations and updating gave us the F9F-4 and F9F-5 for operational commitment to the attack mission. By 1952, Marine Air Group 33 had two squadrons of these aircraft based at K-3, 100 miles farther to the rear of the 1st Marine Division than K-6 (or two and one half times as far).

Comparison With the F9F

We'll content ourselves with a quick comparison with the Corsair and AD. First, the bomb load. The F9F had eight stations: six ATAR or 250-pound GP, and two 1,000-pound bombs or NAPALM tanks, for a total of 3,500 pounds. This was less than the AD, but *not* less than the Corsair. And while the runway at K-3 was 1,000 feet longer than the one at K-6, anyone who has ever seen K-3 will appreciate that hauling 3,500 pounds of ordnance out of there regularly was no mean accomplishment.

Add to this the fact that it took no longer for the F9F to fly the 170 miles to the Division than it did for the F4U or AD to cover 70 miles. Then it becomes apparent that the performance of this airplane was such that the extra 100-mile rearward displacement of its home base did not result in any penalty in on-call response time.

Today's tactical thinking presupposes less than adequate numbers of airfields, more rapid displacement of battle lines, and wider dispersal of operational and support units. Consequently, rapid response time is an obvious and essential requirement.

Performance pays off at the target, too. An F9F could complete the cycle from roll-in, bomb run, pull-out, recovery (*with* evasive action), and climb back to roll-in



The F9F, shown here in action in Korea, provided a preview of today's modern jet attack aircraft

The F4U was a "real dog" in Korea but some people still shed real tears of nostalgia at its passing

in little more than half the time it took an F4U or AD. Think of the ordnance an aircraft drops or fires in one run as a unit of fire. This means a formation of F9Fs had about twice the *rate* of fire (frequency of attack) as a formation of F4Us or ADs.

Can't Just Hang on More Bombs

To the Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC), coordinating flak suppression and other fires with the Close Air Support (CAS) mission, the attack cycle time of an aircraft assumes measurable importance. Most CAS targets are precision targets, often difficult to distinguish and not always stationary. It follows, therefore, that the airplane, like artillery, mortars, or any supporting arm, is not always going to fire for effect the first time and get a hit.

Thus if you accept the necessity for "registering," it is essential that this be done in minimum time. A significant proportion of all the runs made by a formation of aircraft are misses (registering). Consequently, the important figure as far as weight of ordnance is concerned is *not* the total which is brought to the target from home base, but the total which is actually put *on* the target.

To increase the tonnage on the target, then, it is not enough merely to hang more bombs on the airplane. Rather we must decrease the time required to register so more of the runs can be "for effect." In addition we must arrange for an airplane with performance characteristics which contribute to greater accuracy. The F9F answered both of these requirements. The first we have noted. The second was met by increased longitudinal and directional stability in the bomb run, which resulted in significantly greater accuracy.

As for endurance, less was required to get the job done. And although the F9F's 40 minutes on station was far less than the AD's two hours, it wasn't significantly less than the F4U's 50 minutes. The average F9F flight had time for four runs, which, as we have seen, was all that could generally be had from a flight of ADs anyway. Assuming equal pilot proficiency, a greater percentage of F9F ordnance could be counted as effective hits. The net effect was that the F9F did the same job more quickly and with less attrition. The loss rate for ADs was three times as high as for F9Fs. About $300,000 was tied up in either aircraft. This plus an additional minimum of $100,000 for even a second lieutenant to fly it, and up to $1 million or more for field grade types with 3,000-4,000 hours. Attrition was therefore a matter of economic as well as personal concern. How much more is this true today, when a single attack aircraft may cost from $800,000 (A4D type) to $2,000,000 (F-105)?

Endurance Is Academic

Actually, endurance is largely an academic consideration. Modern attack aircraft are all equipped for aerial refueling. In fact, with addition of "Buddy Stores," attack aircraft can now refuel each other. This obviates the need for a tanker over or near an impact area.

Many of us like to remember with some pride that infantry units on the Korean Main Line of Resistance in 1952-53 used to ask specifically for F9F close support

Capt Verdi has flown close air support under two flags. After flying 131 missions as a pilot and controlling 120 as a forward air controller in Korea he joined the French Air Force for another 150 flights in Viet Nam and Laos during the Dien Bien Phu action. His picture was taken during his recent active duty with VMA-332. He's a member of VMF-131 at NAS, New York, and works for the General American Tank Storage Terminal in New Jersey.

from MAG-33. The F9F was a *jet* aircraft. Yet we often hear our brethren, both ground and air, disparage the jet as a close support vehicle with such statements as: "Jets don't carry varied firepower. . . Jets can't stay on station. . . Jets fly too high and too fast to find targets. . ." We can only wonder where these folks have been all these years.

More on Controllability

Having dealt with the first two of these often-repeated canards, it's time to turn to the third. This brings us back to the comparative controllability of the jet aircraft and the propeller-driven aircraft. The best way to assess controllability is to list factors which govern how and where aircraft are held before being committed. These include, but are not limited to, the following:

- Trajectories (maximum ordinates) of both friendly and enemy supporting arms. We keep even our observation aircraft (TAO) above these. In fact, working aircraft in the midst of friendly fire is about as serious a measure as calling down artillery on your own troops—and we all know how serious *that* is.
- Enemy counter-air and/or anti-aircraft weapons capability. 37/40-mm automatic weapons, which were generally organic to front-line enemy units in Korea and French Indo China, and which will almost certainly be encountered again in "limited" warfare, are accurate to 12,000 feet, can reach 14,000 feet.
- Air traffic control. It is necessary to keep friendly flights from getting in each other's way.
- Aircraft performance parameters. Wherever possible, within limitations specified above, assignment of holding fixes, altitudes, and air space should be predicated on optimum endurance capability of the particular aircraft type.

Visual dive bombing patterns used for close support usually require a minimum of 8,000 feet terrain clearance. This means flights awaiting clearance to their direct air support controller (FAC) must be held above flights actually working a target, at orbit points over friendly troops. Hence the first three of the factors listed above nearly always add up to holding flights at altitudes from 10,000 to 20,000 feet at orbit points other than over the intended impact area.

These are the considerations which make target identification difficult for pilots of attack aircraft. (Remember, we're talking about *war* now, not fire support demonstrations) Of course, the difficulty is independent of the type aircraft being used. Holding airspeeds in jet aircraft are only 50% greater than for the AD (even though cruise speeds are 100 to 150% greater). Only 50% more lateral separation is needed between orbit points, and *no* greater vertical separation is required. Visual target acquisition is well or badly done according to the qualifications of the pilot. Poor target acquisition must not be blamed on the aircraft.

We've spent enough time comparing the F9F to the Corsair and the AD. After all, all three are yesterday's aircraft. But it seems reasonable to conclude that if yesterday's jet aircraft was superior to the venerable Corsair and obsolete AD, then today's jet aircraft must be even more superior. The interested reader need only refer to Capt Vincent's report on the A4D multiple carriage (GAZETTE: Aug '60) to find reassurance that modern performance *and* multiple stores are not incompatible. The really interested student of tactical aviation could also cite other aircraft which can now meet the criteria of tonnage and variety combined with performance—the FJ-4B, the F-100, and the outstanding F-105.

It's Time To Say Goodbye

We don't pretend that the AD type aircraft no longer has any utility at all. We do say it has far less to offer the close air support mission than the jet attack aircraft. Nor do we advance the notion that today's jet attack aircraft are without significant shortcomings. (The major shortcoming, in our opinion, is dependence on elaborate ground servicing equipment). But let's be realistic and look to *tomorrow's* equipment and tactics. Let's try to bid farewell to yesterday's AD—and the time has long past when the day-before-yesterday's Corsair ought to have been buried for all time. USMC

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First Lieutenants, Second Lieutenants and Third Lieutenants

AFTER BEING COMMISSIONED as a new second lieutenant I arrived in Quantico for Basic School. We were considered as students by the staff officers, many of whom were first lieutenants who had completed the course just prior to us. One day we were in the field working on a problem and the time came for chow so as usual we began to fall in a column and wait our turn to have the messmen load up our tray. As I came up I thought I would have the lad give me a little more meat. I asked the boy and he looked at me and said, "Oh no, the REAL Lieutenant (pointing at the instructor) said one slice per man."

$15.00 to IstLt Otis B. Thomas
Capt R. W. Peard



Foreword

NEITHER NUCLEAR NOR CONVENTIONAL WARFARE HAS directly enabled any aggressor nation to take over other countries since the beginning of WWII.

The East has failed to better us significantly in nuclear kill and launcher invulnerability. Therefore, the threat of indiscriminate suicidal destruction must be given credit for successful deterrence. Moreover, with substantial capacity for overkill on both sides, it seems reasonable that this parity is not likely to be altered soon.

Our instant willingness to react to overt aggression has been demonstrated by Korea and is backed up by a virtual ring of defensive alliances around the East—NATO, CENTO, SEATO, and the Japanese defense pact. These arrangements must be given credit for successful containment of conventional warfare.

But certainly the Communists have not abandoned their passion to bury us and take over the world. So what alternative methods of warfare are they up to? Mr. Khrushchev has declared economic war against us. Will this satisfy him? It is slow. It requires the complete dedication of Communism's scarce material resources. And it's just possible he might not win if the West unites itself economically.

Guerrilla warfare already has given Communism its major ally, mainland China. It sneaked in North Vietnam, Iraq, and Cuba, to say nothing of "neutrals." It now threatens Laos. It could succeed in still other countries in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. Guerrilla warfare incites no nuclear retaliation. It weasels out of the troops-cross-border criteria required to set our defensive treaties and charters into action. Witness the failure of the Rio Pact, the United Nations, and the Organization of the American States regarding Cuba.

Guerrilla warfare involves none of the heavy costs of an all out slug-fest between nations. It exploits Communism's long experience in revolution. The aggressor merely finds a suitably poverty stricken land, then supplies a few catalysts: ideology, "moral" encouragement, organizers, methods, and—if anything at all—a minimum of war material.

And what of its potentialities in a poverty stricken region such as Latin America? The following excerpt from the *New York Times* datelined Moscow, 10Dec60, reveals admitted intentions: "Maj Ernesto Guevara President of the Cuban National Bank, declared today that Cuba stood ready to fulfill her Communist desig-



Wide World

Guevara is with Castro. What he has to say, though, only incidentally involves US/Cuban relations. His pitch: A Communist doctrine for world-wide guerrilla war conquest

nated goal as a model for armed revolution in Latin America."

Is this type of guerrilla warfare world Communism's real carving knife, the realistic form for future warfare? If so, what role can and will we Marines have?

It might pay to consult Maj Guevara. He's published a how-to-do-it-yourself revolutionary guide, entitled *La Guerra de Guerrillas.* No other publication from Cuba reveals so much. Mr. Castro himself has written nothing since his "history will absolve me" speech in 1953. Transcribed versions of his nocturnal harangues defy analysis. Gen Alberto Bayo, principal indigenous military advisor to the Cuban Rebels, has written over 20 publications, including his latest, *150 Questions and Answers for Guerrillas.* His works, however, are too personalized and disorganized to be helpful. Guevara, the mastermind, the clear thinker, generalizes on Cuban experience and looks beyond to wholesale export.

It was impossible to translate Guevara's handbook word-for-word into English. His flowery Spanish is too verbose for the US reader's patience. What I have done is to read paragraph by paragraph, then digest into concise English. Thus the ideas are presented in the order they appear with no attempt to alter their original bias.—HCP


GUERRILLA WARFARE



Wide World

Cuban rebel training camp. Guevara says revolt should begin in rural areas as agrarian reform

sional army. Also refuted are those who feel they must wait until, in some perfect way, all the right conditions are at hand, instead of hastening to bring these conditions about by their own efforts. Of course, not all the prerequisites for a revolution are going to be created solely by guerrillas. Certain minimum preconditions are needed to kindle the first spark. The people must be shown that social wrongs aren't going to be redressed by civil means alone. And it's better to arrange that the oppressor, wittingly or not, first breaks the peace.

Revolt Easily Stopped in Cities

The third conclusion is strategic: to convince those who want to center the revolution on urban masses not to overlook the tremendous role of rural people in underdeveloped America. In the cities, armed revolt can all too easily be smothered when customary civil liberties are suspended or ignored, thus forcing resistance movements to act clandestinely, without arms, and against enormous dangers. The opposite is true in rural areas where guerrillas and inhabitants cooperate closely, beyond the reach of oppressor forces.

Who are the combatants in guerrilla warfare? On one side, we have the oppressive oligarchy with its agent, the professional army, well armed and disciplined and frequently the recipient of foreign aid. Allied with the army are pampered bureaucracies. On the other side stand the people of the nation or region concerned. Guerrilla warfare is a fight of the masses, with the guerrilla band as the armed nucleus. The bands need not be considered inferior to the opposing army. Rather, the contrary is true: one resorts to guerrilla warfare when oppressed by superior numbers and arms. For the individual guerrilla warrior, then, wholehearted help from the local population is the basis on which to start.

Why does the guerrilla fight? He is a social reformer. He takes up arms in response to widespread popular protest against an oppressor, impetuously hurling himself with all his might against anything that symbolizes the established order. More on this later.

When we analyze the tactics of guerrilla warfare, we see that the guerrilla must have a highly developed knowledge of the terrain over which he operates. He must be familiar with avenues of access and escape, possibilities for rapid maneuver, popular support, and hiding places. All this favors rural areas. Moreover, here the guerrilla can represent the desires of the great mass of poor farmers to own their land, animals, and all that makes up their life from cradle to grave.

In other words, the guerrilla is—above all else—an agrarian revolutionary. So for an up-to-date understanding of guerrilla warfare, what we are interested in is an armed group which fights the existing government. Whether colonial or not, it acts on its own initiative, is rural in character, and is economically based on the desire to hold land. Mao Tse-tung's China began with worker uprisings which were defeated and almost wiped out. The revolution recovered only when it took seat in rural areas and adopted the cause of agrarian reform. Ho-chi-minh's victory in Indochina was based on poor rice farmers oppressed by French colonists. In Algeria, Arab nationalism is bolstered by oppressive conditions of sharecropping imposed by French settlers. In Puerto

Rico, special conditions so far have prevented a guerrilla outbreak. Nationalism is arising, however, because the poor farmers want their land back from the Yankee invader. This same craving drove the farmers of Eastern Cuba to fight, ever since Batista first came to power 30 years ago, for the right to hold land.

This type of hostility feeds on itself, and eventually transforms guerrilla warfare into positional warfare as the strength and number of fighting units increase. The possibility for such transformation is as great as the chance to destroy the enemy whenever encountered. Therefore, never undertake any fight which won't be won.

There's a saying: "The Guerrilla is the maverick of war." He practices deception, treachery, surprise, and night operations. Thus circumstances and the will to win often oblige him to forget romantic and sportsmanlike concepts. Military strategy and tactics represent the way the group conceives its objectives to take full advantage of the enemy's weak points. Individual combat is much the same in guerrilla warfare as at the squad level in conventional warfare. When trickery doesn't work, it's only because the enemy is alert and can't be caught off guard. However, because the guerrilla band commands itself and because the enemy can't forever guard all areas, surprise is always possible. It's the guerrilla's duty to exploit this weakness.

Hit and Run Tactics

Some disparaging people call this "hit and run." That's exactly what it is! Hit and run, wait, stalk the enemy, hit him again and run.. Do it all again and again, giving no rest to the enemy. Perhaps this smacks of not facing up to the enemy. Nevertheless, it serves the goal of guerrilla warfare: to conquer and destroy the enemy.

It's well known that guerrilla warfare is a preliminary step which can't win a war all by itself. What happens is that the guerrilla army swells in size until it becomes a regular army. Then it's ready to deliver a knock-out blow.

Just as a division commander no longer has to sacrifice himself out front leading his troops, the guerrillas—each one his own commander—don't have to sacrifice themselves in battle. A guerrilla is willing to give his life, but more to achieve an ideal than to defend it.

Thus the essence of guerrilla warfare is the miracle by which a small nucleus of men—looking beyond their immediate tactical objective—becomes the vanguard of a mass movement. They establish a new society, ending the ways of the old, and win social justice. Considered in this light, guerrilla warfare takes on true greatness, a sense of destiny, without the need for further rhetoric. Likewise, an unfaltering will to fight and persistence against immense obstacles are the greatness of the guerrilla.

Strategy

In guerrilla terminology, strategy means the analysis of the objectives we wish to attain.

First, determine how the enemy will operate, his manpower, mobility, popular support, weapons, and leadership. Then plan a strategy to best confront these factors, always keeping in mind that the final objective is to destroy the enemy army.

In the case of weapons, consider how they are used. Study the realistic value of such items as tanks and airplanes in guerrilla warfare, the enemy's small arms, ammunition, his customs, etc. Keep in mind that the guerrilla's most important source of supply is the enemy himself. So if there's a choice, use the same type of weapons. The greatest danger is to run out of ammunition—an item which must be captured from the enemy.

Wide World

Author Guevara: He's now Cuba's economic boss

At the start take special pains that no guerrilla needlessly gets himself killed. Then, as his new life becomes an everyday affair, he will instinctively duck and throw off scent any hostile forces trying to hunt him down. He takes up positions whose inaccessibility keeps the enemy away, or he amasses forces which discourage enemy attack. Now the guerrilla can begin a campaign of attrition, first in the places nearest anti-guerrilla activity. Then he moves deep into the enemy's territory to attack his communications, to harass his bases, and to lash out in every conceivable way.

The guerrilla must hammer away constantly. The enemy soldier caught in this operation is not allowed to sleep. His posts are attacked and systematically liquidated. Throughout the day in woods and crags, and

Guevara's book on guerrilla war is frankly intended to serve as a manual for Communist revolution in underdeveloped nations throughout the world. He learned much from Mao Tse-tung

GUEVARA'S "MINUET"



1. **Guerrillas surround enemy column and open fire from one flank.**



2. **Enemy returns fire and sends out counter-attack force. Guerrillas shift fire to 2d flank, withdraw from 1st flank.**



3. **Guerrillas shift fire to rear, withdraw on flanks.**



4. **Guerrillas shift fire to front. Withdraw rear attack.**



5. **Enemy column is pulled apart suffering heavy losses. Guerrillas withdraw before risking losses.**

throughout the night in open country, the enemy is made to feel he is inside hostile jaws.

To put the enemy in such a state of mind, the guerrilla must have absolute cooperation from the people living in the area and an intimate knowledge of the terrain. This requires that, simultaneously with terrain studies, he conduct an intensive campaign on the purpose of the revolution and the unquestionable truth that those who hold out against the people are going to lose. Anyone who doesn't feel this truth can't be a guerrilla.

Security is Important

The campaign begins with care. Each person spoken to is asked not to reveal anything he has seen or heard. Next the guerrilla seeks out persons of obvious loyalty to the revolution for use as contacts, carriers of weapons and supplies, and guides. Then he goes to the urban masses to bring about a general strike.

Such a strike is crucial but to achieve it requires a chain of events which seldom takes place spontaneously. The necessary conditions must be created. This is done by explaining the purposes of the revolution and arranging incidents which display the people's power.

The guerrilla employs sabotage to paralyze entire armies, stop industry, leave people without work, light, water, communications, or courage to venture upon the street. If all of this is carried off, the morale of the enemy and his front line troops will crumble, leaving him ripe for plucking.

All of this assumes an increase in the size of the territory dominated by guerrillas and hence deserves a word of caution: don't overextend the base of operations. Build it up carefully by indoctrinating local residents, neutralizing counter-revolutionaries, and perfecting defensive installations such as trenches, mines, and interior communications. Only when the guerrilla band becomes a respectable force, in arms and numbers, are new columns formed.

After a while the territory occupied by guerrilla columns becomes too small for good protection and, in their advance toward the enemy's stronghold, the columns will come up against powerful opposition. At this moment the columns unite into a compact fighting front and undertake a war of positions. Even so, the old guerrilla army can't cut itself off from its bases. Hence, it forms new guerrilla bands behind the enemy to deliver still other hostile blows. Thus the attack carries itself to the city, defeats reinforcements, inflames the whole country, and attains its ultimate objective: victory.

Tactics

Tactics is the practical means used to achieve strategic objectives. Compared to end objectives, tactics generally are much more flexible. While there are some

tactical objectives which won't change, others will vary considerably, adjusting themselves to best fit each moment of battle.

The guerrilla relies on mobility. This permits him to flee quickly from the area of action whenever necessary, to constantly shift his front, to evade encirclement (a most dangerous situation for the guerrilla), and even to counter-encircle the enemy.

Speaking of counter-encirclement, several examples come to mind. Small groups of guerrillas apparently are surrounded by the enemy; then all of a sudden the enemy himself is surrounded by larger forces. Or an impregnably located enemy is lured out by some trick, then surrounded and annihilated and his supplies seized.

Another maneuver, frequently used to wear down a larger enemy force, is called the "minuet." The guerrillas surround the enemy—an advancing column for example—on all four sides. Five or six guerrillas are stationed on each side, sufficiently spread out to avoid their own encirclement. The dance begins as one side fires on the enemy, who naturally moves toward that side. The guerrillas on that side move back, without breaking visual contact, and succeed in drawing the enemy out. Then another guerrilla side begins firing and draws out the enemy to a different side. Thus, as the partners on all sides participate in the dance, the enemy column is rendered immobile, expends vast quantities of ammunition, and loses morale, while the guerrillas remain unharmed.

Night Operations

The same maneuvers can be executed at night, but at closer range and with greater aggressiveness to overcome the inherent difficulties of a night encirclement. In general, night operations are important for the guerrilla. They enable him to advance to lines of departure or otherwise move around in unfamiliar areas with less danger of being reported.

The guerrillas' numerical inferiority makes it necessary always to attack by surprise, permitting them to inflict disproportionate losses upon the enemy. Such an advantage is indispensable. With equal casualties on both sides the numerically inferior guerrilla band would be wiped out much sooner than the more numerous enemy.

Arms and ammunition are extremely precious items on the battlefield. Never leave a dead guerrilla behind without first recovering his gear. Similarly take great care in conserving ammunition. In a fire fight, one can always distinguish the regular, with his scatter-gun shooting, from the guerrilla and his isolated, well-aimed shots.

Another characteristic of the individual guerrilla is his initiative. In contrast to the rigidity of classical warfare, the guerrilla invents his own tactics for each moment of battle and constantly surprises his enemy.

A major responsibility of guerrilla leaders is to choose properly the time and place to defend a position to the end. If a first-class terrain study finds an impregnable position in the path of the enemy's advance, he can be stopped cold by just a few guerrillas.

The way a guerrilla army attacks also is different: a sudden, surprise, furious, relentless attack; then, abruptly, total passivity. The survivors think things have returned to normal when suddenly a fresh blow lands from a new direction. An unexpected, lightning blow is what counts!

Sabotage is an important revolutionary means but should be differentiated from terrorism. Terrorism against numbers of simple folk is inefficient and can provoke massive repression. Terrorism in retaliation against the curelty of a key individual in the oppressor hierarchy, however, is worthwhile.

Terrorist Tactics

There remains another point regarding terrorism—a controversial one. Many feel that once terrorism is used and the oppressor angered, sympathetic communication with the masses will be more difficult. That's true as far as it goes. But often the oppressor's grip is so tight that nothing can be done anyway, except by force of arms. It comes down to a calculated risk.

If well conducted, sabotage is an efficient arm. But don't knock out industries which will needlessly put people out of work without helping to achieve the revolution's goals. For example, stopping a soft-drink factory won't paralyze a whole sector of the oppressor's economy. Blowing up an electric plant will. We'll have more to say on sabotage later.

Aviation is a favorite weapon of the enemy, but it really contributes nothing during the preliminary phases when the guerrillas are scattered in the hills. Aviation's job is the systematic destruction of organized, visible defenses or troops on the march in open country in daytime.

One of the enemy's weakest points is highway and rail transport. It's practically impossible to guard this

Maj Peterson, a New York business consultant on Latin America projects has had three separate tours of active duty with the Corps. He was commissioned via the Officer Candidate Application program in 1945, came back in 1951 for a tour in Korea. Reactivated in '57 at his own request, he served a tour at the Equipment Board as a member of the Advance Base Problem Unit at Quantico. He is a graduate of Boston Latin School, Harvard College and Harvard Business School.

meter by meter. The route, or transport passing over it, can easily be blown up. In Cuba we made our own gunpowder and invented various tricky devices to set it off. A highway ambush, mining the truck and shooting the survivors, made the most efficient use of our munitions: the enemy was surprised, had no time to return fire, and couldn't flee.

Of course the enemy will react to this and, instead of dispatching single vehicles, will send through armed convoys. The answer is good selection for an ambush site, breaking up the column, and concentrating fires. Also guard escape and reinforcement routes. Know the local population and get them to help out on supplies and transport, roadblocking, and care of wounded. If all these principles are followed, the effect on enemy communication will pay rich dividends.

An important aspect of guerrilla tactics is the treatment accorded people found in the zone, including the enemy. Be relentless in the attack and toward traitors, but merciful toward those who fought only because they were forced to by the oppressor. If there are no protected operating bases, don't take prisoners; let them go free and give what reasonable aid you can to the wounded. In conduct toward the civil population show great respect and demonstrate the guerrillas' moral superiority. Don't execute anyone without a hearing, unless required by the situation.

Wide World

Revolt expands from country to suburbs to cities

Fighting in Favorable Terrain

Basic principles and similar tactics will apply whenever the guerrilla band is located in areas of difficult and intricate access, such as jagged mountains or swamps.

With a naturally well-protected refuge, guerrillas can come out to fight in the day as well as night. They are less restrained by enemy land and air observation; they can wage battle with fewer men and for longer duration. and hostile reinforcements can be held off.

The disadvantage of such warfare is the difficulty of capturing in a single action a large quantity of arms and ammunition. This is more or less compensated for, however, by the relative ease of establishing free from enemy interference, service activities such as hospitals. training centers, supply dumps, propaganda mills, etc. Moreover, the entire guerrilla force can be better integrated between fighters and service forces, trainees and veterans.

The number of individuals in a guerrilla band is quite flexible. It depends on the terrain, supply facilities, mass flights of oppressed people from other areas, available arms, organizational needs. There's nothing wrong with staying put for a while and accummulating more and more fighters.

The band's radius of action usually is five or six hours, determined by the duration of darkness available to leave protected ground, reach the point of action, and return.

Preferred weapons are those of long range and low ammunition expenditure rates, supported by some automatic or semi-automatic weapons. One of the best small arms is the M-1, the Garand. However, it must be used only by experienced people for it can waste much ammunition. Medium-weight weapons, such as tripod-mounted machine guns, offer a better margin of safety in favorable terrain, but only as weapons of containment, not assault.

A good set of weapons for a band of 25 men would be 10 to 15 single-shot rifles and approximately 10 automatic weapons such as the Garand, sub-machine guns, the Browning automatic rifle, or the modern Belgian FAL or the US M-14. Heavy arms, aviation, cannons, and tanks have little use in the type of terrain that is favorable for guerrilla warfare.

Supplying guerrilla strongholds in such terrain is difficult, not only because of transport but also because of local scarcity. It's a constant struggle and it's best to build up some reserves against contingencies. For transport, use mules and, for the last stretch, man-haul. Figure a sustained 55-pound load per man. For exterior communications, use a chain of trustworthy people to store supplies and provide hiding places when needed.

Fighting in Unfavorable Terrain

To wage guerrilla warfare in more or less open country, all the regular principles have to be followed with even more skill and intensity. The maximum possible mobility is required. Strike lightning-swift blows, preferably at night. Withdraw in a different direction.

During the night a man can march 20 to 25 miles. This can be stretched into the early hours of daybreak if the area isn't closely guarded and one can risk being reported by the local inhabitants. Introduce variety in the routine so as not to invite prearranged ambush.

Since shock, not sustained attack, is the key to fighting in open country, emphasize automatic weapons. At night, especially, it's not marksmanship but concentra-

tion of fire at a short distance that will annihilate the enemy.

Also important is the mining of roads and blowing up of bridges. Aggressiveness will be vented in the frequency and violence of attacks rather than their duration. For example, a shotgun loaded with buckshot is an excellent weapon to greet passing trucks and busses carrying troops.

Staying supplied with munitions to continue fighting is always a touchy problem for guerrillas. The guerrilla never attacks the enemy—even if it's probable he can annihilate them—if it means he will expend all his ammunition and can't immediately resupply himself.

A good number of men for a guerrilla band fighting in open country is 10 or 15 at the most. This number provides good mutual support, presents a formidable front when fires are massed, yet can readily scatter and hide itself when necessary. The danger of detection when encamped is not too great.

Lacking good cover and concealment, the plains guerrilla trusts no one whose loyalty isn't proved. Enemy retaliation is so brutal, not only against men but also against women and children, that only the very strongest won't succumb and tell where the guerrilla band is and how it operates. This could produce an encirclement of most disagreeable, although not necessarily fatal, consequences.

Organization and Command

For major attacks guerrillas can be massed, but immediately thereafter they must withdraw in small, widely-dispersed groups. Virtual armies can be organized under a single command without actually merging the various groups. The secret is to be sure to elect the right chief for each band, one who will ideologically and personally work well with the top leader of the zone.

Because of its ease of transport and operation, the bazooka is a very useful weapon, replacing anti-tank rifle grenades against armored vehicles, troop-carrying trucks, or pillboxes. Make each shot count, for on the march the maximum a man can carry is only three rockets.

If heavy weapons are captured, it would be natural to try to use them. Heavy machine guns can be readily used, but one must resign himself to abandoning them eventually in order not to lose the mobility required for fighting in open country. In any other case, however, the loss of weapons would be inexcusable.

Supply in open country is much easier because the inhabitants are more numerous. Hammocks, blankets, waterproof wrapping, mosquito netting, shoes, medicine, and food can be readily obtained by using loyal people and contacting ordinary stores. If the group is small, it won't be too difficult to get meals.

Communications will be easier with respect to contacting and moving about greater numbers of men. But it will be much harder to relay a message safely to a distant point because the security risk multiplies with the number of handlers. Oral messages, after being repeated too often, get distorted. It's better to use written messages in code.

When all factors are considered, two conclusions emerge: First, what is favorable for civilian life usually is unfavorable for guerrilla warfare. Second, because of the much greater consequences of treachery in open country, great efforts must be made to proseletyze the inhabitants. Any defection must be dealt with summarily.

Fighting in Suburban Areas

If it should happen that the battle is pursued right up to the outskirts of a city and seems to lodge there with some permanency, special procedures will be required.

But first let's point out that a guerrilla band never arises by itself in a suburban area. Such a band will form only when a favorable environment has been created by others and the band will always be under direct orders of superiors situated outside. Accordingly, the mission of this band will not be to act independently, but to follow preconceived strategic plans. In other words, a suburban band will not be able to choose whether to knock down telephone poles or to ambush patrolling soldiers; it will do exactly as told. If its job is to cut telephone poles, electric cableways, sewerage lines, water conduits, or railways, it will confine itself to just these things—and do them to perfection.

Such a band shouldn't number more than four or five men. This is important because the suburban guerrilla is working in exceptionally unfavorable terrain where the risks and consequences of exposure are tremendous. There's scant distance separating the guerrilla's point of action and his refuge, so night action predominates. He doesn't finally come out into the open until the insurgents beseige the city.

Essential qualities of the suburban guerrilla are discipline, probably to a degree unexcelled by any other, and discretion. He doesn't count on more than two or three friendly houses where he can get fed, since encirclement inside a house would be fatal. His only armament is a small, easily concealed personal weapon which won't hamper running. His action is limited to surprising one or two enemy troops or executing sabotage on order.

Sabotage Materials

For sabotage he needs good saws, lots of dynamite, picks and shovels, railway crowbars—items that can be easily hid, yet quickly accessible when needed.

If there's more than one guerrilla band, all will operate under a single chief who will issue orders through civilian contacts of proven loyalty. Sometimes a guerrilla can continue in his civilian work, but this is very difficult. Usually the suburban guerrillas operate beyond the law in military fashion and with all the unfavorable aspects cited.

The importance of suburban fighting has not been fully appreciated. When done effectively and extended over a wide area, it completely paralyzes the everyday life of the sector. The population becomes restless, anguished, almost anxious for the development of violence in order to bring the matter to an end. If, at the very start of the war, specialists are organized for suburban guerrilla work, quicker action can be obtained, more lives spared, and the nation's valuable time saved.

(NEXT MONTH: PART II)

WALLER of SAMAR

Part II

For many years, whenever a veteran of the Samar campaign entered the mess the senior officer present would call out, "Stand gentlemen, he served on Samar."

What has gone before: On 17 March 1902, Maj Littleton Waller Tazewell Waller, USMC, went on trial by general court-martial for "murder, in violation of the fifty-eighth article of war." Specifically, while serving as commanding officer of the Basey Subdistrict on the island of Samar in the Philippines, on or about 20 January 1902, Maj Waller ordered the execution of 11 natives by firing squad.

Although admitting the act, Maj Waller pleaded not guilty to murder, his defense being that he was authorized in his action by the laws of warfare. His career, possibly his life, thus would depend on the validity of his defense—on what actually had happened during his months in Samar.

Waller had been ordered to Samar in command of a battalion of Marines after native rebel forces had treacherously attacked and massacred a company of American infantry. By a series of brilliant expeditions culminating in the successful assault of the rebel stronghold, Waller in less than six weeks had so disorganized the insurgents that he now was able to undertake a new mission assigned by his immediate superior, BGen Smith, USA: a reconnaissance march across southern Samar.

By Capt Robert Asprey

THE EXACT GENESIS OF WHAT ONE DAY WOULD BE called the "March across Samar" is not known, but apparently BGen Smith had favored the notion for some time. Speaking of a conference with Smith in early December, 1901, Waller wrote:

> "General Smith also asked me again to make the march across the mountain to Hernani, on the east coast. He gave me authority to work from Basey to Balangiga, a distance of about 52 miles by trail, in order that I might either capture or destroy the remnants of the insurrectos, now scattered in small bands and causing much trouble to the other natives. Authority was given me to use my own judgment as to the point of departure from the east coast to cross the mountains; that is to say, either from Hernani or Lanang."

Waller spent most of December in leading an expedition from Basey to the east coast, during which he fought numerous small and successful skirmishes at such phonetically-pleasing places as Quinapundan, Omagonggong, and Pambuham. On 21 December he reported to Gen Smith:

> "Unless we meet with something much more serious than we have during this march, I think it safe to say that the southern part of the island of Samar is as quiet as many parts of Luzon, where peace is supposed to reign."

The report presciently continued:

> "Of course there will be bands of ladrones [native bandits] to encounter, but this conditon has existed for several hundred years and, in my humble opinion, will continue until by education and prosperity these people are taught where their interests lie. When this time arrives, they may be capable of self-government —not before."

In late December, Waller reached Lanang on the coast which was garrisoned by the American Army. There, two Army officers, Capt Pickering and Lt Williams, attempted to talk him out of the proposed march but,

> "remembering the General's [Smith] several talks on the subject and his evident desire to know the trail and run wires across, coupled with my own desire for some further knowledge of the people and the nature of this heretofore impenetrable country, I decided to make the trail with 50 men and the necessary carriers."

The expedition shoved off from Lanang on 28 December, a pleasant day that contrasted strongly with earlier, very heavy rains. Waller took Porter and Bearss, 1stLt Williams, 2dLt Halford, and 2dLt Lyles, an Army

officer assigned by BGen Smith. In addition the force comprised 50 enlisted Marines, two native scouts named Slim and Smoke, and 33 native carriers or cargadores.

They traveled by boats as far up river as they could, which was not very far. The subsequent march almost at once struck impossibly tortuous terrain. While gritty soil tore through heavy soles of hobnailed marching boots, heavy vines and thorns ripped clothes from the body and dispensed slimy leeches which homed under lacerated skin to produce painful, festering sores. The mountainous country dictated constant fording of the river which, in turn, spelled wet clothing with severe chafing. Then the rains returned.

Moving slower and slower, the long column traveled about 12 miles for every three miles gained. On 30 December Waller reduced rations; the next day he cut them to one-half and the number of meals per day to two. By 1 January his maps had been destroyed and he had as yet seen nothing that looked like the alleged Spanish trail. On 2 January the column was reduced to one-third rations; by 3 January many of the men could no longer keep up.

Waller now decided to take Lt Halford and 13 men in the best condition, push on to a rendezvous with Capt Dunlap who was waiting with food and clothing on the Sojoton river, then send back a relief party to the main column. This group, under Porter's command, would move ahead slowly and follow Waller's trail, which would be clearly marked.

Due to communications failure, this plan completely miscarried.

By the morning of 4 January, Waller's party had made such little progress that he decided to return to Lanang. In a message sent by native carrier to Porter, Waller informed him of his new decision and instructed him to go to the Suribao river and start building rafts until his, Waller's, party returned.

Porter soon discovered that the wood was not suitable for rafts—it wouldn't float. When Waller failed to appear, Porter sent Bearss and one man to find him.

Disliking to abandon the expedition, Waller meanwhile had pushed on a mile or two and had discovered salvation in the form of a clearing planted with bananas, young cocoanut palms, and camotes, a variety of sweet potato. An equally prosperous clearing was located on the opposite side of the river and a trail led five minutes away to still another clearing with shack.

Capt Bearss and Cpl Murphy now caught up to Waller and reported that Porter's group was only about an hour and a half away. Waller thereupon sent a second message to Porter instructing him to march to these clearings, feed and rest his troops, then continue the march along Waller's marked trail. In short, Waller reverted to his first plan: he would push on, rendezvous with Duncan, and send back a relief party.

After waiting an hour for Porter, Waller crossed the river to a new clearing, messed his troops, and saw to it that their feet "were well washed with soap and bathed in a good strong bichloride solution." At this point Waller's native runner returned and reported that the insurrectos were so numerous he had not gotten through to Porter. Capt Bearss told Waller he was





Waller and some of his officers in the Philippines in the early 1900's

sure Porter would come along anyway as "he was considering it when he [Bearss] left." With that, Waller resumed the march.

Waller's party soon struck a well-defined trail that eventually led to a native shack where five persons were captured. Of them, a man and a 12-year-old boy knew the way into Basey. After a rugged march of two more days, the small party picked up the Sojoton river and, eventually, Dunlap's party. They reached Basey on 6 January 1902.

Waller Takes Off Again

Although exhausted, Waller immediately organized a relief party which he personally led out on 8 January. Altogether he spent nine days in a fruitless search for Porter's group—indeed, severe floods had removed traces of his own camp sites. His troops giving out, he returned to Basey and collapsed. In something over a month this 45-year-old officer had marched about 250 miles, much of it through impossible mountain terrain. His ankle in bad shape and his body covered with sores, he now gave in to a fever and was hospitalized with a 105° temperature.

What happened to Porter and the main column?

After Porter had dispatched Capt Bearss and Cpl Murphy to Waller, he stood by awaiting new orders. When none came by late afternoon, Porter sent out a native who soon returned and reported that he couldn't find Waller.

Porter and Williams now made an estimate of the situation. The last word received from Waller was to build rafts and stand by. Porter concluded that Waller was delaying up ahead because of the sad condition of his troops. Porter's own troops were nearly exhausted. His native carriers were becoming increasingly surly, and his supply consisted of a few cans of bacon and one ration of coffee. He decided his column must return to Lanang on foot.

Accordingly, on the morning of 3 January, Porter, who considered himself "stronger and in better physical condition than Lt Williams," took GySgt Quick, six men and six natives and started for Lanang where he would organize a relief party. Leaving Williams in command of the main column, he ordered him "to remain where he was, waiting for [Waller] a reasonable time and then to follow my trail." Porter also left Waller a detailed report of his plan in a tin can "tied to a tree in a most conspicuous place where it was impossible to miss it, that side of the tree being blazed so as to attract attention."

After an indescribably brutal march—the Lanang river had risen 15 feet in one night which prevented crossing and re-crossing—Porter's small party reached the area where the original column had left the boats. Here he was forced to abandon four of his seven Marines, hopeful in the knowledge that they could subsist on potatoes until his return. He and the rest of his party finally struggled into Lanang on the evening of 11 January, three days after Waller had started out in search of them *from Basey*.

At Lanang, Porter organized a relief party under Army Lt Williams, but the flood river prevented its departure until 14 January. Two days later the relief party found the four Marines left behind by Porter, got them safely into Lanang by canoe, then pushed on in search of Williams' column.

Williams, meanwhile, had been undergoing the tortures of the damned. With no rations and his men barefooted,

"one day was like the rest. By day we stumbled painfully forward and by night lay in a stupor, tormented by the most vivid dreams of food and comforts. At the first clearing Pvt Baroni, too sick to move, was left, and from that time until five days before we were rescued ten men were left scattered along the trail, despairing in mind and so nearly dead from starvation and exposure that they could not crawl, and, in most cases, move."

Native Scouts Mutiny

The conduct of his native carriers, never exemplary, soon became mutinous. Repeatedly disobeying direct orders, they refused to scout the trail or to gather firewood. When they found edible wild food they hid it from the Marines. Late in the ordeal, when Williams ordered three of them to search for firewood, one jumped him, stabbed him with a bolo, and bit him in the hand while the rest looked on. "Although the attack occurred but a few yards from camp, it was at least two minutes before the men came to my assistance, and then the first to come, Sgt McCaffery, was too weak to work the bolt of his rifle." Pursuit, of course, was impossible. The three natives escaped into the bush.

Williams would have had the other carriers shot except that each plan he conceived "depended upon the concerted action of every man in the party." "He was afraid that because of their weakness—the weakness of all of us—that some one or two might slip up in carrying it out, and then the natives might kill us."

At this critical juncture—about noon of 18 January—the Army relief party came onto the survivors. *Williams and his men were crawling towards them.* They reached Lanang that night and by 20 January all hands were in the Army hospital at Tacloban, Leyte.

Capt Porter at once telephoned the terrible story to Maj Waller at Basey. Porter had arrested 11 of the natives and was sending them to Basey under GySgt Quick. Porter believed they should be shot; so did Williams; so did the troops.

Waller knew exactly what Porter was talking about. On 5 January he had been personally threatened by a carrier named Victor and throughout the march his scouts, Slim and Smoke, had failed to report to him when ordered. Victor, who had not gotten through to Porter because the area was full of insurrectos, was discovered to have lied and to have told another guide, "As the Americans will not return to the other party, it will be a good time for us to kill them and flee to the mountains."

After Porter's telephone call and GySgt Quick's personal report, Waller called in the 11 prisoners, who only trembled silently during interrogation. Convinced of their treachery, Waller was also mindful of his overall mission. He was still out of action; the populations of Basey and Balangiga were openly hostile; he had 95 prisoners, and only 45 effective Marines for duty.

His orders to execute the 11 people were carried out that afternoon. The next day he telegraphed BGen Smith on Leyte that he had "expended" 11 natives.

The matter might have ended there except for, according to Waller's later report to the Commandant, "the vain boastfulness of one of the officers of my battalion." However it happened or whoever was responsible, word of the executions reached MajGen Chaffee in Manila. Already in trouble with Governor Taft for his military policy, Chaffee at once queried BGen Smith, who started the official investigation that led to Waller's arrest and court-martial.

Waller was defended by Cdr Adolf Marix, USN, Maj Edwin F. Glenn, 5th US Infantry, and one Mr. Oscar Sutro, of whom nothing more is found in the records.

Senior Member of the Court was BGen William H. Bisbee, USA. In addition to seven Army officers ranging from colonel to captain, the Court comprised six Marines, including Maj William P. Biddle and Capt Eli C. Cole.

Defense opened with a plea "in bar of jurisdiction"—that since Waller had been relieved from service with the Army, the Army could not now court-martial him. This, a very fast legal curve, caused endless adjournments until the convening authority, MajGen Chaffee, denied the argument and the trial proceeded.

Smith Puts His Foot In It

Apparently not discouraged, Defense now chose a singular plea that lasted until the end of the trail. In executing the natives, the Defense maintained, Maj Waller was not only acting completely within his authority as area commander in time of war and under martial law (as opposed to military law) within the terms of General Order Number 100, but his act was fully justified by the circumstances and was defended by national and international precedents.

This was a good plea and as one studies the 400 some flimsy pages of transcript the impression is gained that Defense was winning its case. At the very least the Court's decision would have been close. But now an Army major named Kingsbury, who was Judge Advo-

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Zoo's Who

In 1952 while walking a shot-up piece of ridgeline occupied by 3/5 I came across this sign lettered on an old piece of C-ration carton:

The only foxhole in H/3/5
With a real live fox inside.

Inside was HM Foxx, company corpsman.

$15.00 to MSgt Clay Barrow

cate prosecuting, committed a dreadful error—one that not only would influence the trial but would bring down the wrath of Theodore Roosevelt on the United States Army. Kingsbury called BGen Smith as a witness for the prosecution.

When Smith took the stand, Defense reiterated its intent to argue the case solely within the legal bounds of General Order Number 100. Apparently unimpressed, Kingsbury now established that Smith had never seen Waller's original operations order (see Part I) and that he would have disapproved of parts of it, particularly the last paragraph: "We have also to avenge our late comrades in North China—the murdered men of the Ninth United States Infantry." Smith then stated his incredible opinion to the Court that the massacre at Balangiga was actually defensible under international laws of warfare!

Waller Takes the Stand

This was too much for Defense. Calling Waller to the stand, his counsel asked him to describe the original conference with Gen Smith, the one that had inspired the now questionable operations order. Waller told the Court that in front of witnesses Smith had stated to him, "I want no prisoners," and "I want you to kill and burn. The more you kill and burn, the better you will please me."

Waller then testified that Smith wanted all persons killed "who were capable of bearing arms." When Waller asked him what age limit he should respect, he was told ten years! Further, before Waller's final assault against the Sojoton stronghold, he had received a message from Smith ordering, "You will make the interior of Samar a howling wilderness!"

The evidence was terribly damning to Smith, the more so because Waller obviously had employed great restraint throughout the campaign in carrying out such desired retribution. As Porter testified—and he was witness to the conference—Waller later told him in reference to the order to kill ten-year-old insurgents, ". . . we are not making war against women and children, Porter; we are making war against men capable of bearing arms." And when in Court the Major was asked, "Why did you take prisoners . . . when you had specific orders not to take them?", he replied, "I have been twenty-three years in the service; I have served with almost every army in the world; and I know the laws of war, sir."

Although it was now obvious to the Court that almost any punitive action by Waller would have been defensible under the extraordinary orders issued by Smith, it is greatly to the credit of the former that he still refused to admit that protection in defending himself. The following testimony is revealing:

Q.—From the evidence you received during these various reports [from Porter, Quick, etc.], and the opinions which were expressed to you directly or indirectly by officers and men, what was your decision as to what should be done with these men?

A.—No doubt in my mind at all, sir, and I acted on that and had the men shot.

Q.—Did you honestly believe that these men deserved death?

A.—Undoubtedly; and they were the only men I ever had shot.

Q.—Did the military situation, or did it not, make it advisable to kill these really condemned men at that time?

A.—It did.

And in a written statement submitted to the Court, Maj Waller wrote:

"As the representative officer responsible for the safety and welfare of my men, after investigation and from the information I had, considering the situation from all points I ordered the eleven men shot. I honestly thought I was right then, I believe now that I was right. Whatever may happen to me I have the sure knowledge that my people know, and I believe the world knows that I am not a murderer."

After lengthy deliberation the Court agreed: Major Littleton W. T. Waller, USMC, was acquitted.

Although the Court's decision was excoriated by the local reviewing authority, it was upheld by the Judge Advocate General of the War Department, who also ironically concluded that Waller's original plea "in bar of jurisdiction" was valid. Therefore, he ruled, "the court-martial acted without jurisdiction and . . . its proceedings are, for that reason, null and void, and it is recommended that General Chaffee be so advised."

Unfortunately, this did not end the affair.

Under fire by important civilians for his Philippine policy, a thoroughly alarmed President Roosevelt immediately ordered "a most thorough, searching and exhaustive investigation" into Army policy in America's newest possession. Less than a month after Waller's trial, Chaffee was forced to court-martial five regular Army officers, one of whom was BGen Jacob Smith.

Found guilty of the charge, "Conduct to the prejudice of good order and military discipline"—specifically, his retributive orders to Waller—Smith was sentenced "to be admonished by the reviewing authority." Elihu Root, however, in forwarding the case to the President, concluded that, despite Smith's excellent military record, his action was inexcusable. Since he was going on 62 years of age, Root recommended Smith be retired. Roosevelt agreed.

The High Price of Success

But for a political coincidence, the episode probably would have left Waller otherwise unscathed. But the Governor of the Philippines at the time, William Howard Taft, was a mortal enemy of MajGen Chaffee and his military policy with which Waller was inextricably volved. In 1911, when Waller became eligible for Commandant of the Marine Corps, Taft was President and chose instead William P. Biddle who, as a major, had sat on Waller's court-martial.

This was indeed a high price to pay. Yet it is doubtful if Waller ever regretted his decision on that day of 20 January in Basey, Samar. To Waller the order was a matter of protecting his mission. And to Waller his mission was forever paramount in importance to all else—to career, even to life. For this reason, perhaps, Smedley Butler, who saw a lot of officers in his own career, later called Littleton Waller "the greatest soldier I have ever known." USMC

From the Director



BGen W. T. Fairbourn

MARINE CORPS RESERVE

Each year on-board strength at major Commands take on added muscle—40,000 dedicated Marines making annual training pilgrimage

SHOULD MOBILIZATION COME, MEMBERS OF ORGANIZED Reserve units would find themselves in ranks with regulars. For many this change of scenery would come as no great surprise. Thousands of reservists have "gone down that road before." Each summer, dozens of units train with Fleet Marine Forces.

This "host unit" system has proved immensely popular both with reserve and regular commanders. In addition to professional aspects lent to training, both parts of the whole gain in mutual respect.

Last year, at Camp Pendleton, 23 Reserve units were hosted by 1st Marine Division units. At Camp Lejeune, 27 Reserve outfits trained with units of the 2d Marine Division.

Training available by adoption of the host system primarily consists of exercises and instruction that can't be done at home. Tank-infantry tactics, employment of flame throwers, hand and rifle grenades and combat in built-up areas are some examples.

Other Reserve units at AFT (Annual Field Training), depending upon their designations take to field or classroom, either on their own hook or aided by Force Troops or base units. This is especially true with specialist units, e.g., engineers, motor transport, service and ordnance, where more technical training is required.

While members of infantry units are under the wing of FMF units, certain reservists in each of these organizations are undergoing on-the-job training. Communicators, supplymen and administrators, for instance, spend a great deal of their two weeks' training in short courses designed for their particular MOS.

On the opposite side of the coin, division Marines are integrated into Reserve infantry battalions and rifle companies to beef-up manpower during field exercises calling for full-strength units. Regulars also act the aggressor role in many such operations.

A typical two-week stint of annual field training, using the host system, was undertaken last summer by 24th Rifle Company, New London, Conn. Unit started training with helicopter indoctrination and familiarization flight. Then came instructions in land mind warfare, defense against gas attack, mission and capabilities of division recon, and tank-infantry coordination. Entire company fired machine guns and rifle grenades. A battalion FIREX wound-up training. Host unit was 2nd Battalion, 8th Marines.

Out in Hawaii, the lone organized Reserve unit in the state, Pearl Harbor's 27th Rifle Company, went through its paces under the eye of host unit 1st Battalion, 4th Marines. Members of the company also got a lesson in CAS (Close Air Support) from MAG-13 fighter and attack aircraft at MCAS, Kaneohe Bay.

This month, first increments of reservists start 1961 AFT. By September, more than 40,000 of them, aviation and ground, will have spent two weeks on active duty.

At this writing, indications are that eight Reserve infantry unlits will train with the 2nd Marine Division this year. While we have not yet set figures on the number of units to be hosted by Camp Pendleton's FMF units, total should read about the same as last year. District Directors have been polled to determine which units in their jurisdiction would benefit most from such training.

Of course, in addition to infantry units, dozens of other Reserve units will also train with regular units—the divisions, Force Troops and base units. Roanoke's 5th Engineer Company will spend its two weeks AFT at Quantico training as a regular engineer outfit for the post.

The bond of mutual respect welded between regulars and reservists during these summer training sessions is still another factor that makes the host system workable and worthy. About the system a division commander in his annual report on local reserve training wrote:

"The host unit system . . . proved very effective in accomplishing the prescribed training objectives. In addition, it is conducive to fostering better relations between reserve and regular, acquaints both units with mutual problem areas and exchange of ideas."

Someday, regulars and reservists may again fight from the same foxhole. They will be trained as a team. USMC

REPORT FROM THE READY FORCES

1st MARINE DIVISION

Trained on the beaches of Pendleton, in the snow and ice of the high Sierras, and on the desert at Twentynine Palms, this mixture of the Old and New Breeds is ready for action

STANDING ON CAMP PENDLETON'S EAGLE PEAK A MARINE, the basic commodity of the 1st Marine Division, can see the golden-hued panorama of the land. He can see the housing, training, and support installations which have helped mold him into a modern instrument of war.

To seaward are the landing beaches (Aliso, Las Pulgas and San Onofre), oddly contrasting with busy US Highway 101.

Between Eagle Peak and the distant snow-capped mountains to the northeast emerge Camp Pendleton's maneuver areas, firing ranges, barracks, and housing areas.

One encompassing look takes in the 10 by 20-mile reservation and its patchwork of training facilities well-populated with busily training Marines.

Assisting the 1stMarDiv in maintaining its position of readiness to undertake any assigned mission are the augmenting training facilities of six military installations, almost within commuting distance.

Of major training importance to the Division are the Marine Corps Air Station, El Toro; the Naval Amphibious Base, Coronado; the Naval Bases at Long Beach and San Diego; the Cold Weather Training Center, Bridgeport, California; and the vast network of artillery ranges at Twentynine Palms. All of these facilities are utilized to a high degree in the Division's heavy training schedule.

To develop and maintain the skills of all Marines and their units (thereby insuring readiness for immediate deployment), is the principal objective of the 1st MarDiv's training program.

The program provides completely trained transplacement infantry battalions for the Okinawa-based 3d Marine Division in accordance with the Marine Corps' rotation-transplacement program.

On St. Patrick's Day 17 March 1959, the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, embarked aboard USNS *General Hugh J. Gaffey* to launch the Corps' unprecedented transplacement program. Over 10,000 highly trained Marines have since been processed.

The training schedule for the 1stMarDiv is set forth in directives from the Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific. Implementation of the training program provides for the blending of the Infantry Training Regiment's raw Marines with the "old hands," in an extension of both individual and unit training, ranging progressively from the fire-team level to full-scale division exercises. If a yardstick existed for measuring variety in training, it would prove that the Division's program provides full measure in all facets.

During calendar year 1960, units of the 1stMarDiv successfully completed more than 28 major training exercises. These exercises spanned the extremes of climate and terrain from the beaches of Camp Pendleton, to the mountains of the Cold Weather Training Center, and the barren sands of Twentynine Palms.

Included among the exercises were three brigade or regimental landing team and two battalion team amphibious exercises; two battalion helicopter exercises; one snow field exercise; four artillery regiment exercises (two at Twentynine Palms); one combat support landing exercise; three close air support exercises; Reconnaissance Battalion mountain and desert exercises; four Atomic-Biological-Chemical-Defense exercises; an Antitank Battalion firing exercise (at San Clemente Island); and four division command post exercises.

Squeezed in among these major training exercises were support programs for the Marine Corps Reserve, the Pacific Summer Midshipman's Training Program, a landing demonstration for the annual meeting of the

▲ **1st Division Marines hit Camp Pendleton's White Beach. During 1960, the Division conducted 28 major training exercises of various types**

Assault by fire. Combat readiness of the individual Marine "with his feet on the ground" is the ▼ Division's primary training objective



Navy League, and a full scale amphibious assault demonstration for the 31st Joint Civilian Orientation Conference. In 1961 the Division will complete an even more impressive record of training.

In January of this year two infantry battalions conducted successive helicopter exercises and by March two battalions had completed extensive snow exercises at the Cold Weather Training Center. Then in May and June the Division joined the 3d Marine Air Wing, the Brigade from Hawaii and elements of the Navy's 1st Fleet in OPERATION GREENLIGHT, perhaps the most extensive amphibious exercise on the West Coast since Korea. Landing on Camp Pendleton's beaches in May, the massive exercise continues at Twentynine Palms into June.

Major Exercises

The Division's 1st, 5th, 7th Regiments participated heavily in the 1960 landings over Pendleton's beaches. February's SWAN DIVE exercise was of regimental landing team size. BIG TOP in May and PACK MULE in late October were of brigade size. These exercises involved the landing and support of troops by helicopters.

The 1stMarDiv's amphibious exercises proved to be outstanding vehicles for the planning and execution of modern amphibious assaults. Simultaneously, the exercises provided an opportunity to improve techniques for control and protection of helicopter waves, and the operational and logistical aspects of ground-delivered atomic weapons.

In SWAN DIVE, battalion and regimental commanders tested the use of HOK helicopters as organization air-vehicles. Displacement of an entire LSA containing dummy cargo and ammunition was accomplished by HUS and HR2S helicopters.

Commanding General
MajGen H. R. Paige

ADC
BGen F. E. Leek

CO, 1st Marines
Col C. T. Hodges

C/S
Col L. Metzger



G-1
Col E. J. Rowse



How to get the troops ashore—here both lateral and vertical assault techniques are combined

Rotorcycles and high speed aerial delivery techniques received testing attention. In conjunction with MAG 36, 3d MAW, considerable work was done on the command, control, and protection of helicopters during BIG TOP.

PACK MULE was made to order for certain tests in connection with Fleet Marine Force Troop Test Program. Battalion Landing Team 2/3/5 had Redeye and a platoon of 4.2-inch HOWTARS. Regimental Landing Team-7 tested the organization of Regimental Headquarters Company.

A firing exercise in conjunction with PACK MULE involved the helicopter lift of a 4.2-inch HOWTAR Battery to San Clemente Island.

Even in sunny, southern California the weather pulls tricks. During three major exercises, the value of alternate plans was once again proved in debarking landing force elements, originally to be carried by helicopters. For safety reasons they were landed by surface means to counter the rain and fog.

Schools Training

In the overall training program, formal school training plays an important role. Here, both officers and men acquire knowledge of a particular skill under expert instruction. Specialized school training such as this is not designed to replace on-the-job training at the unit but rather to supplement it.

Personnel of the Division have access to varied courses included in the curricula of five schools which comprise the Division Schools Center. These cover basic skills in Communications, Intelligence, NCO Leadership, and ABCD. Each of these schools provides additional courses where more intensive treatment of a particular phase is desired. For example, the Intelligence School provides courses in Aerial Photo Interpretation, Map and Aerial Photo Reading, and Officer and Staff

CO, 5th Marines
Col W. D. Sawyer

CO, 7th Marines
Col A. Arsenault

CO, 11th Marines
Col D. R. Griffin

CO, 1st FSR
Col A. S. Sanders

G-2
Col H. S. Roise

G-3
Col H. Stiff

G-4
Col C. E. Warren

Div Sgt Maj
B. H. LeGrand

NCO Combat Intelligence. During 1960, the Schools Center graduated approximately 4,000 officers and men.

The Divisions Schools Center is not the only school training facility within the Division. Other schools are conducted under cognizant staff sections. Schools such as Supply, Ordnance, Demolition and Land Mine Warfare, and Tactical Air Observation are offered on an "as required" basis.

Schooling in personnel administration and other associated courses is offered by Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton. The 1stMarDiv makes maximum use of these facilities.

The location of the Amphibious Training Command, Pacific Fleet, in Coronado puts it within easy reach of the Division. Here the Landing Force Training Unit, Pacific, conducts resident courses of instruction for Marines in amphibious warfare. In addition, mobile instruction teams from LFTU have conducted courses at Camp Pendleton in Embarkation, Landing Force Communications, Shore Party and Staff Planning.

Nuclear Weapons Training is acquired at the Nuclear Weapons Training Center, a part of the Training Command, Pacific Fleet, located in San Diego. This center offers courses ranging from Nuclear Weapons Orientation to Employment and furnishes the Division with trained personnel in this field. Many Division officers also attend the Cryptographic, Registered Publications, and Electronic Warfare Courses.

Marksmanship Program

A proposed marksmanship program described in the 1959 1stMarDiv report (GAZETTE: Feb '60) gained reality during 1960 in a highly successful way.

Of the 14,408 division Marines firing for rifle requalification, 3,312 fired expert. The Division completed the year with a 96.2 per cent requalification record. Last year's Division record was bettered by 254 experts and

Other Assignments

Surgeon	Capt J. R. Bierley, USN
Communications Officer	Col R. Hall
Supply Officer	Col B. B. Hammond
CO, 1stServBn	Col W. J. Hawatt
Air Officer	Col J. W. Ireland
Dental Officer	Capt J. R. Justice, USN
Legal Officer	Col J. T. Klegon
Chaplain	Capt R. F. McComas, USN
Director, ECIG	Col F. F. Parry
Inspector	Col A. Walker
Ordnance Officer	LtCol M. J. Culley, Jr.
CO, HqBn	LtCol E. W. Byan
CO, 7thEngBn	LtCol G. W. Ellis
Embarkation Officer	LtCol H. C. Gregory
CO, 7thMTBn	LtCol A. Hartman
CO, 1stTkBn	LtCol S. B. Jones, Jr.
Disbursing Officer	LtCol H. P. Langgut
CO, 7thCombBn	LtCol T. A. Manley
CO, 1stMTBn	LtCol W. T. Miller
CO, 1stReconBn	LtCol R. R. Miner
CO, Division Schools	LtCol W. Morris
CO, 1stServTroops	LtCol J. R. Mundy
Naval Gunfire Officer	LtCol C. W. Perry
CO, 1stAABn	LtCol H. St. Pierre
Safety Director	LtCol W. T. Shafer
CO, 1stSigBn	LtCol R. S. Stratton
Special Services Officer	LtCol [illegible] Threadgill
Engineer Officer	LtCol E. C. Turner
CO, 1stPionBn	LtCol E. C. Turner
CO, 1stMedBn	LtCol T. E. Watkins
Motor Transport Officer	*LtCol W. C. Wells
Food Director	Capt E. D. Bridges
Reenlistment Officer	Maj E. A. Deptula
Provost Marshall	Maj D. L. Evans
Staff Secretary	Maj F. G. Hudson
Adjutant	Maj M. S. Walker
Informational Services Officer	Maj. R. E. Campbell

*Retired 31 May - Home of record and available at press time.

in overall qualification by two percentage points.

Pistol records show an increase of two and one half percentage points over 1959's showing, with an overall qualification mark of 94.9 per cent. The two-handed pistol grip is credited for a measure of the increase. In illustration of the grip's success, the 5th Marines fired 900 Marines and only three failed to qualify.

Troop Tests

The 1stMarDiv commenced operation of Phase 1 of the Fleet Marine Force Troop Test in September 1960, as part of the Marine Corps-wide program directed by Quantico's Landing Force Development Center.

Upon completion of Phase 1, during December, the Division moved directly into the current Phase 2.

The importance of the Test Program to the 1stMar Div lies in the involvement of the smallest unit commander in the projected future planning for the Division's organizational and equipment needs. That plus rapid integration of the newly adopted policies and equipment into the Division.

Organization and Reorganization

The 1st Tank Battalion completed reorganization on 3 December 1960. Two companies are re-equipped with the M48A1, medium tank, while one company retains the M103A1 heavy tank. Now, within one battalion, is the desirable heavy punch of the 120MM gun tank and the speed and agility of the medium tank.

Battalion Landing Teams 3/5 and 3/7, formerly in a cadre status, took their place in the duty line by way of the reinstatement route, bringing the Division up to full organizational strength.

Programs to Improve Readiness

A prevailing Division objective is to constantly improve readiness to deploy on short notice for combat operations.

While training and operations enjoy the lion's share of public notice, many behind-the-scene projects make significant contributions to readiness.

Projects such as one adopted by G-2 personnel, who compile and publish "World Hot Spot" area studies for up-to-the-minute dissemination, keep Division personnel constantly informed on the world situation.

A prominent contributor to readiness is the "Ready Battalion Landing Team." Serving for periods of one month, the Ready BLT duty is assigned to an infantry battalion, reinforced, on a rotating basis from units within the Division.

Prior to the assumption of duty by the assigned Ready BLT, preparations are completed for its movement; air lift within 24 hours; surface movement within 48 hours (after notice). Prior preparation includes embarkation rosters and complete planning for movement by aircraft and ship; segregation of supplies and mount-out equipment; and preparation of personnel recall plans.

Upon receipt of an order to deploy the Ready BLT, its prearranged plans are immediately set in motion. When it is embarked, the Division commander designates and alerts another Ready BLT.

Two full-sized BLT drills during 1960 ironed out many planning difficulties. To illustrate, the second mount-out drill, involving BLT 1/7, was initiated on a Monday. The BLT was assembled, embarked with equipment and supplies aboard amphibious shipping on Wednesday, and landed in the assault over Camp Pendleton's beaches on Friday.

Rapid air movement to a world trouble spot, to prevent the eruption of all-out war, requires special training considerations.

As a result of a joint agreement between the Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Chief of Staff of the US Air Force, the 1stMarDiv began air movement training last September.

The purpose of the training is to familiarize Marines with the loading characteristics of C-123 and C-130 type aircraft. In addition, it serves to acquaint Air Force personnel with Marine Corps organization and air lift requirements.

Further aid to the rapid movement of Division units has been developed by the 1st Service Battalion. Using IBM Cardatype Accounting machines, IBM card decks are assembled, recording each Division organization's Table of Equipment.

Basically, the process involves the pre-packaging of mount-out and replenishment needs of Class II supplies; and the preparation of machine cards for each supply box or piece of equipment.

When a particular Division task organization is drawn up, the proper cards are selected and inserted into the machine. Within 12 hours the process produces the stock lists and manifests necessary for embarkation planning. The time element involved in a similar service using the old manual method was measured in days.

Even wider application of the IBM machines is currently being studied for the supply accounting of rapid mount-out.

Fiscal Management

Since material readiness ranks high in importance to overall combat readiness, speed between requisition and delivery is essential on needed items to insure a minimum of equipment deadline. This fiscal management problem is dealt with in the 1stMarDiv by delegating to 1st Service Battalion control of approximately 60 per cent of allotted funds, along with a planning estimate for each commodity group.

Unit commanders then requisition to fill shortages within their authorized allowances, without fund limitations. Special projects are monitored by a project manager, who provides guidance to the 1st Service Battalion whenever required. The Service Battalion commander reports daily listings of issue to the budget planning officer who insures that funds are not over-obligated.

This method of fiscal accounting promotes flexibility and rapidity of issue by making funds available to any unit commander with a minimum of budgetary control.

An excursion to Eagle Peak on any day during 1961 will afford the viewer similar scenes of activity. The 1st Marine Division attacks new problems, strives for mastery of new weapons, equipment and concepts—testing, discarding, accepting, and implementing the best of the new into its combat planning. USMC

From the Commander

Special Report

BGen L. B. Robertshaw

MARINE AIR RESERVE

Merger training for the Air Reserve started last summer when Reserve HMR-767 integrated with Regular HMR-361 at El Toro. The complete program runs through 1963. Here's how it works

CO-MATE—UNITY—CLIMAX!

These words denote an added feature to Marine Air Reserve Training. They establish a planned three-year increased program of integrated training which will enable Marine Air Reservists to augment regular squadrons more effectively in the event of mobilization.

The initial phase of the program started last summer when HMR-767 from New Orleans integrated into HMR-361 at Santa Ana. It will expand with this summer's maneuver, Operation Co-Mate, and will be followed by Operation Unity and Operation Climax, annual summer maneuvers for 1962 and 1963 respectively.

Integrated training involved in this program is not designed for summer training exercises alone. The program is to be carried on continuously throughout the year to facilitate the sharing of up-to-date technical information, training, and operational procedures between members of regular and reserve units.

The integrated training program fosters a "buddy" system wherein regulars and reservists become co-mates. As such, direct liaison for training purposes is authorized between designated units.

Regular Naval Aviators and aviation ground personnel will make informal visits to their co-mate or "buddy" unit for the purpose of exchanging information and conducting training programs. Reserve pilots on cross-country training flights will visit their "buddy" unit and discuss with their co-mates such things as the latest operating procedures and training techniques.

Where the same model aircraft are flown by both the regular and reserve units, integrated training possibilities approach the ultimate. In such instances, more reserve pilots may be eventually ordered to active duty, at various times throughout the year, for short periods of proficiency training. Meanwhile, most of the integration will be accomplished at summer maneuvers.

Operation Co-Mate, which outlines the summer reserve training for 1961, includes considerable integration of reserves into regular units. This summer, two reserve jet squadrons, eight helicopter squadrons, and three Marine Air Reserve Groups (MARGs) will be integrated with regular squadrons and groups on the East and West Coasts.

Integration of the helicopter squadrons involves the assignment of reserve squadron members to their corresponding departments in the regular squadrons as individuals. Thus, valuable on-the-job training and assistance in maintaining the reserve's proficiency level comparable to that of his co-mate in the regular squadron is provided.

MARG officers will be integrated on a similar individual basis into the regular groups, and reserve jet squadrons will join regular tactical groups, as units, for operations and training. Such a program envisions a complete correlation of training between regulars and reserves.

Operation Unity, in 1962, will place even greater emphasis on integrated training. This will be made possible by the introduction of more modern aircraft and equipment into the reserve program.

If present Air Reserve planning can be carried out, Operation Climax, in 1963, will culminate the integrated training program with the augmentation of regular units by reserves as the primary test objective of the summer maneuvers.

Since reserve squadrons, in the past, have spent a great deal of their time (48 drill periods) training at their home bases, and since many regular units have been moved to outlying areas to make room for reserves at regular bases during summer training exercises, reserve units have had little opportunity to share technical information, training, and operation procedures with members of regular squadrons.

Operations Co-Mate, Unity and Climax, with the integrated training concept, are designed to foster a closer regular-reserve relationship, resulting in better mutual support and understanding among the forces concerned. USMC



The lieutenant went to Korea as a replacement. He expected a briefing in a candle-lit bunker somewhere on the MLR. But nobody bothered to tell him:

THAT DIRECTION'S NORTH

By Capt P. R. Clapper, USMCR

MAYBE THE REPLACEMENT PLATOON LEADER EXPECTED too much.

Back in Basic School he had imagined his first Korean experience would be a thorough briefing by the division G-3, complete with acetate overlays and sandbox demonstrations.

And later, he assumed, would come the tensely whispered orientation by a seasoned company commander deep in a candle-lit bunker somewhere on the MLR.

Far from it. When the lieutenant arrived at the division CP with half a dozen of his classmates, he received a sleeping bag, hot chow, and an order to report to the regiment then in reserve.

When the lieutenant meekly asked a division staff officer when the briefing would be held, he was told that "regiment takes care of things like that."

As the six-by-six bucked him toward the regiment, the lieutenant told himself he really didn't need to know what the whole division was doing anyway.

He disembarked at the regimental CP and again looked around for the briefing officer. He searched without success and was finally told that "battalion handles the details."

Still not even sure exactly what part of Korea he was in, the young officer reported to his battalion CP. Again no briefing. Only a clerk who briefly told him that his company commander would give him the word.

The lieutenant reported to his company commander. The skipper welcomed the newcomer warmly, reached into a locker-box and pulled out a brand new map.

The replacement's eyes lit up. This is it, he thought. At last the briefing. Like one waking from unconsciousness, he felt like blurting, "Where am I?"

But the company commander said he had nothing to add to what the lieutenant had already learned at the division, regiment, and battalion. Not sure what he was supposed to have learned at those levels, the replacement nodded his head in confusion. He answered several polite questions about his background, accepted the strange new map and left the CO's tent in a daze.

Later a sympathetic veteran pinpointed the battalion area on the replacement's map. But the lieutenant still had no idea where the enemy was.

Time passed. By careful attention to random conversations and old newspapers, the lieutenant doggedly pieced together the situation. Just about the time he

felt he was getting himself squared away, the regiment moved out.

On the way up, the company commander described vividly his recent helicopter flight to reconnoiter the company's position on the MLR. He told of the easy life of the airdales and the convenience of 'copter travel. The only thing the skipper neglected to describe was the company's new position.

But he did say he knew exactly where they were going. This was comforting—because nobody else had the vaguest idea.

The result was a day of milling around which may have convinced the enemy that a major offensive rather than a routine contact relief was underway.

At any rate, the enemy troops stayed in their holes while the Marines found theirs.

The next day, the lieutenant was ordered to take a squad out front to observe. The officer and his men sneaked forward. No sooner had they reached a vantage point than they spotted movement on a peak far to the northeast.

Out came the binoculars. Troops in the open clambered all over the distant mountain. Patrol members fingered their weapons and looked expectantly toward the lieutenant.

To him it certainly seemed logical that any people in front of a patrol in front of the MLR would have to be enemy. He judged the targets to be beyond small arms range. So he breathlessly radioed his company commander to suggest an artillery fire mission.

There was a short pause as the captain back on the MLR consulted his map. Then his dismayed voice cracked over the radio. The troops on the distant peak were ROK soldiers manning a salient of the MLR!

The lieutenant felt sick. He was shaken to think of the mistake he had almost made. He was exasperated that he had not been given the orientation he sought. He was embarrassed that his troops had discovered his ignorance.

Helluva note, he concluded, to try to fight in the orient—unoriented.

After returning from the patrol, the lieutenant reluctantly reported to the skipper, expecting to be drummed off the hill. He envisaged himself at his court-martial, eloquently but futilely calling for up-to-the-minute briefings of all replacements before unleashing them against the enemy. He could almost feel the buttons being ripped from his dungaree jacket.

The captain, however, had suffered quite a shock at the thought of his lieutenant trying to call in fire on our allies. He had done some fast soul-searching. The result was a quick admission of his error in not providing essential information.

Truly a conscientious man, the skipper then called a meeting of company officers.

Yes, you guessed it. He gave them an exhaustive briefing by candlelight deep in his bunker—just as the lieutenant had once imagined.

At the end of the briefing, the captain said he had learned a lesson which none of them should ever forget: never neglect to pass the word to the troops. He ordered his officers to orient their men immediately and completely.

The lieutenant double-timed back to his platoon, called in his squad leaders, pulled out his notes and held school on the whereabouts of the various company elements, adjacent units, and Army and allied outfits operating in that part of Korea.

He thoroughly sketched in the enemy situation and went into detail on the terrain confronting the platoon and the company.

The lieutenant watched as each squad leader passed the word. Then he questioned his men to find out if they were with the program. The troops ate it up.

Many a bunker deck was scuffed that night as Marines dug contours and made like latter-day Von Clauswitzes.

A company which hardly knew whether it was coming or going found itself overnight. And for a very practical reason. As one squad leader put it, "The man you orient may save your life." USMC



Pete Clapper speaks with authority these days as an ABC newscaster working out of Washington, D.C. In his first tour with the Corps (1950-52) he served as a 0302-type second lieutenant with the 5th Marines in Korea. He came back again in '58 and worked for two years in the Radio-TV section of DivInfo at HQMC. Before and after his Marine Corps tours he worked as a police reporter with the Washington Post, as a radio announcer with KFEL in Denver, and with CBS news in Washington and New York.

OBSERVATION POST

This department is for new, constructive ideas. They may be controversial; they must be short. Payment at regular rates on publication.

Aviation Ground Training for Defense

By GySgt Leon High

FAR TOO MANY AVIATION UNITS OF today have no training plans or policies directed toward providing for their own defense in a combat zone.

During previous conflicts in which aviation units have participated they have been relatively secure and immune from direct ground attack by virtue of being deployed far to the rear screened and protected by ground units which were deployed in classic MLR type positions and formations. These factors, plus the enemy's non-employment of guerrilla, partisan, or airborne tactics have enabled aviation units to occupy positions relatively secure from direct ground attack.

Of course, there have been exceptions to this. For example, at Henderson Field on Guadalcanal during the early stages of WWII, aviation units operated from the field while it was under direct and constant attack. But deployed around and actually defending the field were ground troops of the 1st Marine Division, leaving aviation Marines free to conduct flight operations.

In another instance (on Bougainville in 1943) aviation Marines operating from a front line strip dropped the wrenches, picked up rifles to repel Japanese attacks. These things should not be soon forgotten!

Aviation units on future battlefields may not be deployed in these relatively secure positions. Their assigned mission of providing rapid and continuous close air support for ground operations will put them far forward of past bases of operations. Ground troops will be too widely dispersed or otherwise engaged to help with security and defense.

I say aviation Marines need ground training. First let's discuss training requirements to be considered and fulfilled in the planning and execution of active defensive actions by aviation units in the field.

Training must be oriented toward the eventual use of all hands, officer and enlisted, in conducting a defense in the field. Training plans and policies should provide for individual and small team training in the following subjects:

- **Use of the Map and Compass**—vital training if a man is to operate in an area unfamiliar to him and if he is accurately to report any activity he may observe.
- **Scouting and Patrolling**—to enable the individual to function better as a part of a small combat team and to prepare him to operate alone.
- **Small Unit Tactics**—this training must be intensive if our people are to combat effectively the small unit tactics employed by guerrilla, partisan, or airborne troops.
- **Small Arms training**—this training must be oriented toward the use of short range, rapid fire weapons fired from normally unorthodox positions—pistols, sub-machine guns, grenades—and the knife. The enemy, in his attack on an airfield, will not permit us the luxury of taking him under fire at long range.
- **Communications training** — this must consist of instructions in the use of lights, flags, runners, and other non-electronic means of communication.
- **First Aid**—necessary for the survival of wounded or injured Marines who may not be able to reach an aid station.

Equipment required should be limited to a weapon, knife, poncho, helmet, first aid kit, canteen, ammunition, and clothing adequate to the climate. Any other equipment would only delay or otherwise encumber the Marine in executing a defense mission.

Aviation organization for defense should provide training of small combat teams with the capability of operating either alone or as a part of a larger group of teams in the execution of predetermined and assigned defensive missions in the event of direct ground attack. This type of organization should be SOP in peace and war. Further organization would include, in SOP, designation of areas of responsibility and the establishment of control and communication centers to be assumed in the event of attack.

Aviation planning for the defense should include, in a Standing Defense Plan, provisions for establishing control and communication centers immediately if a ground attack is imminent or underway. It should further provide for the immediate, direct dispatch of predesignated combat teams to certain vital areas of the field, i.e., control and communication centers, aircraft and flight line equipment, electrical and water supply points, fuel and ordnance supply points, medical facilities, food supplies, and routes of approach and communication. All of these assigned teams would go to their assigned areas of responsibility without reference to assembly areas. This puts combat teams on vital installations, always prime targets of a guerrilla, partisan, or airborne attack. These teams would defend their assigned areas until the attack were repulsed or neutralized and then return to their work. No physical pursuit should be attempted. Instead, certain specified reconnaissance and surveillance teams would assume the mission of observation and security.

A reserve of similar teams would be retained under central control for employment in the event reinforcement or replacement were needed.

All of these are realistic training and planning objectives which could be accomplished by organization, planning and coordination; training and rehearsal by all aviation units who may have occasion to serve in the field in a combat situation.

All these things could quite well be applied to and used by other rear-echelon headquarters, supply and logistical units. USMC

MWSG-27, 2dMAW
Cherry Point, N.C.

One CO for Organized Reserve Units

By LtCol H. W. Edwards

I SHARE LTCOL C. M. JOHNSON'S concern over the existing relationship between the I&I staff and the reserve unit of which it is a part. (*Strength from Within,* OBSERVATION POST: Jan '61.) There is no doubt that an I&I's duties are quite vague and subject to interpretation in a given situation.

In my observation of reserve training at CamPen some years ago, this fact was most clearly demonstrated to me. In the case of two battalions which were present for training at one time, one was completely handled by the unit commander and his staff and the I&I staff was conspicuous by its absence; the other was completely run by the I&I while the unit commander sulked in his tent. There was no cooperation evidenced in either case and all too often this spirit of disharmony prevails in the home armories.

Both of these I&I's no doubt started out on the principle that they would "command by persuasion" since they didn't have the authority to do otherwise, but they nevertheless were charged with the responsibility for the overall performance of their unit. However, the personality factors of I&I and reserve commander intervened to alter the situation as it so frequently does; a painful adjustment took place which left neither one satisfied.

As a solution to this impasse, LtCol Johnson suggested selecting the I&I staff from the unit and putting them on continuous active duty, thereby eliminating the assignment of regular Marines. I would make a compromise proposal: that a regular officer (I&I) in each case, along with the senior NCO continue to be assigned as at present, except that they be given the title of commanding officer and sergeant major (or 1st Sergeant) of the unit. The unit executive officer and other key staff members should come from the unit as continuous active duty personnel.

I believe regular personnel need the opportunity to work with reserve units for the lessons that are to be learned about our reserve program and the opportunity to live in civilian communities not otherwise available. I also believe that the turnover of command with rotation of regular officers (and NCO assistant) is also desirable to infuse new ideas into a unit. Having his staff designated from the unit insures the necessary continuity and consideration for local problems.

Otherwise I agree with LtCol Johnson's thesis that we can do without the arrangement of two I&I's or two unit commanders, as the case may be, each trying to exercise authority and only succeeding in a painful compromise. Command by committee was thrown out many years ago as an unworkable doctrine. USMC

Naval Examining Board
HQMC

Rate Change

Beginning next month, we're changing our "Observation Post" payment rates. Instead of 3¢ a word, we'll pay a flat $30 for each OP article published. Maximum length: 1,000 words. Shorter lengths preferred. Payment on publication.—Ed

Whoever's responsible for the care and feeding of this coffee urn has been trained to perform his job properly, and with pride. This is the attitude you'd like to develop in your civilian food service people. Ask your Standard Brandsman for his program on "How to Train Civilian Food Service Personnel."

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OBSERVATION POST CONTINUED

Benny Suggs — Neglected Marine

By GySgt D. M. Bruce

WITHIN THE MARINE CORPS TODAY there's a great loss in the field of Beneficial Suggestions. In commercial enterprises, almost all private industries have an active, progressive employee suggestion program. Industry has found this to be the biggest untapped source of ideas for internal improvement.

While the Marine Corps (and Navy) maintain suggestion programs at major bases, not enough Marines are taking part. Lack of participation is mostly due to apathetic response to ideas put forth. When a money-saving idea is submitted by a civilian employee the donor usually gets a cash award. When the idea is submitted by a Marine, too often there is no acknowledgment or official recognition. And there is never a cash award. This means that when Marines come up with an idea they forget it or pass it along to a civilian. Both ways USMC loses. If the idea is never submitted a good money-saving plan may never come to light. If it's sent in by a civilian, USMC gets no recognition.

This is not to suggest that ideas submitted by our civilian employees are not important or that they do not reflect credit on the Marine Corps. However, credit given to Marines for suggestions that improve their own service reflects favorably on our Corps.

Our sister service, the Air Force, has recognized this defect in the idea department. It now authorizes payment of cash awards to airmen who come up with the right ideas. This cash award, non-appropriated, is often a token amount and of course can't reflect a percentage-saved factor as do awards given civilians. However, the fact that a cash award is offered, plus the official recognition, has placed the Air Force program far beyond ours. It has resulted in many more ideas, greater savings to the Air Force.

In order to improve our own program and to obtain the interest, co-operation and participation of all Marines, I propose this:

1) Have all posts and stations encourage a local Marine Corps suggestion program. Most bases have such programs in effect now, smaller commands could organize their own. Administration could be simple.
2) Set up a limited amount of money (from non-appropriated sources) for payment of cash awards.
3) Acknowledge all worthy ideas with an official letter of commendation, meritorious mast or other official action that would be reflected in the Marine's record at HQMC.

Adoption of this three-point program would provide an incentive for Marines to submit their ideas under their own names. It would indicate that the Beneficial Suggestion Program is for all hands and not limited to civilian employees. It should produce many excellent time-and-money-saving ideas that bear on the mission of the Corps. After all, isn't that the ultimate goal for all Marines? By reporting acceptable ideas to HQMC. widespread use could be achieved. Formal acknowledgment of an idea becomes part of a Marine's record and should encourage more participation by career Marines.

Currently there is a plan in the mill to allow payments to service personnel on the same basis as those to civilians. However, we all know how slowly grinds the mill. Meanwhile how many valuable ideas are lying dormant? How many thousands of dollars are being wasted? Surely they're worth saving. USMC

CWTC
Bridgeport, Calif.

Ed: A personal letter to CMC might speed up the mill. In his 1961 guidance message (GAZETTE: Feb '61) Gen Shoup asked that ideas which may benefit the Marine Corps be sent directly to him. Also your GAZETTE pays $25.00 for ideas used in "A Better Way" section of PROFESSIONAL SCRAPBOOK.

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Small Unit Training On Okinawa

By LtCol M. J. Sexton

"OH, OKINAWA IS ALL RIGHT BUT there's no place to train."

"You don't have room to maneuver, and it's poor terrain to operate in."

This is the advice I got prior to transplanting my battalion to Okinawa.

Having made the Okinawa campaign as a rifle company commander in the 4th Marines, and recalling that two Marine Divisions, a Marine RCT, four Army Divisions and over 100,000 Japanese defenders found enough room to combat one another in, I was curious. However, it was reasoned that perhaps due to the manifold considerations for local economy the training areas were cramped and small for the Division (-) (Rein).

On Okinawa similar comments about the relative inadequacy of training areas were volunteered to the "new arrival."

Nevertheless, since my battalion was ripe for small unit training regardless of crowded conditions, a training request was immediately initiated for a week's training in the Northern Training Area, generally located due west of the village of Aha.

This village struck a responsive cord, because "K" Company, 4th Marines which I had commanded in 1945 had patrolled northward through it in April, 1945.

Word was received from regimental S-3 that in addition to my battalion there would be a rifle company engaged in survival training, also elements of the Reconnaissance Battalion participating in Scheduled Training. My apprehension mounted as I tried to envision the "crowded" training conditions.

We moved out however, and after hiking 35 miles arrived at our planned bivouac area. To my delight the terrain constituted the finest small unit training area that I have seen since I was last on Okinawa. There were approximately 45 square miles of densely wooded, precipitous terrain, blanketed with live oak and conifers, climbing vines and thick underbrush for the "crowded" units to avoid one another in. As a matter of fact, the battalion was literally swallowed up in the area as they enthusiastically engaged in fire team, squad and platoon training.

All of the old timers as well as the new men agreed it was the finest small unit training they had ever engaged in.

Why then are so many remarks made decrying the training areas on Okinawa? Upon closer examination and questioning it has been determined that many persons meant that it was far from ideal for large size organizations (BLT's up). Exception is taken to such a contention! It is readily agreed that control and maneuver of larger size units in such jungle type terrain is much more difficult, but certainly not impossible or even out of the question. The crux of the matter is the capability and confidence of the small units to move, maintain control, become acclimated and conduct effective offensive and defensive operations. When this is achieved it is maintained that the BLT's and RLT's can, and will, be able to carry out any assigned mission in this type terrain.

Small unit training has always been one of our cardinal assets. Our very traditions reek with it, and throughout WWII a tremendous wealth of experienced jungle fighters evolved.

In truth it was said that US Marines beat the Japanese at their own game—jungle warfare. What happened then? Is it that the most recent experiences in Korea have conditioned a new generation of Marines who are unaware of jungle warfare and its high premium on small unit training and leadership?

Realistically, it is probably a combination of this factor and also the stress laid on separation under the modern doctrine of amphibious warfare.

Small unit training has been and *must always be* our stock in trade! This is where our reputation was made, where our reputation grows.

It is readily admitted that control, movement, fire support and all facets of command are more difficult in dense jungle-type terrain. This is not a new thesis. It has always been true.

The terrain on Okinawa is considered to be ideal for preparation for possible employment in such environmental areas throughout the world. *Get with it. Get in the bush—and appreciate Okinawa!* USMC

3/3, 3dMarDiv
FPO, San Francisco

Combat Refresher Course

2dLt Allan R. Millett

PLANNING REALISTIC COMBAT TRAINing for a rifle company has stumped more than one company commander.

Plagued by administrative demands, logistical support planning, limited use of training facilities, the company commander even wth the best platoon commanders and NCOs in the FMF may still feel his training program is not what it could and should be.

But here's a little scheme that combines three handy ingredients available to stateside divisions:

- The rifle company — Marines who need *continual* practice in the skills of the combat infantryman.
- The Infantry Training Regiment—a permanent plant geared strictly for combat training for new Marines who need to be *shown* the skills of the Marine infantryman.
- The benefits of *school* training—for both the ITR Marines and the rifle company, including "canned" problems, more thorough logistical support, better instruction, and more accurate reproduction of combat conditions.

The plan goes like this. Send a rifle company to the ITR for, say, three weeks or a month. After a week or two of practice, FMF Marines would then demonstrate various phases of both offensive and defensive combat to the ITR Marines as part of their initial infantry training.

The company also stages a couple of live-fire problems. For the practice period provides the time to set up proper communications and control measures. This is a real bonus for the FMF unit which in a normal training cycle is hard pressed to properly run such a problem.

The tactics demonstrations would be at the squad, platoon, and company level including the use of supporting arms, e.g., tanks.

In reality, then, the rifle company is the Schools Demonstration Troops for the Infantry Training Regiment. Both profit—the FMF unit by more-realistic combat training through the use of permanent facilities and "canned" problems; ITR by having an actual FMF unit to use in training its students.

The people who run the Infantry Training Regiments swear by them and the product they turn out: the combat ready Marine. Why deny the same training to the older ITR graduate who may sorely need a brief refresher in the skills that are so critical to himself and our Corps. USMC

H&S Co, 2/2
CamLej, N.C.

BASEPLATE

Mc GURK

How the Ale & Quail Club decided that wars—hot or cold—are pretty much the same in the end

"HOSE-NOSE," TEX SAID LOOKING ME STRAIGHT IN THE eyeballs, "Your proposed speed run sounds just peachy! But I can't take off right now—don't you know there's a war on!"

"Hoidy toity and a piddily pat!" I chortled. "I've got news for you, big daddy! Peace reigns throughout the domain. In fact, if you'd tune up your ear pans, you'd probably be able to hear the voice of the turtle. Come on, let's hit that Washington routine with all those lovely government girlies."

"Sit down, Baseplate, quit wiggling your tail and desist from clomping those paddle feet around the room," said old picklepuss. "You're not designed for such antics in the first place. And in the second place, if I may speak frankly, when such a mood seizes you, I'm reminded of that screwy idea you conned us into at Basic School."

"You mean the time we swiped that Air Group's battle flag at our class reception and were going to fly it from the control tower at Bolling?" Dusty chuckled.

"Listen, gents," Tex said, ignoring Dusty's question and letting us know something was really bugging him, "I'm serious. I really think that we're in a war and too damn few people realize it."

"Who's at war?" Johnny Johnson asked as he walked into the room and flopped on my rack. "The only one I've been able to find is the 'Cold' one and I'm getting bored with it. You got a better one, Skinny?"

"Well look what the cat dragged in," Tex said sarcastically, "my cup floweth over and all that jazz! Why don't you clowns shove off so I can meditate?"

Johnny, Dusty, and I looked at each other sheepishly and knocked off the fol-de-rol.

"As I figure it, Tex," Dusty said calmly, "you're not quite satisfied with what we're doing toward winning the Cold War?"

"Friends," Tex said in a tired voice, "I've been reading up on this deal. In the first place you can't even find *one* definition for the so called 'Cold War.' The economists look upon it as chiefly economic warfare, and the political scientists as political warfare. Then there are those who claim that it's primarily a contest for mens' minds—they can't agree whether it's ideological or psychological warfare."

"Crazy!" Johnny murmured and ducked a shower clopper.

"Wait a minute, Johnny," Dusty frowned, "Tex has something here. Let's at least have the Ale and Quail Club agree on what is meant by 'Cold War'—how's this for a start?

"Cold War is considered to be a *new* kind of warfare. Let's not get trapped into believing it's just a new name for something that has happened before in history."

"Right!" Johnny said enthusiastically. "This *new* kind of warfare is caused by new technologies, new values, new national aspirations, and many other factors sharing one thing in common—they're new—20th century new!"

"I see it!" Even I had the bug. "In this warfare, intelligence is gathered, objectives are seized or defended, reserves are committed, and casualties have and will occur. Why hasn't anyone told me this before?"

'Territories have been, and will be, won or lost," Dusty broke in. "New allies are sought and old ones are strengthened. Why, for crying out loud, we really are at war! I've never recognized it as such!" He ended on a note of dismay.

"Well," Tex said somberly, "whether recognized or not, we're staking our national existence on its outcome, so we'd better get humping!" USMC

General Officers

Transfers

Condon, J. P. 9903
Fr STF CINCEUR WDJun
To 1stMAW

Temporary Promotion, Reserve

Evans, R. A. Apr

Retired

Hudson, L. C. 9903
HQMC 30Jun

Colonels

Transfers

Bachhuber, A. J. 9906
Fr Ofc CNO WDJun
To NB Subic Bay

Berkeley, R. C. 9907
Fr 2dMAW
To HQMC By1Jul

Booth, A. L. 9906
Fr 4thMCRRD WDJun
To 2dMarDiv

Brush, C. H.
Fr NWC Wash DC WDJun
To HQMC

Burns, R. R. 9907
Fr ICAF Wash DC WDJun
To MCS Quant

Cash, E. A. 9906
Fr MB NB Subic Bay WDJun
To 1stMarDiv

Chaisson, J. R. 9906
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To Sixth Fleet

Chambers, O. W. 9907
Fr STF CINCSOUTH
To COMART By10Jul

Christensen, J. R. 9907
Fr HQMC
To FMFLant By11Jul

Churley, R. A. 9906
Fr MCS Quant
To Asst CofS SUSMOP By21Jun

Croizat, V. J. 9906
Fr 3dMarDiv WDJun
To SEATO Bangkok

Danser, D. M. 9907
Fr FMFPac
To MARTC Willow Gv By1Jul

Davenport, W. K. 9906
Fr FltActy Yokosuka WDJun
To HQMC

Dooley, G. E. 9907
Fr NWC Wash DC WDJun
To 1stMarBrig MAG-13

Drake, C. B. 9906
Fr HQMC WDJun
To 3dMarDiv

Dulacki, L. J. 9906
Fr ALUSNA WDJun
To The Pentagon

English, L. E. 9906
Fr Carlisle Bks Pa
To Ofc Asst SecDef By26Jun

Ferrill, J. P. 9906
Fr NWC Wash DC WDJun
To CINCEUR

Garretson, F. E. 9906
Fr MCS Quant
To HQMC By15Jul

Gentleman, A. W. 9906
Fr Univ of Pa WDJun
To Ofc SecNav

Godbold, E. C. 9906
Fr NWC Wash DC WDJun
To MCS Quant

Gomez, A. D. 9907
Fr War College Npt WDJun
To MCS Quant

Gunter, H. G. 9906
Fr MB NNSYD
To ComPhibLant By10Jul

Herring, G. W. 9907
Fr 2dMAW
To Ofc JCS Wash DC By10Jul

Holmes, F. W. 9908
Fr HQMC
To 3dMarDiv By17Jul

Howatt, W. J. 9906
Fr 1stMarDiv
To MB Vallejo Calif By10Jul

Johnson, R. S. 9906
Fr MCRD PI SC WDJun
To Pt Lyautey

Jones, W. K. 9906
Fr War College Npt WDJun
To Ofc JCS Wash DC

Kelly, S. M. 9906
Fr FMFLant WDJun
To MCB CamLej

Lowell, A. C. 9907
Fr 1stMAW
To BUWEPS Wash DC By31Jul

Lyman, A. I. 9906
Fr Ofc CNO WDJul
To Ofc JCS

Mahoney, A. M. 9906
Fr HQMC WDJun
To FMFLant

Marshall, D. E. 9907
Fr NWC Wash DC WDJun
To HQMC

Martin, K. E. 9908
Fr ICAF Wash DC WDJun
To HQMC

McBrayer, J. D. 9906
Fr War College Npt WDJun
To Dir 6th MCRRD

McHaney, J. C. 9906
Fr FMFLant WDJun
To FltAct Yokosuka

Miller, R. D. 9906
Fr MB NAS CorpC WDJun
To FMFLant

Mills, J. E. 9906
Fr NATO WDJun
To HQMC

Moore, J. B. 9907
Fr State Dept WDJun
To FMFPac

Moore, J. R. 9907
Fr Univ of Redlands WDJun
To 1stMAW

Morganthal, N. 9906
Fr FMFPac WDJun
To Camp S.D. Butler

Platt, J. M. 9906
Fr NWC Wash DC WDJun
To 2dMarDiv

Pregnall, D. S. 9906
Fr ForTrps FMFLant
To HQMC By10Jul

Rhoades, J. R. 9906
Fr Univ of NMex WDJun
To MCRD SDiego

Robertson, D. J. 9906
Fr NWC Wash DC WDJun
To MCS Quant

Robinson, D. J. 9906
Fr ICAF Wash DC WDJun
To CINCPac

Ross, J. F. 9908
Fr MCB CamPen WDJun
To 1stMarDiv

Rydalch, E. N. 9906
Fr War College Npt
To DOD By10Jul

Schwenke, C. R. 9906
Fr ICAF Wash DC WDJun
To HQMC

Scott, J. C. 9907
Fr 3dMarDiv WDJun
To MARTC NAS Oakland

Seibert, L. R. 9907
Fr NavWarCol Npt WDJun
To Carlisle Bks Pa

Sherman, D. W. 9906
Fr MCS Quant
To HQMC By10Jul

Skoczylas, J. S. 9906
Fr 2dMarDiv
To MCS Quant By10Jul

Smart, H. J. 9906
Fr Ofc CNO
To HQMC By26Jun

Spiker, T. F. 9906
Fr MCAS CherPt WDJun
To Clarksville Tenn

Strickler, R. D. 9906
Fr MCB CamLej
To HQBn HQMC By10Jul

Vick, K. B. 9906
Fr 3dMAW
To Maxwell AFB By1Jul

Williams, M. R. 9906
Fr 2dMarDiv
To San Juan PR By30Jun

Wismer, R. M. 9906
Fr MCB CamPen
To MCS Quant By3Jul

Wright, E. A. 9906
Fr MCB CamLej WDJun
To MB Phila

Temporary Promotions

Callender, J. M. May
Glick, J. E. May

Temporary Promotions, Reserve

Dorroh, Jr., J. D. Apr
Dyer, R. W. Apr
Ervin, R. M. Apr
Fosseen, N. R. Apr
Fowler, C. M. Apr
Glassman, S. Apr
Haggerty, G. G. Apr
McAuliffe, Jr., C. P. Apr
Mullahey, T. F. Apr
Newby, C. R. Apr
Newell, N. C. Apr
Rostov, L. L. Apr
Salmon, J. P. Apr
Shaw, W. H. Apr
Solomon, F. Apr
Webster, Jr., D. P. Apr

Retired

Allen, A. H. 9908
MCS Quant 31May

Brent, Jr., H. 9907
FMFLant 30Jun

Burns, R. C. 9906
Pentagon 30Jun

Chapman, M. C. 9906
Nav Dept Wash DC 30Jun

Currin, R. H. 9906
MCS Quant 30Jun

Donohoo, M. O. 9906
Ft Leavenworth Kans 30Jun

Earle, J. H. Jr. 9906
FMFPac 30Jun

Herring, W. T. 9907
HQMC 30Apr

Houser, R. L. 9906
HQMC 30Jun

Little, Jr., J. R. 9907
MCAF Jacksonville NC 30Jun

Mason, L. M. 9906
HQMC 30Jun

Moore, L. S. 9907
2dMAW 30Jun

Nees, C. M. 9906
Carlisle Bks Pa 30Jun

Nusbaum, H. R. 9906
12thMCRRD 4May

Roberson, W. D. 9907
FMFLant 30Jun

Rothwell, R. 9906
Pentagon 30Jun

Sayers, J. P. 9906
CMC NavDept Wash DC 30Jun

Schatzel, D. 9906
MB NS SFran 30Jun

Smith, S. A. 9907
3dMAW 31May

Stonecliffe, D. W. 9906
Pentagon 30Jun

Van Dam, N. 9906
MB San Juan PR 30Jun

Vandegrift, A. A. 9906
6thMCRRD 30Jun

Walker, R. C. 9906
9thMCRRD 31May

Wallace, R. W. 9906
MCB CamPen 30Jun

Williamson, H. H. 9907
AirFMFPac 30Jun

Winecoff, J. L. 9906
MB NAS Whidbey Is 30Jun

Recent Command and Staff Assignments

Ashley, P. H., CofS, MCS, Quantico
Cargill, W. M., Deputy CofS, MCAF, Iwakuni
Clark, R. W., Inspector, 1stMAW
Demosthenes, T. A., Comptroller, MCS, Quantico
Dobbin, J. F., Asst WgComdr, 3d MAW
Houston, K. C., Asst Deputy Comptroller, Dept of Navy
Lawrence, H., CofS, 3dMAW
Lucas, A. F., G-4, 3dMarDiv
Stewart, J. L., Deputy Director, MCEC, MCS, Quantico
Roach, M. E., Inspector, 3dMarDiv

Lieutenant Colonels

Transfers

Allen, P. L. 7333
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To Ofc SecDef

Allen, R. L. 7333
Fr Rensselaer Inst WDJun
To MCAS Cherry Pt

Andres, R. A. 7332
Fr 2dMAW
To HQMC Wash DC By1Jul

Asbury, D. E. 0302
Fr FMFPac WDJun
To NB Losa LBeach

Atwater, W. L. 7307
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 2dMAW

Augeri, R. J. 2502
Fr 1stMarDiv WDJun
To HQMC

Bale, E. L. 1802
Fr War College Npt WDJun
To HQMC

Bauman, G. F. 7333
Fr Univ of Md WDJun
To HQMC

Blankenship, C. P. 7305
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To Ofc CNO

Boortz, N. A. 7307
Fr 3dMAW
To CNAVANTRA CorpC By10Jul

Boress, B. M. 2502
Fr George Wash Univ WDJun
To HQMC

Brant, R. E. 1802
Fr Univ of Md WDJun
To MCS Quant

Brenneman, R. A. 0302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To CINCEUR

Brown, R. E. 0302
Fr HQMC WDJun
To MAAG Saigon

Bruce, H. K. 7335
Fr Univ of Md WDJun
To VMO-6 MAG-36

Buford, E. A. 7333
Fr State Col LBeach
To NAS SDiego By1Jul

Butler, Jr., N. D. 3501
Fr FMFLant
To 2dMAW By1May

Campbell, R. A. 0302
Fr Ft Leavenworth WDJun
To 1stMarDiv

Chambers, J. S. 0302
Fr AFSC Nor Va
To 1stMarDiv By1Jul

Codrea, G. 0302
Fr 2dMarDiv WDJun
To 3dMarDiv

Conley, R. F. 7302
Fr Maxwell AFB WDJun
To 3dMAW

Conroy, D. 7307
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 2dMAW

Danowitz, E. F. 0302
Fr AFSC Nor Va
To 3dMarDiv By1Jul

Davis, D. L. 7333
Fr War College Npt WDJun
To FMFLant

Davis, S. 0302
Fr Ft Leavenworth WDJun
To 2dMarDiv

Dawes, G. M. 0302
Fr HQMC WDJun
To 1stMarBrig

Dillow, R. O. 0302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To COMFIFTEEN

Dimond, N. 0302
Fr MCB CamPen WDJun
To MB Barbers Pt

Dodson, R. C. 2502
Fr MCS Quant
To HQMC By5Jul

Driftmier, J. F. 7331
Fr Univ of Md WDJun
To 1stMAW

Dwyer, R. T. 0302
Fr AFSC Norfolk Va
To 2dMarDiv By1Jul

Ebert, J. R. 7333
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 3dMAW

Emils, A. L. 0302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 6thMCRRD

Estey, R. E. 0302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To AirFMFPac

Farish, G. B. 7333
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 2dMAW

Fenton, F. I. 0302
Fr 1stMarDiv WDJun
To Ft Leavenworth

Fields, J. R. 3002
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To SUPAG Columbus O

Ford, K. M. 7335
Fr 2dMAW WDJun
To MCAF Santa Ana
Frankovic, B. J. 7333
Fr Univ of Omaha WDJun
To HQMC
Freeman, E. P. 0302
Fr Univ of Md WDJun
To FMFLant
Fristoe, A. J. 0302
Fr NAS Barbers Pt WDJun
To 1stMarDiv
Fry, W. F. 0302
Fr LFTULant WDJun
To CINCNELM
Gall, W. 0302
Fr Carlisle Bks Pa WDJun
To 3dMarDiv
Gocke, C. E. 1302
Fr San Diego College WDJun
To HQMC
Graves, J. B. 7302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 3dMAW
Haigler, W. D. 2502
Fr MCSA Phila WDJun
To MCS Quant
Halbert, W. M. 3002
Fr MCB CamPen WDJun
To FMFPac WESTPac
Hammerbeck, E. E. 0302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To ALUSNA
Hammond, R. H. 2502
Fr War College Npt WDJun
To 1stMarDiv
Harbin, F. F. 0302
Fr MCS Quant
To 1stMarDiv By1Jul
Harney, J. B. 3002
Fr MCB CamPen WDJun
To 1stMarDiv
Harper, E. A. 7331
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 2dMAW
Harris, Jr., D. R. 7333
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To HQMC
Hartley, D. S. 7333
Fr War College Npt WDJun
To 3dMAW
Hill, J. T. 0302
Fr HqBn HQMC
To HQMC By26Jun
Hise, H. W. 7305
Fr War College Npt WDJun
To FMFPac
Horton, S. 1802
Fr War College Npt WDJun
To NB Ptsmh NH
Hudock, J. C. 3402
Fr MCSA Phila WDJun
To HQMC
Hudson, R. S. 0302
Fr Ofc JCS WDJun
To 3dMarDiv
Irish, H. J. 0802
Fr ForTrps FMFPac WDJun
To MCS Quant
Jackson, O. G. 0302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To Camp Butler
Johnson, V. M. 2502
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To ForTrps FMFLant
Johnson, F. M. 0302
Fr AFSC Nor Va
To 3dMarDiv By1Jul
Johnson, E. W. 7307
Fr JAG
To 1stMAW By25Jul
Jones, J. L. 1802
Fr MB NB LBeach
To 3dMarDiv By13Jul
Keith, B. E. 0802
Fr 3dMarDiv WDMay
To War College Npt
Kelly, P. W. 7304
Fr State Col SDiego WDJun
To 1stMAW
Kirby-Smith, E. 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDJun
To MCB CamPen
Laing, R. B. 7333
Fr Maxwell AFB
To CINCUSAREUR By10Jul
Larson, B. E. 0802
Fr 2d 105mm HowBn 1Jun
To MB NS SDiego
Lear, W. R. 0301
Fr MCAF Santa Ana WDJun
To MCB CamPen
Lengyel, N. P. 3002
Fr 1stMarDiv WDJun
To 2dMAW
Leogue, J. J. 7332
Fr Ft Leavenworth WDJun
To FMFPac
London, L. K. 0302
Fr War College Npt WDJun
To 3dMarDiv
Lupton, E. I. 7302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To Langley AFB

Lynch, R. J. 7333
Fr MCS Quant
To PgScol Monterey By31Jul
Matthews, M. T. 0302
Fr Beirut Lebanon WDJun
To HQMC
McCaleb, E. H. 7302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To MCAS Quant
McManus, J. 7302
Fr Univ of Hawaii WDJun
To 1stMAW
McHenry, G. W. 0302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To I&I 4thMTBn
McDonald, J. E. 7335
Fr Maxwell AFB WDJun
To 1stMAW
Metzelaars, C. R. 0402
Fr 1stMAW WDJun
To NABTC NAS Pncla
Mickelson, L. M. 7307
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 3dMAW
Mitchell, W. P. 7335
Fr Maxwell AFB WDJun
To 1stMAW
Moore, R. B. 4302
Fr MARTC NAS Glen WDJun
To HQMC
Moriarty, J. A. 0302
Fr 8thMCRRD WDJun
To 3dMarDiv
Morrison, G. W. 7335
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 2dMarDiv
Morrison, R. J. 7333
Fr 1stMarBrig
To Ft Leavenworth By27Jul
Mueller, E. 7335
Fr HQMC
To Grosse Ile Mich By1Jul
Mulroney, P. J. 0802
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To ArmyStfCol Ontario
Mulvey, W. H.
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To HQMC
Nehf, Jr., A. N. 7305
Fr AFSC Nor Va WDJun
To 1stMAW
Padalino, M. J. 3002
Fr MCSC Albany
To NROTC Troy NY By28Jul
Panchison, W. 7302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 3dMAW
Peevey, N. B. 7302
Fr 2dMAW
To ComSixthFlt By25Jul
Penn, L. S. 7335
Fr George Wash Univ WDJun
To 2dMAW
Peterson, A. H. 3002
Fr FMFPac WDJun
To MCB CamPen
Petty, D. D. 7302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 2dMAW
Pierce, R. H. 7335
Fr George Wash Univ WDJun
To MCAS Cherry Pt
Pond, D. B. 1302
Fr Stanford Univ WDJun
To 3dMarDiv
Pope, E. J. 7333
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 2dMAW
Reed, H. C. 3002
Fr MCB CamLej WDJun
To MCSC Albany
Reese, P. F. 0302
Fr Univ of Missouri WDJun
To 1stMarBrig
Reifel, H. C. 0302
Fr AFSC Nor Va WDJun
To Ft Meade Md
Reighard, R. V. 0302
Fr FMFPac WDJun
To MCB CamPen
Richards, R. M. 0702
Fr West Point WDJun
To 2dMAW
Roberts, E. L. 0302
Fr FMFLant WDJun
To 3dMarDiv
Robertson, C. S. 0302
Fr AFSC Norfolk Va
To 2dMarDiv By1Jul
Robinson, R. B. 7332
Fr MAD NAS PaxRiv
To BUWEPS Wash DC By10Jul
Sabatier, H. S. 7333
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To HQMC
Schumaker, D. W. 3002
Fr NROTC Troy NY WDJun
To MCSA Phila
Seibert, K. D. 0302
Fr 2dMarDiv WDJun
To MB NB Gtmo
Shelly, K. H. 3002
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To FMFPac

Shoden, J. C. 7304
Fr 1stMAW WDJun
To HQMC
Shook, F. A. 7335
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 2dMAW
Shoop, W. G. 0302
Fr CinCEur WDJun
To HQMC
Simmons, R. L. 7335
Fr 3dMAW
To Ft Leavenworth By27Jul
Simpson, W. H. 0302
Fr MCRD SDiego WDJun
To MAAG Taipei
Simpson, F. 0302
Fr MCAS El Toro WDJun
To 1stMarDiv
Skinner, J. 7333
Fr AFSC Nor Va WDJun
To 2dMAW
Snead, M. R. 0802
Fr NAD Lualualei WDJun
To 3dMarDiv
Sperry, J. W. 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDJun
To HQMC
Stanfield, J. C. 0302
Fr Ft Leavenworth WDJun
To HQMC
Stankus, H. W. 0302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To Stanford Res Inst
Staples, M. M. 7302
Fr 1stMAW
To PgScol Monterey By31Jul
Steman, L. H. 7302
Fr Univ of Hawaii WDJun
To 1stMAW
Stingley, E. D. 3002
Fr 1stMarDiv
To HQMC By25Jul
Stockwell, T. D. 0302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To HQMC
Thorne, N. G. 0302
Fr Ausna Finland WDJun
To MCS Quant
Ward, R. A. 7333
Fr George Wash Univ WDJun
To 2dMAW
Wasson, G. E. 7331
Fr Orange Calif WDJun
To 1stMAW
Watson, P. B. 0802
Fr PgScol Monterey WDJun
To MCS Quant
Webster, W. J. 7302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 2dMAW
Whipple, W. E. 0302
Fr War College Npt WDJun
To MCS Quant
Wilcox, W. D. 7333
Fr LBeach St College WDJun
To 1stMarDiv
Wilson, H. S. 7305
Fr NAS Willow Grove
To COMARTC NAS Glen By1Jul
Witt, W. T. 7302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To COMART
Woods, R. 3002
Fr NROTC Univ of Pa
To 3dMarDiv By31Jul
Zingheim, C. F. 7335
Fr 1stMAW WDJun
To MCS Quant

Permanent Promotions

Adams, P. Apr
Parham, B. L. May

Temporary Promotions

Davis, P. A. May
Helstrom, R. S. May
Horner, B. E. May
Johnson, Jr., J. D. May
Walker, E. H. May
Ward, D. L. May

Temporary Promotions, Reserve

Alexander, M. V. May
Barbour, R. F. May
Barry, Jr., D. A. May
Bates, W. A. May
Bentley, C. H. May
Brenner, E. May
Brewster, Jr., D. B. May
Brooks, J. M. May
Brown, T. A. May
Carr, C. H. May
Chamblin, Jr., L. A. May
Conable, Jr., B. B. May

Conley, S. C. May
Cunningham, J. L. May
Dysart, W. H. May
Elliott, R. L. May
Erickson, S. P. May
Ewing, Jr., L. J. May
Felix, K. G. May
Fields, K. May
Fitzgerald, J. T. May
Forrester, R. D. May
Gilman, G. W. May
Hanan, II, J. B. May
Jenkins, E. T. May
Kamp, A. M. May
Kitko, F. V. May
Kobell, R. J. May
Kyle, H. H. May
Lewis, H. J. May
Mayer, Jr., S. B. May
McDonald, L. J. May
McHugh, F. T. May
McKinley, R. A. May
Moyer, D. A. May
Murray, F. May
O'Donoghue, J. W. May
Olon, J. M. May
Osgood, C. W. May
Pennell, E. S. May
Petro, G. T. May
Piel, E. J. May
Prather, A. T. May
Purdy, F. A. May
Reynolds, Jr., J. A. May
Roisum, K. F. May
Rufe, C. F. May
Schoetz, D. J. May
Schroeder, W. F. May
Shipman, R. D. May
Smith, D. N. May
Smurr, J. E. May
Stewart, C. R. May
Vernor, Jr., C. W. May
Vincent, G. May
Williams, J. E. May

Retired

Allard E. W. 7304
3dMAW 30Jun
Beatty, L. I. 6402
2dMAW 30May
Bradley, Q. A. 0302
LFTUPac 30Apr
Brandenburg, P. F. 2502
Pt Mugu Calif 30Jun
Brilliant, M. 0301
3dMAW 30Jun
Chapman, H. J. 0302
MCB CamLej 30Jun
Cook, H. D. 7331
COMART 30Apr
Cortner, F. D. 0802
LFTULant Nor Va 30Jun
Dyer, J. R. 7335
2dMAW 30Apr
Ford, C. P. 0302
MB NAS North Is 30Jun
Gagner, H. W. 2002
MCS Quant 31May
Greeley, R. W. 0302
MB NB BSN 30Apr
Hasperis, T. N. 0302
MCB CamPen 31May
Heely, D. H. 0802
8th105mm HowBn 30Jun
Hinsdale, C. I. 0195
MCB CamLej 30Jun
Holt, W. R. 3002
HQMC 30Apr
Holt, J. F. 0302
MCB CamLej 30Jun
Kingsbury, N. C. 3002
HQMC 30Jun
Knox, R. T. 0302
MCS Quant 30Jun
McLean, Jr., C. E. 7302
3dMAW 30Jun
McLaughlin, W. S. 0302
LFTULant Nor Va 30Jun
McReynolds, W. 0802
MCS Quant 30Jun
Migneault, H. R. 0302
1stMarDiv 30Jun
Ober, Jr., M. S. 7335
3dMAW 31May
Peoples, E. L. 0802
NavPhibScl SDiego 30Jun
Reed, G. H. 3002
MCSA Phila 31May
Rogers, L. M. 0302
MCB CamLej 30Jun
Chaffer, R. D. 0802
FMFLant 30Jun
Smunk, T. R. 7335
1stMarDiv 30Jun
Stack, J. R. 7333
3dMAW 30Jun
Strayhorn, E. H. 0185
Fr HQMC 30Jun
Throneson, H. K. 0302
1stMarDiv 30Jun

Tinsley, W. G. 3002
HQMC 30Jun
Wells, W. C. 0802
1stMarDiv 31May
Witherspoon, J. A. 0702
MCB CamLej 30Jun
Witt, Jr., F. X. 1302
MCB CamPen 30Jun
Woodbury, H. G. 0302
MCS Quant 30Jun

Death, Retired

Prichard, C.
Letterman Army Hosp. 23Mar

Recent Command and Staff Assignments

Anderson, E., CO, OrdSch, MCS, Quantico
Bardon, T. J., CO, MD, USS Princeton
Bruder, J. A., Asst G-1, MCAF, Iwakuni
Lillie, J. L. Jr., CO, H&MS-16, MCAF, Futema
McKiever, C. F., CO, 3dBn, 8thMar, 2dMarDiv
Peck, R. C., Asst G-2, 2dMarDiv
Perkins, R. V., Asst G-3, Iwakuni
Peterson E. K., CO, MCAS, MCS, Quantico
Reusser, K. L., XO, MCAS, MCS, Quantico

Majors

Transfers

Abrahams, C. W. 7302
Fr Indianola Iowa WDJun
To MCAS Beaufort SC
Adams, S. E. 7302
Fr FMFLant
To 1stMAW By1Jul
Aitken, H. S. 0302
Fr War College Npt WDJun
To 1stMarDiv
Alderman, H. L. 0302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 2dMarDiv
Anderson, T. A. 0302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To MB NavActy Italy
Anthony, W. S. 0302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 3dMarDiv
Arceneaux, E. J. 6402
Fr MCAS CherPt WDJun
To MAD NATTC MFS
Arkland, E. H. 0302
Fr Univ of Mich WDJun
To 3dMarDiv
Bailey, A. S. 0302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To MB NAS Alameda
Ball, V. E. 7304
Fr Univ of Omaha WDJun
To MCS Quant
Barber, S. C. 0302
Fr Univ of Omaha WDJun
To 1stMAW
Beach, W. L. 7304
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 2dMAW
Bethards, L. S. 0802
Fr MCS Quant
To I&I 2d105mmHowBn By15Jul
Blanchard, D. H. 0302
Fr 1stMarBrig
To I&I 1stRecon CorpC By20Jul
Boles, J. F. 0302
Fr 6thRflCo LRock WDJun
To US Taiwan DefComd
Bowen, R. E. 7331
Fr Univ of Md WDJun
To 2dMAW
Brady, C. L. 2702
Fr Ft Meade WDJun
To 3dMarDiv
Breckinridge, J. T. 0302
Fr Univ of Md. WDJun
To 3dMarDiv
Brier, G. R. 7333
Fr PgScol Monterey WDJun
To 1stMAW
Browne, J. 7307
Fr Univ of Omaha WDJun
To 9thMCRRD
Browne, J. A. 7333
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 1stMAW
Buchanan, F. L. 0702
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 1stMarDiv
Buckley, C. C. 3002
Fr PgScol Monterey WDJun
To 3dMAW
Bunnell, C. F. 0302
Fr War College Npt WDJun
To 3dMarDiv
Burger, D. J. 0302
Fr MCB CamPen WDJun
To Stanford Univ
Bushnell, R. H. 3002
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To HQMC
Busick, C. J. 0302
Fr Univ of Calif WDJun
To MCS Quant
Buskirk, W. K. 6602
Fr AirFMFPac WDJun
To MAD NMC Pt Mugu
Buss, K. M. 3502
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To ForTrps FMFPac
Butters, R. J. 7332
Fr 1stMarBrig WDMay
To MCS Quant
Call, R. D. 0802
Fr Miami Univ Ohio WDJun
To I&I 6th105mmHowBn
Carlson, W. C. 7335
Fr MCAF Jacks SC WDJun
To 2dMAW
Carr, I. T. 3002
Fr George Wash Univ
To 3dMarDiv By24Jul
Carson, R. W. 4602
Fr MCRD PI SC WDJun
To MCRD SDiego
Cashion, D. B. 0302
Fr Univ of Omaha WDJun
To Univ of Tex
Cassidy, E. W. 7335
Fr Univ of Md WDJun
To 1stMAW
Chambers, F. R. 0302
Fr Univ of Ill WDJun
To 2dMAW
Clark, T. 7305
Fr MCS Quant
To Sec Acty Ft Meade By25Jul
Coffman, H. L. 0302
Fr Univ of Omaha WDJun
To MB Atsugi Japan
Connolly, M. F. 0702
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 1stMarDiv
Corcoran, C. T. 7302
Fr Univ of Md WDJun
To 1stMAW
Cory, O. E. 7307
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 2dMarDiv
Costanza, F. V. 2502
Fr Ft Meade Md WDJun
To ForTrps FMFLant
Covert, B. R. 0302
Fr Univ of Omaha WDJun
To 3dMarDiv
Cowling, D. R. 0302
Fr 1stMarDiv
To FltActy Yokosuka By5Jul
Cox, J. F. 7304
Fr 1stMAW
To Univ of Omaha By17Jul
Crispen, R. W. 1302
Fr MCSC Albany
To PgScl Monterey By31Jul
Crowley, J. F. 0802
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To NavPhibScol Nor Va
Cuneo, J. E. 1802
Fr SDiego StCollege WDJun
To 1stMarDiv
Curwen, B. H. 0302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 2dMAW
Dake, M. L. 7333
Fr Univ of Omaha WDJun
To 1stMAW
Dauphine, G. M. 7304
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To MCAS Quant
Davis, E. K. 0302
Fr Wayne State Univ WDJun
To HQMC
Davis, O. R. 7307
Fr George Wash Univ WDJun
To 1stMAW
Deasy, R. A. 7305
Fr George Wash Univ WDJun
To 1stMAW
Denny, R. C. 7331
Fr St College Okla WDJun
To CNABATRA Pncla
Dionisopulos, J. G. 0302
Fr NAS Alameda WDJun
To MAAG China
Dziaio, E. W. 0302
Fr Geo Wash Univ WDJun
To 3dMarDiv
Edwards, D. H. 7335
Fr PgScol Monterey WDJun
To DASA SandiaB
Ely, R. O. 1310
Fr 1stMarDiv
To HQMC By21Jul
Emswiler, R. H. 7304
Fr George Wash Univ WDJun
To MCAAS Yuma
Evans, H. W. 3002
Fr 1stMarBrig
To PgScol Monterey By31Jul
Fegley, J. E. 7333
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To LFTULant Nor Va
Fellingham, R. J. 7305
Fr 1stMAW
To PgScol Monterey By31Jul
Ferguson, Jr., G. L. 7335
Fr MCS Quant
To VMO-2 By1Jul
Flores, J. R. 0302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 3dMarDiv
Flynn, J. P. 7333
Fr Maxwell AFB WDJun
To AirFMFPac
Foss, D. H. 7335
Fr Univ of Omaha WDJun
To MCALF CamPen
Fox, G. C. 0302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 2dMarDiv
Foyle, R. A. 2502
Fr PgScol Monterey
To HQMC BY15Jul
Fraser, R. M. 7302
Fr Univ of Omaha WDJun
To 3dMAW
Fuller, G. E. 3002
Fr MCSA Phila WDJun
To HQMC
Gallman, J. R. 0802
Fr PgScol Monterey
To HQMC By1Jul
Gibney, J. L. 0802
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To HQMC
Gibson, G. A. 7333
Fr Univ of Md WDJun
To MB NB Npt
Gleanso, T. E. 0302
Fr Univ of Rochester WDJun
To MCS Quant
Good, R. N. 0302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 3dMAW
Gore, W. L. 0802
Fr Univ of Omaha WDJun
To I&I 8th105mm HowBn
Greene, R. P. 1803
Fr Ft Leavenworth WDJun
To 3dMarDiv
Green, C. M. 7304
Fr TACRON-22 WDJun
To 2dMAW
Green, M. K. 1302
Fr Univ of Omaha WDJun
To MCSC Barstow
Hadcock, K. G. 7302
Fr Univ of Md WDJun
To 1stMarBrig
Haden, F. M. 0185
Fr 12thNavDist WDJun
To MCSC Barstow
Hall, E. C. 7333
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To TACRON-22
Haney, J. M. 1802
Fr Univ of Omaha WDJun
To 3dMarDiv
Hansen, D. W. 7333
Fr 2dMAW WDJun
To FMFLant Nor Va
Harris, C. W. 2502
Fr Ft Leavenworth WDJun
To MCS Quant
Hawkins, H. W. 7335
Fr NABTC NAS Pncla
To 1stMAW By25Jul
Hayward, G. E. 1802
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 3dMarDiv
Hecker, J. S. 0302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 1stMarBrig
Heflin, B. A. 0302
Fr Harvard Univ
To HQMC By15Jul
Heitzler, J. S. 0302
Fr MCRD PI SC WDJun
To CO MB NAS JAX
Helstrom, R. S. 0802
Fr 3dMarDiv
To PgScol Monterey By27Jul
Hermes, J. M. 3010
Fr 1stMarDiv
To MCCOM NAG Korea By17Jul
Herod, J. 0195
Fr 2dMarDiv WDJun
To 3dMarDiv
Hess, J. J. 0302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 2dMarDiv
Hoereth, W. H. 1302
Fr MCS Quant
To HQMC By6Jul
Horn, J. A. 3002
Fr MCSA Phila WDJun
To 2dMarDiv
House, A. E. 0302
Fr SDiego St College
To Ft Benning Ga By10Jul
James, T. A. 3002
Fr 2dMAW WDJun
To MCSA Phila
Johnson, T. D. 1302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To HQMC
Karukin, D. S. 0302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 1stMarDiv
Kaufer, E. E. 0302
Fr 2dMarDiv WDJun
To MCRD PI SC
Kearns, T. J. 0302
Fr George Wash Univ WDJun
To 1stMarDiv
Kelly, Jr., H. R. 2502
Fr ForTrps FMFLant
To Ft Bragg NC By19Jun
Kennedy, H. T. 0302
Fr 1stMarDiv
To Univ of Calif By26Jul
Kessler, P. 0802
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 3dMarDiv
King, P. D. 7305
Fr 3dMarDiv
To Taiwan By26Jun
Kirsch, O. H. 3502
Fr 2dMarDiv WDJun
To MCAS CherPt
Kluckman, W. A. 0802
Fr 9th MCRRD
To LFTULANT By1Jul
Koontz, C. G. 1802
Fr ForTrps FMFLant
To HQMC By28Jul
Kraince, F. R. 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDJun
To 1stMCRRD
Kritter, E. J. 0302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To AmEmb Belgrade
Lamb, G. R. 0802
Fr 1stMarDiv WDJun
To Ft Sill Okla
Lamoureux, W. D. 6402
Fr MAD NATTC Jax WDJun
To MCAS CherPt
Lauck, J. H. 0302
Fr Brown Univ WDJun
To 3dMarDiv
Leidy, A. L. 0702
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 1stMarDiv
Leon, J. 0802
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 3dMarDiv
Lewandowski, T. F. 2501
Fr Univ of Omaha WDJun
To 3dMarDiv
Libbin, E. L. 0302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To FMFLant
Lillich, G. L. 7333
Fr TACRON-11 WDJun
To MCS Quant
Lindfelt, H. E. 4102
Fr MCB CamLej
To HQMC By15Jul
Lucas, E. M. 0130
Fr George Wash Univ WDJun
To MCAS El Toro
Lynch, D. G. 7331
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 2dMAW
Mader, J. F. 1302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 3dMarDiv
Magness, B. L. 0302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 3dMarDiv
Maiden, R. F. 0302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 3dMarDiv
Marchette, D. E. 0302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To NS Sangley Pt
Marr, R. F. 7307
Fr 2dMAW
To CINCLantFlt By1May
Mayo, D. E. 7304
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 1stMAW
McCurdy, W. B. 7302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To CNAVANTRA CorpC
McLennan, K. 0302
Fr UCLA Los Angeles WDJun
To 1stMarDiv
McNeely, R. L. 0302
Fr George Wash Univ WDJun
To 1stMarDiv
McCarty, J. R. 0302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 3dMarDiv
McKamy, D. I. 7307
Fr 2dMAW WDJun
To MCS Quant
Mendenhall, H. E. 7302
Fr Univ of Md WDJun
To HQMC
Menjes, J. H. 3302
Fr Ft Lee Va
To HQMC By1Jul
Metcalfe, R. B. 0802
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 2dMarDiv

Millette, E. 7335
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To HMX-1 MCAS Quant

Minielier, J. F. 3502
Fr Univ of Minn Mpls WDJun
To Ft Eustis Va

Molsberry, D. M. 7333
Fr HQMC
To PgScol Monterey By31Jul

Morris, R. A. 7305
Fr Univ of Omaha WDJun
To 3dMAW

Moss, R. B. 0802
Fr Ft Bliss Tex WDJun
To 3dMarDiv

Muir, W. B. 3002
Fr 3dMarDiv WDJun
To MCSA Phila

Neiman, J. L. 7332
Fr 2dMAW
To HQMC By27May

Nichols, R. L. 0302
Fr Indian Head Md WDJun
To 3dMarDiv

Nilsen, G. H. 0802
Fr Yale Univ WDJun
To NB Portsmouth NH

O'Hara, F. J., Jr. 7307
Fr War College Npt WDJun
To HQMC

Park, C. E. 0302
Fr Wesleyan Univ WDJun
To 1stMarDiv

Parsons, H. L. 3002
Fr 1stMAW WDJun
To MB NB Phila

Peck, W. H. 0802
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To MAAG Taiwan

Peterson, W. S. 0302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 1stMarBrig

Phelan, D. G. 0302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 1stMarDiv

Phelps, L. M. 0802
Fr HQMC WDJun
To PhibForLant

Pickett, P. G. 7333
Fr Chapman Col WDJun
To 3dMAW

Plaskett, W. 0802
Fr War College Npt WDJun
To ForTrpsFMFLant

Presson, R. E. 7335
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To CNABATRA Pncla

Pryor, B. H. 7302
Fr Univ of Omaha WDJun
To 1st MarDiv

Rann, L. A. 0302
Fr AFSC Nor Va WDJun
To FMFLant

Rees, G. J., Jr. 7333
Fr 1stMarBrig WDJun
To USNA Annapolis

Ringwood, T. E. 0302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 1stMarDiv

Roark, W. N. 7333
Fr George Wash Univ WDJun
To 1stMAW

Robinson, E. L. 3002
Fr SFran St College WDJun
To 1stMarDiv

Robinson, H. G. 7305
Fr 1stMarDiv
To COMFAIRWESTPAC By15Jul

Roe, M. O. 0302
Fr 2dMarDiv
To NAG Korea By2Jul

Rooney, J. J. 0302
Fr Villanova Univ WDJun
To MCS Quant

Ross, G. W. 7335
Fr 2dMAW WDJun
To MCS Quant

Sanchez, K. J. 3402
Fr 1stMAW
To MCRD PISC WDJun

Sargent, G. T. 0302
Fr War College Npt
To NavConstBnsLantF By15Jul

Scruggs, R. L. 1302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To Camp Butler

Sears, R. D. 0302
Fr Rice Institute WDJun
To 1stMarDiv

Segner, D. R. 7335
Fr MAD NAS PaxRiv
To PgScol Monterey By31Jul

Selly, W. D. 0302
Fr MCS Quant
To 2dMAW WDJun

Seminoff, N. M. 0302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To CINCEUR

Seward, R. F. 0302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To MCCWTC Bridgeport

Shutler, P. D. 7305
Fr 1stMAW
To PgScol Monterey By31Jul

Siedfried, W. G. 7335
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 1stMarDiv

Skvaril, W. J. 0302
Fr Maxwell AFB WDJun
To 2dMarDiv

Slaton, C. H. 7333
Fr Univ of Md WDJun
To 2dMAW

Smith, A. C. 3002
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To HQMC

Smith, G. E. 7335
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 1stMAW

Smith, R. A. 0302
Fr Univ of Utah WDJun
To 1stMarDiv

Smith, D. H. 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv
To I-I 54thRflCo By15Jul

Snelling, E. W. 0302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 3dMarDiv

Squires, G. R. 7304
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 1stMAW

Stavridis, P. G. 0302
Fr Purdue Univ WDJun
To MCS Quant

Stephenson, C. R. 0302
Fr MCS Quant
To USMA West Point By15Jul

Stuart, V. R. 1802
Fr MCS Quant
To HQMC By19Jul

Sullivan, C. H. 0302
Fr MB NS Kodiak
To HQMC By1Jul

Swetnam, W. E. 0302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 3dMarDiv

Tatem, L. E. 0302
Fr War College Npt WDJun
To 1stMarDiv

Thomas, J. J. 0302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 2dMAW

Thomas, A. I. 0302
Fr Ft Leavenworth WDJun
To 1stMarBrig

Treado, M. J. 0702
Fr HQMC
To PgScol Monterey By31Jul

Troen, L. G. 0302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 3dMarDiv

Van Cleve, R. R. 0302
Fr Univ of Omaha WDJun
To FltActy Sasebo

Veach, H. C. 7304
Fr High Pt College WDJun
To 1stMAW

Vernon, T. E. 7333
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To Alusna Cairo

Wade, R. 7302
Fr Univ of Md WDJun
To 3dMAW

Warshawer, A. J. 0302
Fr NAS Atsugi WDJun
To ComPhibGru 3

Washburn, G. M. 7335
Fr 3dMAW WDJun
To MCS Quant

Watson, W. D. 7333
Fr Maxwell AFB WDJun
To 1stMAW

Watson, W. C. 7304
Fr Maxwell AFB WDJun
To CINCSOUTH

Watson, E. R. 0302
Fr Port Hueneme
To PgScol Monterey By31Jul

Webb, L. R. 0302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 1stMarBrig

Weber, R. J. 3002
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To MCSA Phila

Welch, R. N. 7335
Fr MCS Quant
To MCALF CamPen WDJun

Whipple, R. E. 0302
Fr MCAS Kaneohe WDJun
To MCB CamPen

White, T. B. 0802
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 3dMarDiv

White, J. D. 3002
Fr George Wash Univ
To 1st MAW By24Jul

White, J. H. 7304
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To AirFMFPac

Whiting, C. S. 0302
Fr Univ of Miss WDJun
To MCS Quant

Wilder, C. S. 0302
Fr MB NAS PaxRiv WDMay
To MCS Quant

Wiley, N. C. 7333
Fr Chapman College WDJun
To HQMC

Wolf, J. 7305
Fr War College Npt WDJun
To BuWeps Wash DC

Woods, H. D. 0802
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 3dMarDiv

Worster, L. H. 0302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To LFTUPac

Yingling, J. M. 1802
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 3dMarDiv

Yount, V. L. 7304
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 1stMarDiv

Zeugner, R. 0802
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To FMFPac

Permanent Promotions

Adair, H. F. Apr
Alexander, L. G. Apr
Alford, B. W. Apr
Allen, R. B. Apr
Allen, W. H. Apr
Allen, J. F. Apr
Anderson, G. B. Apr
Anderson, Jr., H. A. Apr
Anderson, H. L. Apr
Anthony, W. S. Apr
Argo, H. D. Apr
Baar, Jr., S. P. Apr
Bailey, E. A. Apr
Bain, H. J. Apr
Ball, R. E. Apr
Barrett, J. B. Apr
Beal, S. G. Apr
Beat, N. J. Apr
Beckett, W. H. Apr
Bekins, Jr., R. Q. Apr
Bell, Jr., V. D. Apr
Bland, K. R. Apr
Bonds, W. E. Apr
Boudreaux, D. L. Apr
Boulware, J. C. Apr
Brandel, R. E. Apr
Brierton, Jr. ,T. J. Apr
Broome, N. C. Apr
Browne, Jr., G. S. Apr
Burch, C. B. Apr
Burke, T. W. Apr
Burnett, L. E. Apr
Busick, S. J. Apr
Byrum, P. B. Apr
Campbell, F. H. Apr
Camporini, E. E. Apr
Chambers, Jr., G. G. Apr
Chapman, F. Apr
Christopher, W. N. Apr
Clyde, D. P. Apr
Coffeen, A. E. Apr
Colella, R. L. Apr
Cook, Jr., B. E. Apr
Cooley, R. A. Apr
Coppins, F. B. Apr
Costanza, F. V. Apr
Cox, Jr., S. A. Apr
Crispen, R. W. Apr
Crowley, J. F. Apr
Croyle, F. K. Apr
Cunard, Jr., E. M. Apr
Cuneo, J. E. Apr
Cunningham, J. D. Apr
Daskalakis, J. A. Apr
Dauphine, G. M. Apr
Davis, D. A. Apr
Davis, R. L. Apr
Dayvault, N. E. Apr
DeBarr, J. R. Apr
Defenbaugh, N. F. Apr
Dillon, J. W. Apr
Dittmar, R. W. Apr
Doering, Jr., J. J. Apr
Domina, W. E. Apr
Donahue, r., W. F. Apr
Doty, D. J. Apr
Dunbar, M. J. Apr
Dunphy, J. C. Apr
Eberhart, J. W. Apr
Eddy, Jr., S. L. Apr
Ettenborough, R. B. Apr
Evans, R. C. Apr
Evans, r., H. W. Apr
Fassino, A. N. Apr
Ferguson, Jr., H. Apr
Fisher, S. Apr
Fox, J. T. Apr
Franzman, F. L. Apr
Frazier, A. C. Apr
French, H. D. Apr
Fulton, Jr., F. K. Apr
Gibson, Jr., G. E. Apr
Girard, D. D. Apr
Glover, W. R. Apr
Gore, W. L. Apr
Gray, H. Z. Apr
Green, C. M. Apr
Groome, R. C. Apr
Hall, L. R. Apr
Hall, C. D. Apr
Hamilton, Jr., R. H. Apr
Hampton, E. Apr
Harpe, L. L. Apr
Harper, E. E. Apr
Harris, Jr., L. C. Apr
Harris, W. D. Apr
Hart, L. P. Apr
Haynes, Jr., A. B. Apr
Head, R. M. Apr
Heflin, B. A. Apr
Hendrickson, A. B. Apr
Herald, C. D. Apr
Herndon, W. N. Apr
Hershey, G. R. Apr
Hewlett, M. M. Apr
Hickman, Jr., E. L. Apr
Hill, F. A . Apr
Hill, M. A. Apr
Hoch, K. L. Apr
Hoskins, R. E. Apr
House, Jr., A. E. Apr
Hunter, G. R. Apr
Ingram, A. L. Apr
Janiszewski, G. Apr
Johnson, C. J. Apr
Johnstone, . H. Apr
Jones, A. T. Apr
Jones, B. D. Apr
Kearns, T. J. Apr
Kelly, W. D. Apr
Kelly, J. J. Apr
Kelly, W. C. Apr
Kirchmann, C. S. Apr
Kirk, W. C. Apr
Kluckman, W. A. Apr
Kramek, S. E. Apr
Kroodsma, G. A. Apr
Ksycewski, C. C. Apr
Kurth, Jr., H. R. Apr
Ladutko, J. Apr
Landrigan, J. M. Apr
Lauck, J. H. Apr
Lee, H. Apr
Leeseberg, P. K. Apr
Lemmons, R. T. Apr
Lindall, Jr., A. L. Apr
Little, Jr., E. L. Apr
Locke, W. R. Apr
MacCormack, W. H. Apr
Mann, C. R. Apr
Matheson, K. A. Apr
May, Jr., W. L. Apr
McPherson, D. G. Apr
McGlynn, R. J. Apr
McGowan, L. J. Apr
McKamy, D. I. Apr
Mehlinger, M. F. Apr
Metcalfe, R. B. Apr
Metzger, T. E. Apr
Michaux, Jr., A. L. Apr
Mills, D. L. Apr
Misiewicz, J. Apr
Mitchell, W. R. Apr
Moore, W. L. Apr
Moritz, A. B. Apr
Murphy, J. J. Apr
Nahow, T. Apr
Nelson, W. L. Apr
Nelson, Jr., A. A. Apr
Nichols, R. L. Apr
Novak, A. Apr
O'Connor, Jr., A. L. Apr
O'Donnell, A. W. Apr
Park, C. E. Apr
Pates, Jr., B. A. Apr
Pavlicin, G. A. Apr
Pechar, G. Apr
Penley, V. R. Apr
Pickett, P. G. Apr
Platt, R. M. Apr
Pommerenk, A. C. Apr
Priddy, J. R. Apr
Primrose, R. A. Apr
Probst, A. E. Apr
Raphael, M. L. Apr
Read, J. L. Apr
Reeder, J. H. Apr
Reep, M. A. Apr
Reese, R. W. Apr
Riggs, T. W. Apr
Roberts, C. R. Apr
Roberts, J. F. Apr
Robinson, E. L. Apr

Rogal, E. R. Apr
Rossi, R. J. Apr
Rowe, E. J. Apr
Rowlett, G. W. Apr
Rumble, Jr., G. M. Apr
Sander, P. E. Apr
Sanzo, J. Apr
Schening, R. J. Apr
Schmid, C. H. Apr
Schwartz, F. L. Apr
Scott, L. B. Apr
Sears, R. D. Apr
See, C. M. Apr
Selleck, Jr., L. M. Apr
Settle, R. W. Apr
Seward, R. F. Apr
Shea, W. E. Apr
Sheehan, C. I. Apr
Shelby, Jr., A. C. Apr
Shuford, R. L. Apr
Sinclair, R. B. Apr
Skotnicki, A. J. Apr
Slenning, B. N. Apr
Smith, V. J. Apr
Smith, G. H. Apr
Snyder, B. H. Apr
Soper, J. B. Apr
Stone, Jr., E. H. Apr
Stott, H. D. Apr
Sullivan, A. J. Apr
Taylor, W. W. Apr
Terry, Jr., J. M. Apr
Thomas, A. I. Apr
Thompson, R. B. Apr
Thompson, J. S. Apr
Timme, W. G. Apr
Toups, T. J. Apr
Tunnell, Jr., R. J. Apr
Unger, W. T. Apr
Usher, E. G. Apr
Vandalsem, R. R. Apr
Vaught, F. W. Apr
Von Horn, C. S. Apr
Wadsworth, T. B. Apr
Wagenhoffer, M. T. Apr
Walker, E. A. Apr
Wann, r., C. M. Apr
Watson, R. W. Apr
Watson, W. C. Apr
Weaver, C. A. Apr
Webb, Jr., M. A. Apr
Webb, J. O. Apr
Weber, R. J. Apr
Weber, W. E. Apr
Weizenegger, J. A. Apr
Whitehurst, K. Apr
White, J. H. Apr
Whitehead, A. T. Apr
Wilkerson, H. L. Apr
Ziegler, P. E. Apr

Temporary Promotions

Crosswait, P. M. May
Cumming, G. D. May
Howard, Jr., R. E. May
Laney, Jr., J. M. May
Martz, II, J. G. May
Overgard, W. E. May
Severson, R. I. May

Temporary Promotions, Reserve

Adkins, H. R., Jr. May
Buchanan, R. M. May
Cappiello, F. A., Jr. Apr
Courtney, J. E. Apr
Doggett, A. C., Jr. Apr
Gray, R. Apr
Grimes, W. P. Apr
Grisham, O. L. Apr
Hershner, C. H. May
Houck, I. C., Jr. May
Ireland, J. B. Apr
Thomas, H. H. Apr
Trammell, D. B. May
Williams, T. R. May

Retired

Baker, A. S., Jr. 0302
MB NS SFran 30Jun
Corvi, J. A. 7307
Nav MisCen Pt Mugu 31May
Gilman, G. L., Jr. 7335
3dMAW 31May
Holmes, H. G., Jr. 7335
2dMAW 30Apr
Iungerich, S. 4602
MCRD SDiego 31May
Kay, W. L. 0202
ForTrps FMFLant 30Apr
McGarry, J. P. 2502
2dMarDiv 31May
Tatum, H. M. 0115
4thMCRRD 30Apr

Deaths, Active Duty

Pearce, R. H. 1302
3dMarDiv 4May

Walker, P. D., Jr. 2502
MCAS Kaneohe Bay 23Apr

Deaths, Retired

Shealty, C. W.
Vista, Calif. 5Apr

Recent Command and Staff Assignments

Archer, T. E., PM, MCAF, Iwakuni
Cooh, A. T., WgAcftMaintO, MCAF, Iwakuni
Duncann, H. C., XO, WpsEngBn, PI
Jannell, M. T., CO, HMR-363, El Toro
McAlister, J. S., CO, 1stForReconCo, 1stMarDiv

Captains

Transfers

Abernathy, T. R. 0802
Fr PgScol Monterey WDJun
To MCS Quant
Adrian, B. M. 7307
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 2dMAW
Aldridge, J. B. 0130
Fr HQMC WDJun
To 1stMarBrig
Alexander, M. H. 0702
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To Ft Bliss Tex
Allan, L. J. 7333
Fr MCAAS Yuma WDJun
To 3dMAW
Allen, T. H. 0702
Fr Ft Bliss Tex
To USS Hancock By10Jul
Anderson, D. C. 0302
Fr MCRD SDiego WDJun
To 1stMarBrig
Anderson, D. W. 7304
Fr Maxwell AFB WDJun
To 1stMAW
Andriliunas, F. 0802
Fr MCAS Quant WDJun
To USS Canberra
Annas, T. T. 1302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 3dMarDiv
Armstrong, M. B. 7305
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 2dMAW
Arneson, R. B. 0802
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To I&I 5th155mmHowBn
Arnold, D. W. 2010
Fr MCAS Kaneohe
To MB NS SFran By25Jun
Ashby, W. C., Jr. 7304
Fr 2dMAW
To 1stMAW By1Jul
Austin, J. H. 3002
Fr ForTrps FMFPac WDJun
To MCB CamLej
Bailey, G. R. 2502
Fr PgScol Monterey WDJun
To 3dMarDiv
Bany, J. B. 0302
Fr MCB CamPen WDJun
To MB Pearl
Barlow, G. H. 7302
Fr Univ of Md WDJun
To 1stMAW
Barrett, R. C. 7331
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 3dMAW
Barry, J. A. 7304
Fr 1stMAW
To PgScol Monterey By31Jul
Baxter, G. S. 0302
Fr MB NS SFran WDJun
To MCB CamPen
Begnaud, P. H. 0302
Fr MCSC Albany WDJun
To 1stMarBrig
Bell, R. H. 3002
Fr PgScol Monterey
To NavSupCen Oak By9Jul
Bench, A. E. 0302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 2dMarDiv
Benson, R. E. 3002
Fr George Wash Univ WDJun
To MCSC Barstow
Bergman, A. A. 2502
Fr FMFPac
To PgScl Monterey By31Jul
Bethel, W. F. 0302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To HqBn HQMC
Binney, D. C. 0302
Fr USNA
To 1stMarDiv By1Jul

Bird, J. H. 2502
Fr MCRD SDiego WDJun
To PhibGru-1
Bjornass, F. R. 7335
Fr 1stMarDiv WDJun
To 1stMAW
Bloom, A. H. 7331
Fr MAD NAS Pncla WDJun
To 1stMarBrig
Boalch, D. F. 0802
Fr FtSill Okla
To 3dMarDiv By3Jul
Bodnar, N. K. 0302
Fr Ft Benning Ga WDJun
To AmerEmb Paris
Boemerman, G. F. 7331
Fr 1stAnglico WDJun
To 1stMarBrig
Boline, J. D. 0302
Fr MB Pearl WDJun
To 1stMarDiv
Bond, R. L. 0301
Fr 3dMarDiv WDJun
To MCB CamPen
Bonney, R. A. 7335
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To TACRON-22
Boone, W. 7335
Fr 2dMAW WDJun
To MCS Quant HMX-1
Bormann, W. P. 6602
Fr 1stMAW WDJun
To 2dMAW
Bornhauser, D. D. 0130
Fr 1stAnglico WDMay
To FMFLant NorVa
Boyd, C. A. 0302
Fr 5thMCRRD WDJun
To MCS Quant
Bradley, W. C. 7333
Fr 2dMarDiv WDJun
To 1stMAW
Brewton, D. P. 0802
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 2dMarDiv
Britt, H. E. 7335
Fr NABTC NAS Pncla WDJun
To 2dMAW
Brothers, W. W. 7302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 2dMAW
Brownell, R. L. 0802
Fr George Wash Univ WDJun
To MCS Quant
Browne, D. F. 7302
Fr 2dMAW WDJun
To 1stMAW
Bruser, G. L. 7302
Fr. MCS Quant WDJun
To 1stMAW
Buckley, C. C. 3002
Fr PgScol Monterey WDJun
To 3dMAW
Buckley, J. D. 0130
Fr Pt Lyautey
To HQMC By5Jul
Buergey, W. L. 0802
Fr MCS Quant
To Camp Zama Japan By5Jul
Cacace, P. L. 0302
Fr MCRD PI SC WDJun
To 2dMarDiv
Cameron, R. A. 7305
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To CNABATRA Pncla
Cannon, F. S. 3002
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 3dMarDiv
Cappeletto, N. 1802
Fr 1stMarDiv WDJun
To NAF Naha Okinawa
Carll, R. C. 0302
Fr Taiwan Def Comd WDJun
To 1stMarDiv
Carruthers, R. E. 2502
Fr NPhibScol SDiego WDJun
To MB Ft Meade
Cassidy, G. W. 7331
Fr Univ of Md WDJun
To 2dMAW
Cates, C. D. 6602
Fr MAD NATTC Mfs
To 1stMAW By17Jul
Chaney, E. D., Jr. 7305
Fr PgScol Monterey WDJun
To 1stMarBrig
Christopherso, N. J. 2502
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 2dMarDiv
Clark, F. A. 0302
Fr Univ of Md WDJun
To MCS Quant
Clark, D. A. 0802
Fr 8thMCRRD
To PgScol Monterey By 31Jul
Clary, O. R. 9901
Fr 1stMarBrig WDJun
To 1stMAW
Clatworthy, J. 0802
Fr MB NS Kodiak
To PgScol Monterey By31Jul
Coit, F. E. 3502
Fr ForTrps FMFLant WDJun
To 3dMarDiv

Colby, D. A. 0302
Fr 1stMarBrig
To 8th MCRRD By21Jul
Coleman, G. F. 7304
Fr 2dMAW
To 1stMAW By1Jul
Colia, J. 0302
Fr 1stMarBrig WDJun
To HQMC
Collins, J. R. 7304
Fr MAD NAS PaxRiv WDJun
To COMART
Colman, R. F. 7333
Fr 1stMarBrig WDJun
To CNAVANTRA CorpC
Connolly, J. P. 1803
Fr 1stMarDiv
To PgScol Monterey By31Jul
Conrad, B. D. 1802
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To ForTrps FMFLant
Cook, H. L. 0802
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 3dMarDiv
Cooney, R. W. 7333
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 2dMarDiv
Cope, J. F. 2715
Fr 1stMarDiv WDJun
To MCRD SDiego
Cottingham, R. P. 7335
Fr NAS Grosse Ile WDJun
To VMO-6 CamPen
Cottrell, H. E. 1803
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To MCB CamPen
Coulter, W. L. 0130
Fr NavSecGrp Wash DC WDJun
To 3rd Mar Div
Crews, D. D. 1302
Fr 1stMarDiv WDJun
To FMFPac
Critz, R. L. 7333
Fr 2dMAW
To 1stMAW By1Jul
Crumback, W. I. 2502
Fr Ft Devins Mass
To HQMC By17Jul
Cumming, G. D. 0302
Fr Univ of NMex WDJun
To 3dMarDiv
Dale, D. T., III 0302
Fr MB NS SFran WDJun
To 1stMarBrig
Danielson, D. C. 7302
Fr Univ of Omaha WDJun
To 1stMAW
Davis, G. G. 7335
Fr NABTC NAS Pncla WDJun
To 2dMAW
DeLong, C. S. 2502
Fr Univ of Omaha WDJun
To CommSta Adak
DeNort, J. 0302
Fr MCAS Kaneohe WDJun
To MCRD SDiego
Deal, C. T. 0802
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To ForTrps FMFPac
Delaney, J. J. 1802
Fr Ft Knox Ky WDJun
To FMFLant
Dereng, C. P. 3002
Fr MCSC Barstow
To PgScol Monterey By1Jul
Dewey, H. C. 7304
Fr 2dMAW
To 1stMAW By1Jul
Diamond, D. L. 0302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 2dMarDiv
Dinegar, W. W. 0302
Fr MCS Quant
To 1stMarDiv By1Jul
Dittmann, W. R. 0802
Fr Univ of Md WdJun
To MCS Quant
Dodds, W. E. 7333
Fr Kingsville, Tex WDJun
To 1stMAW
Doherty, J. P. 0130
Fr 2dMarDiv WDJun
To 3dMarDiv
Donnelly, J. A. 1802
Fr Univ of Md WDJun
To ForTrps FMFLant
Doran, E. J. 0802
Fr MAD NABTC Pncla
To 3dMarDiv By13Jun
Draayer, L. J. 7332
Fr 1stMarDiv WDJun
To 3dMAW
Duggan, E. F. 3010
Fr MB NTC GLakes WDJun
To MCAS CherPt
Dumont, T. J. 7302
Fr PgScol Monterey WDJun
To 3dMAW
Dunn, R. M. 3002
Fr MCSC Albany WDJun
So SUPAG Columbus
Dunwell, R. P. 0802
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To FMFPac

Eagan, A. J. 0302
Fr NAD Lualualei
To I&I 49thRfl Co By1Jul

Eggleston, J. N. 3502
Fr 1stMarDiv
To 2dMarDiv By3Jul

Eidson, R. E. 0302
Fr MCS Quant
To I&I 5thRflCo By21Jul

Emerson, S. M 3302
Fr MCAAS Yuma
To MCAS Kaneohe Bay By17Jul

Engemann, R. A. 3502
Fr 3dMarDiv WDMay
To MCB 29 Palms

Fails, W. R. 7331
Fr NABTC NAS Pncla WDJun
To 2dMAW

Fichter, J. A. 0302
Fr USS Boxer LPH-4 WDJun
To FMFLant

Fischer, H. E. 3002
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To ForTrps FMFLant

Fojtlin, L. 0302
Fr LFTULant WDJun
To MCS Quant

Ford, D. J. 1802
Fr George Wash Univ WDJun
To 3dMarDiv

Gallagher, J. H. 7302
Fr NAATC NAS CorpC WDJun
To 1stMarBrig

Garner, K. C. 3002
Fr MCB CamPen WDJun
To MCRD SDiego

Gascoigne, D. G. 7302
Fr 3dMAW WDJun
To 9th MCRRD

Gemske, J. R. 0802
Fr MCRD PI SC WDMay
To MB NB Npt

Gentile, V. J. 1802
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 3dMarDiv

Gentry, G. H. 0302
Fr MCS Quant
To I&I 31st Rfl Co By15Jul

Gerard, J. C. 0302
Fr MCS Quant
To I&I 46thRflCo By15Jul

German, P. K., Jr. 7302
Fr Pg Scol Monterey WDJun
To 2dMAW

Goeke, H. K. 0130
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 1stMarBrig

Goggin, T. P. 0302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 1stMarDiv

Gomb, F. F. 4602
Fr MCS Quant WDMay
To 2dMarDiv

Goodiel, C. D. 0802
Fr USS Canberra WDJun
To FMFLant

Gowdy, R. J. 7305
Fr NABTC NAS Pncla WDJun
To 2dMAW

Graham, E. W. 7333
Fr 2dMAW WDJun
To NAAS Meridian

Grayson, E. F. 3002
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 3dMarDiv

Grebenstein, E. E. 6002
Fr MAD NATTC Mfs WDJun
To MCRD SDiego

Green, A. H. 7305
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To MCS Quant

Greene, J. W. 3002
Fr MCSC Albany
To PgScol Monterey By31Jul

Grunwald, H. H. 7302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 2dMAW

Guell, E. M. 7322
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To HQMC

Guttormson, D. L. 7305
Fr 3dMAW
To PgScl Monterey By31Jul

Hirt, F. A. 0302
Fr 1stMarBrig WDJun
To MCRS Baltimore

Hale, E. W. 4002
Fr 3dMarDiv WDJun
To FMFPac

Hallden, R. C. 1802
Fr MCSC Barstow WDJun
To 1stMarDiv

Hanna, C. M. 4002
Fr HQMC
To MCB 29 Palms By26Jun

Harris, J. R. 7304
Fr HqBn HQMC WDJun
To MAD NAS PaxRiv

Harris, R. P. 0302
Fr 1stMarDiv WDJun
To 12thMCRRD

Harris, R. E. 1802
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 3dMarDiv

Harvey, D. L. 7333
Fr 2dMAW
To NAirTestC PaxRiv By22Jun

Haskell, J. W. 7304
Fr 2dMAW
To 1stMAW By1Jul

Hawthorne, R. W. 7333
Fr 3dMAW
To PgScl Monterey By31Jul

Haxwell, E. K. 1302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To I&I 2dEngrCo

Helms, S. H. 3010
Fr 1stMarBrig WDJn
To 2dMarDiv

Henn, H. R. 2502
Fr PgScol Monterey WDJun
To MCB CamLej

Hennegan, J. E. 1802
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 1stMarDiv

Henson, H. H. 3510
Fr 6thMCRRD WDJun
To 1stMarDiv

Hergert, J. C. 0302
Fr USS Independence
To I&I 57thRflCo By1Jul

Hittinger, F. R. 0302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 1stMarBrig

Holzinger, B. E. 1310
Fr MCSFA SFran WDMay
To HQMC Wash DC

Hopkins, D. M. 2502
Fr MCS Quant
To PhibGru-4 By5Jul

Howard, E. R. 7302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 3dMAW

Howell, D. W. 0302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 1stMarDiv

Hoxie, R. F. 2040
Fr 2dMarDiv WDJun
To 3dMarDiv

Hudson, R. I. 0302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 3dMarDiv

Huerlimann, E. A. 2502
Fr MCS Quant
To USS Eldorado By10Jul

Huerta, G. 2501
Fr MB Ft Meade WDJun
To 3dMarDiv

Hutchinson, W. E. 0302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 1stMarBrig

Hutter, H. H. 0802
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To ForTrps FMFLant

Ihli, L. J. 7302
Fr Maxwell AFB WDJun
To 1stMarBrig

Ingrando, R. B. 0802
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To ForTrps FMFLant

Johnson, C. B. 7305
Fr MAD NAATC CorpC
To VT-7 NAAS Meridian By15May

Johnson, R. M. 7304
Fr VX-6 NAS QuonPt WDJun
To 3dMAW

Jones, R. K. 1802
Fr USNavIntelScl WDJun
To Ft Meade Md

Jupp, W. A. 7333
Fr 2dMAW
To Univ of Omaha By17Jul

Kain, E. W. 1802
Fr FtKnox Ky WDJun
To FMFLant

Keeling, H. J. 0802
Fr ForTrps FMFLant WDJun
To MCS Quant

Kennedy, J. C. 7335
Fr MCAS CherPt
To NABTC NAS Pncla By12Jul

Kimbrell, H. W. 0302
Fr USS Northampton WDJun
To 2dMarDiv

King, J. W. 1803
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To ForTrps FMFLant

Kinniburch, J. A. 3502
Fr ForTrps FMFLant
To 1stMAW By17Jul

Kramer, R. I. 0302
Fr HQMC WDJun
To 2dMarDiv

Kramer, M. C. 0702
Fr ForTrps FMFPac
To I&I 3dLtAAMisBtry By25Jul

Kress, H. W. 3502
Fr 2dMarDiv
To I&I 7thTrkCo By5Jul

Kruck, F. H. 0802
Fr PgScol Monterey WDJun
To MCS Quant

Laine, E. R. 1802
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 3rdMarDiv

Landers, J. H. 0302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 2dMarDiv

Lane, K. L. 2002
Fr 3dMarDiv WDJun
To 2dMAW

Lawler, G. E. 0302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 1stMarBrig

Lawrence, W. A. 0802
Fr MCS Quant
To FMFPac By1Jul

Le Bas, M. A. 7304
Fr VX-6 NAS QuonPt WDJun
To 3dMAW

Leach, G. H. 7333
Fr 2dMAW
To PgScol Monterey By31Jul

Lewis, E. P. 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDJun
To MCS Quant

Limbach, W. R. 7332
Fr NAAS Whiting Fld
To NATTU NAS Pncla By8Jun

Lindell, C. A. 7307
Fr Princeton Univ WDJun
To 2dMAW

Lisicky, J. F. 6402
Fr MB NAS QuonPt WDJun
To 2dMAW

Little, C. G. 0302
Fr MCS Quant
To 1stMarDiv By1Jul

Lovell, E. F. 7331
Fr NABTC NAS Pncla WDJun
To 2dMAW

Luley, R. E. 1302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 3dMarDiv

Lynch, M. B. 7304
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To MCS Quant

Macha, B. E. 1801
Fr Ft Knox Ky WDJun
To 3dMarDiv

Macy, W. T. 0302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 1stMarBrig

Manley, T. F. 0302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 1stMarBrig

Marques, P. P., Jr. 7332
Fr NATTU NAS Pncla WDMay
To 3dMAW

Marsh, R. C. 7305
Fr 1stMAW
To PgScol Monterey By31Jul

Maxwell, G. K. 0802
Fr Lang Scl Monterey WDMay
To MCS Quant

Maxwell, H. L. 1802
Fr Ind St Teach Col WDJun
To Ft Knox Ky

McAfee, C. K. 0802
Fr Ft Sill Okla WDJune
To MCAS Kaneohe

McAlexander, D. E. 0302
Fr 1stMarDiv
To I&I 2dReconCo By1Jul

McCamey, R. E., II 7331
Fr Pg Scol Monterey WDJun
To 2dMAW

McClure, V. R. 0202
Fr MCS Quant WD3un
To 2dMarDiv

McCool, W. G. 7305
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 1stMarBrig

McCrary, N. B. 7304
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 3dMarDiv

McDonald, R. C. 0302
Fr Ft Benning Ga
To 3dMarDiv By3Jul

McElheny, C. L. 0802
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To Ft Sill Okla

McGahan, J. G. 7335
Fr MCAF Santa Ana WDJun
To VMO-6 MAG-36 3dMAW

McGee, J. H. 7333
Fr MCS Quant
To PgScol Monterey By31Jul

McKinstry, W. E. 0302
Fr Ft Benning Ga
To 3dMarDiv By3Jul

McMillan, D. R. 0802
Fr MCB CamPen
To 3dMarDiv By3Jul

McNally, T. E. 0302
Fr MCAS Quant WDJun
To 1stMarDiv

McNamara, F. T. 0130
Fr 1stMarBrig WDJun
To MCB CamPen

Medis, J. W. 1302
Fr 1stMarBrig WDJun
To I&I 10th EngrCo

Merrell, E. L. 2002
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To MCSC Albany

Mertz, E. P. 7333
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 2dMAW

Miller, R. C. 0302
Fr MCSC Barstow WDJun
To 1stMarBrig

Mitchell, T. R. 2002
Fr MCRD SDiego WDJun
To MCSC Barstow

Mitchell, F. H. 0302
Fr 1stMarBrig
To OSO Phila By20Jul

Moffitt, F. L. 3502
Fr 3dMarDiv WDJun
To 1stMarDiv

Monahan, J. P. 0302
Fr USNA Anna WDJun
To 2dMarDiv

Morin, D. E. 3002
Fr Ind St Teach Col WDJun
To MCSC Barstow

Morre, R. H. 7304
Fr 3dMAW
To 1stMAW By1Jul

Mousetis, R. 0130
Fr HQMC WDJun
To 1stMarDiv

Netka, W. 3002
Fr MCB CampPen WDJun
To MCSC Barstow

Normandeau, J. P. 3010
Fr MCRD PI SC WDJun
To 2dMAW

O'Brien, W. J. 6402
Fr 1stMAW WDJun
To MAD NATTC Mfs

Oden, T. S. 7304
Fr NABTC NAS Pncla WDJun
To 3dMAW

Owens, M. C. 0202
Fr 1stMarBrig WDJune
To 1stMarDiv

Owens, J. L. 0302
Fr MB Ptsmouth WDJun
To 2dMarDiv

Paige, E. C., Jr. 7305
Fr 3dMAW
To Pg Scl Monterey By31Jul

Pangburn, C. E. 2502
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 3dMarDiv

Parchen, J. W. 7302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To MCOSO SFran

Parker, E. L. 0302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 3dMarDiv

Paro, E. E. 3002
Fr ForTrps FMFLant WDJun
To Nav Mission Hawaii

Peeler, J. J. 0302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 2dMarDiv

Percival, R. E. 7302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 2dMAW

Perron, E. R. 7333
Fr 3dMAW
To PgScol Monterey By31Jul

Perry, V. A. 1302
Fr Univ of Md WDJun
To MCS Quant

Phifer, D. W. 0302
Fr 1stMarDiv WDJun
To CINCEUR

Pickett, B. S. 0302
Fr USS Providence
To I&I 20thRflCo By1Jul

Plante, D. P. 7333
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 1stMarBrig

Quinn, F. X. 0302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 2dMarDiv

Quisenberry, J. R. 2502
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 2dMarDiv

Rapp, J. M. 7333
Fr MAD NAS Pncla WDJun
To 1stMarBrig

Redmond, J. E. 3010
Fr 1stMarBrig WDJun
To 1stMAW

Reilly, D. J. 7302
Fr 1stMarBrig WDJun
To PgScol Monterey

Reisinger, F. J. 2502
Fr 2dMarDiv WDJun
To HQMC

Reville, J. T. 0130
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To HQMC

Rhykerd, C. A. 7332
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 1stMarBrig

Rice, W. R. 7307
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 2dMAW

Riddell, W. R. 7302
Fr NAAS Beeville WDJun
To 2dMAW

Ridgely, R. H. 0302
Fr MCS Quant
To USS LChamplain By10Jul

Ridgway, G. A. 6402
Fr AirFMFPac WDJun
To MAD NATTC Mfs

Riney, F. 0302
Fr MCS Quant
To USS Valley Forge By5Jun

Roach, C. D. 0302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 1stMarDiv

Roberts, S. G. 1302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To ForTrps FMFLant

Robertson, J. W. 0302
Fr MCS Quant
To 1stMarDiv By10Jul

Robinett, H. M. 7304
Fr Univ of Omaha WDJun
To MCS Quant

Robinson, C. D. 7333
Fr NATTC NAS CorpC WDJun
To 1stMarBrig

Ross, R. D. 0302
Fr MCRD SDiego WDJun
To OSO SFran

Roth, H. B. 7331
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 1stMAW

Rourke, R. E. 3002
Fr Univ of Md WDJun
To HQMC

Russell, R. A. 0302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 1stMarDiv

Ruvo, V. A. 3002
Fr George Wash Univ WDJun
To HQMC

Ryan, P. J. 0302
Fr FMFPac WDJun
To MCRD SDiego

Ryckman, J. B. 0302
Fr 8thMCRRD WDJun
To MCS Quant

Ryder, N. E. 7302
Fr NAS Pncla WDMay
To MCOSO Columbus

Salzman, F. P. 7333
Fr MAD NAS PaxRiv WDJun
To 2dMAW

Sanborn, D. L. 0130
Fr MB Pearl WDJune
To 1stMarDiv

Sautter, M. H. 7302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 2dMAW

Schifferman, E. R. 0130
Fr 1stMarBrig WDJun
To NAS Anacostia

Schramel, R. F. 7333
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 1stMAW

Schultz, H. N. 2502
Fr 6th CommCo WDJun
To 3dMAW

Searles, R. M. 3002
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 2dMarDiv

Seaton, B. W. 7332
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To CNAVANTRA CorpC

Seene, G. A. 2502
Fr Ft Monmouth NJ
To LFTU NorVa WDJun

Sells, J. D. 7333
Fr 1stMarDiv WDJun
To 1stMarBrig FMF

Serrin, D. E. 7302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 2dMAW

Sewell, C. A. 7302
Fr MCS Quant
To CNATC PaxRiv By22Jun

Seymour, R. A. 0302
Fr Univ of Md WDJun
To 3dMarDiv

Shadrick, U. W. 7302
Fr Maxwell AFB WDJun
To 1stMAW

Sharpe, W. N. 7305
Fr Univ of Calif WDJun
To 3dMAW

Sherman, J. R. 7331
Fr Univ of Md WDJun
To 2dMAW

Shetzer, W. J. 3010
Fr NavSupCen Oak
To MCB CamLej By1Jul

Shinkle, R. C. 7335
Fr 2dMAW WDJun
To VMO-6 CamPen

Siegmund, P. L. 7302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 1stMAW

Simpson, T. H. 0802
Fr ForTrps FMFPac
To PhibGru-3 By5Jul

Skipper, K. J. 0302
Fr 2dMarDiv WDJun
To MCCWTC Bridgeport

Slawter, L. Z. 2502
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 3dMarDiv

Smigay, D. B. 3002
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To MCSC Albany

Smith, K. L. 0802
Fr USNavIntelScol WDJun
To 2dMarDiv

Smith, H. O. 2502
Fr ForTrps FMFLant WDJun
To 1stMAW

Smith, T. C. 0302
Fr MCS Quant
To Port Hueneme Cal By1Jul

Smoke, F. R. 7333
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 2dMAW

Smola, J. K. 0302
Fr Univ of Iowa
To I&I 94thRflCo By10Jul

Snell, B. S. 0302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To CO HqBn HQMC

Snyder, E. N. 0302
Fr Univ of Md
To I&I 71stRflCo By1Jul

Soliday, R. E. 7307
Fr NAS PaxRiv
To Pg Scl Monterey By31Jul

Stoddart, E. R., Jr. 0302
Fr 2dMarDiv WDJun
To MCS Quant

Strandquist, J. H. 0802
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To Comdr PhibGru-2

Studt, J. C. 0302
Fr George Wash Univ WDJun
To 3dMarDiv

Suits, W. J. 0302
Fr NAG Korea WDJul
To MCS Quant

Sullivan, V. C. 0130
Fr 2dMarDiv WDJun
To 3dMarDiv

Sullivan, W. M. 3002
Fr PgScol Monterey
To NavSupCen Oak By9Jul

Taylor, C. H. 3010
Fr PgScol Monterey WDJun
To 1stMarBrig

Taylor, H. E. 7333
Fr PgScol Monterey WDJun
To 3dMAW

Thatcher, J. L. 7305
Fr Utah State Univ WDJun
To 12th MCRRD

Thurston, F. H. 7331
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 2dMAW

Tolnay, J. J. 0302
Fr MCRD PI SC
To I&I 64thRflCo By1Jul

Townsend, R. L. 7331
Fr NABTC NAS Pncla WDJun
To 2dMAW

Townsend, T. A. 0802
Fr 1stMarBrig WDJun
To DASA SandiaB NMex

Trainor, B. E. 0302
Fr 1stMarDiv
To Univ of Colo By26Jul

Twohey, R. B. 0302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 3dMarDiv

Utley, E. H. 3002
Fr Pg Scol Monterey
To 1stMAW By10Jul

Valentine, H. J. 7335
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To MARTC NAS Seattle

Valentini, M. S. 2502
Fr Pg Scl Monterey WDJun
To MAD Pt Mugu

Van Manen, C. M. 2502
Fr ForTrps FMFLant WDJun
To I&I 7thCommCo

Van Sant, F. N. 1803
Fr MCB CamPen WDJun
To FMFPac

Van Winkle, A. 0302
Fr Univ. of Wash WDJun
To 1stMarBrig

Vanairsdale, J. B. 0302
Fr 12thMCRRD WDJun
To MB NavForGuam

Vaught, R. H. 0302
Fr 2dMarDiv
To 1stMCRRD By1Jul

Vey, W. D. 3002
Fr MCB CamLej WDJun
To MCS Quant

Wahlfeld, H. W. 1802
Fr Western Ill Univ WDJun
To USS Roosevelt

Walker, J. G. 7304
Fr NAS QuonPt WDJun
To 3dMAW

Wallach, A. W. 0302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To MAAG Taiwan

Watson, C. E. 0302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 3dMarDiv

Watson, T. H. 0302
Fr MB NTC GLakes
To 9thMCRRD By28May

Webb, B. D. 0302
Fr 1stMarBrig WdJun
To OIC MCRS Milw

Weatherspoon, J. A. 0130
Fr 2dMarDiv WDJun
To 3dMarDiv

Weinert, F. B. 1802
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 3dMarDiv

Westling, D. Y. 7304
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 3dMarDiv

Weston, W. A. 0802
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 2dMarDiv

Whisman, E. L. 0802
Fm NM State Univ WDJun
To 3dMarDiv

White, R. E. 7331
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 2dMAW

Whitfield, C. K. 0802
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To ForTrps FMFLant

Williams, D. G. 2502
Fr NavPhibB NorVa WDJun
To ForTrps FMFLant

Willis, T. J. 0302
Fr MCRD PI SC
To I&I 92dRflCo By5Jul

Williams, T. W. 3002
Fr MCS Quant
To PgScol Monterey By31Jul

Wilson, P. E. 0802
Fr ForTrps FMFPac WDJun
To Pt Arguello

Wood, D. E. 0302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 2dMarDiv

Wood, R. K. 7333
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 2dMAW

Woodruff, R. L. 7302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 1stMAW

Wrenn, J. 0130
Fr 1st MCRRD
To HQMC By7Jul

Wyatt, W. J. 7331
Fr NABTC NAS Pncla WDJun
To 2dMAW

Ziegler, A. G. 2502
Fr 2dMarDiv WDJun
To 3dMarDiv

Zuern, R. L. 0302
Fr USS Ranger
To I&I 95th RflCo By5Jul

Permanent Promotions

Altman, G. F. Apr
Andrews, J. W. Apr
Andrus, K. W. Apr
Angelo, L. N. Apr
Baker, W. H. Apr
Balogh, H. G. Apr
Barlow, G. H. Apr
Batchelder, S. H. Apr
Bates, W. H. Apr
Beach, A. D. Apr
Benton, W. D. Apr
Berthoud, K. H., Jr. Apr
Bicknell, R. L. Apr
Bird, J. H., Jr. Apr
Bogg, C. F. Apr
Borjesson, S. G. Apr
Boyd, C. A., Jr. Apr
Brown, C. E. Apr
Bucher, W. E. Apr
Casey, F. M. Apr
Cash, R. A. Apr
Cheatham, E. C., Jr. Apr
Chesla, E. J., Jr. Apr
Cohn, W. A. Apr
Conlon, J. F. Apr
Corliss, G. A. Apr
Cornwall, G. B. Apr
Cottom, J. W. Apr
Couch, W. M. Apr
Cox, J. V. Apr
Cox, S. D. Apr
Cuppy, W. C., Jr Apr
Davis, J. W. Apr
De Prima, J. Apr
De Schuytner, V. R. Apr
Dean, R. H. Apr
Dittman, W. R. Apr
Dorman, J. F. Apr
Drescher, H. W. Apr
Drovedahl, R. Apr
Duffield, D. M., Jr. Apr
Eastwood, G. W. Apr
Farris, W. E. Apr
Fibich, M. J., Jr. Apr
Field, W. L., III Apr
Field, H. J., Jr. Apr
Fink, A. L. Apr
Fish, T. E. Apr
Fitzgerald, E. F. Apr
Ford, D. J. Apr
Fontenot, K. J., Jr. Apr
Fry, R. S. Apr
Gale, J. R. Apr
Galloway, J. J. Apr
Garrett, E. T., Jr. Apr
Gillis, J. E. Apr
Graham, E. T., Jr. Apr
Gravel, M. J. Apr
Green, A. H. Apr
Green, B. R. Apr
Grunwald, H. H. Apr
Hafey, R. J., Jr. Apr
Harlan, G. Apr
Harris, J. B. Apr
Heesch, R. W. Apr
Henley, R. J. Apr
Hippler, R. E. Apr
Hodges, E. E. Apr
Hofstetter, R. E. Apr
Hollis, J. S. Apr
Hossli, C. C. Apr
Huerlimann, E. A. Apr
Hunter, M. Apr
Hyland, R. L. Apr
Irion, J. W., Jr. Apr
Johnston, P. M. Apr
Johnson, F. S. Apr
Johnson, F. J., Jr. Apr
Jones, V. E. Apr
Jones, R. I. Apr
Jones, J. F. Apr
Karker, F. A., Jr. Apr
Kelly, T. J. Apr
Kelly, D. A. Apr
Kendrick, H. L. Apr
King, J. P. Apr
Kirkpatrick, R. H. Apr
Kramer, W. K. Apr
Kuci, R. A. Apr
La Porte, A. A., Jr. Apr
Lavigne, A. W. Apr
Lawendowski, J. J. Apr
Lee, T. I. Apr
Lewis, R. W. Apr
Love, E. G. Apr
Lynch, R. J. Apr
McBrayer, W. L. Apr
McCarthy, E. C. Apr
McCauley, B. W. Apr
McDonald, R. C. Apr
McEwan, F. J. Apr
McGlone, V. P. Apr
McLane, D. C., Jr. Apr
Mickle, D. A. Apr
Moeller, R. L. Apr
Morrin, W. C. Apr
Moser, C. F. Apr
Munson, J. D. Apr
O'Brien, J. A. Apr
O'Brien, W. J. Apr
O'Donnell, H. F. Apr
Parker, J. K. Apr
Payne, N. E., Jr. Apr
Peck, K. D. Apr
Penny, J. R. Apr
Petersen, F. E. Apr
Peterson, B. H. Apr
Phillips, J. Apr
Pickett, B. S. Apr
Powell, R. R., Jr. Apr
Radtke, P. G. Apr
Reddick, C. N., Jr. Apr
Roberts, R. T. Apr
Romine, R. E. Apr
Ruete, A. W., Jr. Apr
Saul, J. L. Apr
Scoppa, J., Jr. Apr
Shaklee, H. G. Apr
Slee, D. J. Apr
Snyder, T. O. Apr
Snyder, L. G. Apr
Steinberg, M. J. Apr
Thomas, S. F. Apr
Thomas, W. J. Apr
Thompson, A. F., Jr. Apr
Tolnay, J. J. Apr
Trescott, E. H. Apr
Turner, F. P. Apr
Valentine, H. J. Apr
Walker, D. R. Apr
Wallace, C. F. Apr
Ward, G. W. Apr
Weise, W. Apr
Went, J. J. Apr
Whalley, A. Apr
Whelan, W. L. Apr
White, M. E. Apr
Wickman, G. A. Apr
Wilson, B. E. Apr
Witt, L. C. Apr
Wynn, N. B. Apr

Temporary Promotions

Burns, M. J. May
Caylor, D. A. May
Correll, W. R., Jr. May
Ellis, G. L. May
Kirby, D. E. May
Miller, R. D. May
Rule, J. M., III May
Wallace, L. C., Jr. May
Yates, C. E. May

Temporary Promotions, Reserve

Allen, W. W. May
Crowe, D. F. May
Jacobsen, D. E. May
Marshall, L. A. May
McCoy, J. W. May
Pisaturo, C. A. Apr
Smith, N. A. May
Wallace, A. A. Apr

Deaths, Active Duty

Brennan, J. J. 7333
3dMAW 15Apr

Hess, D. L. 7305
NB China Lake 28Apr
Hill, L. H., Jr. 7333
NAS Atsugi Japan 21Apr
Whaling, R. W. 7333
3dMAW 15Apr

Deaths, Retired

Burns, T. R.
USNH, Philadelphia 17Apr
Seider, G. O.
USNH, Bethesda Md 26Apr

Retired

Beeler, L. L. 0310
MCAS CherPt 30Apr
Bixler, J. A. 0130
HQMC 31May
Branch, T. A. 3102
MCB CamLej 30Apr
D'Lamater, R. J. 6402
MCAS CherPt 31May
Diehl, J. J. 0130
MCS Quant 31May
Fivel, E. J., Jr. 6502
MCAS El Toro 30Apr
Fox, A. F. 0430
LFTUPac 30Jun
Jensen, D. L. 6702
2dMAW 30Apr
Johnson, R. K. 3510
MCB CamPen 30Apr
Lamothe, L. G. 1302
3dEngrBn 31May
Lawrence, D. W. 3510
2dMAW 31May
Lendon, R. 2010
1stMarDiv 31May
McCarthy, H. S. 2002
3dMarDiv 31May
Nelson, C. C. 3102
MCS Quant 31May
Ogilvie, G. F. 0130
MCRD SDiego 31May
Oldenburg, F. A. 0302
9thMCRRD 31May
Philbin, W. 0130
2dMarDiv 31May
Rapp, R. E. 3030
MCRDep Sdiego 30Apr
Smith, C. 4002
HQMC 30Apr
Sullivan, R. C. 0130
MCB CamPen 30Apr
Tate, J. D. 2020
1stMarDiv 30Apr
Tworek, Jr. 0302
LFTUPac 31May
Valencic, R. F. 0302
HQMC 30Jun
Walker, L. W. 3015
LFTUPac NavPhib 31May
Williams, W. G. 0302
1stMarDiv 30Apr

1st Lieutenants

Transfers

Allen, J. M. 6708
Fr 1stMAW WDJun
To 3dMAW
Anderson, L. G. 2710
Fr ForTrps FMFPac
To 3dMarDiv By3Jul
Angus, T. P. 0302
Fr 1stMarBrig WDJun
To MB Portsmouth NH
Armstrong, S. A. 0302
Fr 2dMarDiv
To USS Lexington By1Jul
Babbin, R. R. 0302
Fr USS Noble WDJune
To MCCWTC Bridgeport
Ballaine, D. A. 0301
Fr USS Yorktown WDJun
To 1stMarDiv
Bates, W. S. 0302
Fr 1stMarBrig WDJun
To HQMC
Baulch, E. F. 2502
Fr 1stMarBrig WDJun
To 1stMarDiv
Bjork, W. V. 3030
Fr 3dMAW
To FMFPac By10Jun
Boggs, P. G. 9901
Fr MAD NABTC Pncla
To MCS Quant By29May
Buehl, L. H., III 0302
Fr MCRD SDiego WDJun
To 1stMarBrig
Burhans, A. D. 6709
Fr 1stMAW WDJun
To MACS-1 3dMAW
Chancey, J. A. 7335
Fr 3dMAW
To 1stMAW By1Jun
Clarence, D. L. 3502
Fr 3dMarDiv WDJun
To MCRD SDiego
Cole, J. P. 0302
Fr 1stMarDiv
To USS Cavalier By20May
Connolly, J. E. 6709
Fr 2dMAW
To 1stMAW By10Jul
Corbell, D. H. 7398
Fr NAAS Beeville WDJun
To 2dMAW
Correro, P. O. 6709
Fr 2dMAW
To 1stMAW By10Jul
Crigler, C. F. 6709
Fr 2dMAW
To 1stMAW By10Jul
Dancey, R. W. 2010
Fr 1stMarDiv WDJun
To 1stMarBrig
DeVries, K. J. 7335
Fr 3dMAW
To 1stMAW By1Jun
Deuser, J. F. 2602
Fr 2dMarDiv WDJun
To MCB CamPen
Duffy, P. E. 0302
Fr 1stMarDiv WDJun
To MB NS Adak
Dunn, J. L. 0302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 1stMarDiv
Edwards, A. R. 7333
Fr 1stMAW WDJun
To MARTC Willowgrove
Eichelberger, J. M. 7304
Fr 2dMAW WDJun
To CNAVANTRA CorpC
Fowler, J. W. 0802
Fr MB NB Subic Bay WDJun
To 1stMarDiv
Gardner, G. L. 0302
Fr 1stMarBrig WDJun
To NAD McAlester
Gazzaniga, D. A. 0302
Fr MCSC Barstow WDJun
To 1stMarBrig
Germagian, B. P. 6402
Fr 2dMAW
To VMO-2 1stMAW By17Jul
Giodano, J. F. 0302
Fr 1st MCRRD WDJun
To 2dMarDiv
Green, M. M. 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv WdMay
To 2dMarDiv
Hamilton, G. S. 1302
Fr MB NS SDiego WDJun
To 1stMAW
Haynes, J. D. 7304
Fr 2dMAW WDMay
To 1stMAW
Heiden, C. H. 3010
Fr MCB CamLej
To 8thMCRRD By30Jun
Herussell, E. B. 7302
Fr HQMC
To PgScl Monterey By31Jul
Hoen, G. G. 7335
Fr 3dMAW
To NABTC NAS Pncla By12Jul
Hohman, R. B. 1302
Fr 1stMarBrig WDJun
To OIC MCRS Dvr
Hunnicutt, J. E. 3502
Fr 3dMarDiv WDJun
To MCRD PI SC
Hurley, R. B. 0802
Fr 1stMarBrig WDJun
To MCRD SDiego
Jenkins, W. A. 6709
Fr 2dMAW
To 1stMAW By10Jul
Johnson, R. E. 3502
Fr 1stMarBrig WDMay
To 1stAnglico FMFPac
Johns, D. D. 7335
Fr 2dMarDiv WDJun
To 3dMAW
Johnson, R. A. 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDJun
To MB NB Npt
Jordan, L. W. 0302
Fr 1stMarDiv
To MB NAD Oahu By1Jun
Kelly, M. J. 0302
Fr Indian Head Md WDJun
To 2dMAW
Lannes, W. J. 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDJun
To Cecil Fld Fla
Leonard, W. H. 0302
Fr 2dMarDiv
To USS Francis Marion By1Jul
Lessard, P. F. 1802
Fr 1stMarDiv
To MB NB Subic Bay By1Jul
Lodewick, J. W. 6406
Fr 3dMAW
To 1stMAW By19Jun
Marren, H. T. 3010
Fr 1stMarDiv
To 3dMarDiv By24Jul
Martin, B. A. 7305
Fr MAD NAATC CorpC
To VT-7 NAAS Meridian By15May
Martin, R. J. 0302
Fr 2dMarDiv WDJun
To MD NavActy London
McCormack, R. D. 1802
Fr 3dMarDiv WDJun
To 2dMarDiv
McCullough, J. W. 3502
Fr 3dMAW
To 3dMarDiv By13Jul
Merritt, R. O. 0802
Fr MB NB Subic Bay WDJun
To 1stMarDiv
Miller, R. E. 0802
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To MCRD SDiego
Mixson, M. E. 7399
Fr 2dMarDiv
To MAD NABTC Pncla By31May
Moffett, D. L. 7335
Fr 1stMAW WDJun
To NABTC NAS Pncla
Murtland, J. B. 0802
Fr MB NB NorVa
To USS Boxer By15Jul
Norman, R. E. 0702
Fr Camp Butler WDJun
To ForTrps FMFPac
Norris, W. B. 6602
Fr 1stMAW WDJun
To MARTC NAS LBeach
Ovelgonne, W. E. 6602
Fr 1stMAW WDJun
To 1stMarBrig
Pardee, D. L. 0802
Fr 2dMarDiv
To NSA Ft Meade Md By20Jun
Parker, L. E. 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDJun
To MCRD PI SC
Patterson, R. A. 1302
Fr ForTrps FMFPac WDJun
To 3dMarDiv
Perry, C. R. 7335
Fr 1stMAW
To Pg Scol Monterey By31Jul
Peterson, W. P. 0302
Fr 1stMarBrig WDJun
To MCRD PI SC
Phenegar, W. R., Jr. 7399
Fr 2dMarDiv
To MAD NABTC Pncla By31May
Plum, H. E. 7333
Fr 1stMAW WDJun
To 2dMAW
Powell, F. F. 0302
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 3rdMarDiv
Pozza, J. B. 2502
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To Ft Meade Md
Redding, W. P. 0302
Fr 1stMarBrig WDJun
To Seal Beach
Revell, J. E. 0302
Fr 1stMarBrig WDJun
To MB NSA Ft Meade
Reilly, J. E. 0301
Fr 1stMAW WDJun
To 3dMAW
Ross, J. W. 0802
Fr 2dMarDiv WDJun
To MB NavActy Italy
Rost, T. O. 6709
Fr 2dMAW
To 1stMAW By10Jul
Ruckdashel, R. N. 3502
Fr 3dMarDiv WDJun
To MCRD PI SC
Saye, D. A. 0302
Fr 1stMarBrig WDJun
To MCS Quant
Schultz, J. P. 1802
Fr 3dMarDiv WDJun
To MB NB Chasn
Searle, R. E. 3502
Fr 3dMarDiv WDJun
To MCRD PI SC
Sedutto, W. H. 3402
Fr 1stMarDiv
To MB NS SFran By21Jun
Sheridan, R. F. 1802
Fr MB NH Chasn WDJun
To ForTrps FMFLant
Sisson, W. W. 0302
Fr 1stMarDiv
To MAD NABTC Pncla By31May
Smart, R. H. 0802
Fr 1stMarBrig WDJun
To 1stMCRRD
Soesbe, K. E. 0801
Fr 2dMAW WDJun
To 1stMarDiv
Spangler, J. F. 0802
Fr 1stMarDiv
To NavPhibScol By5Jul
Taggart, T. M. 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDJun
To MCRD SDiego
Tedesco, C. M. 2010
Fr 1stMarDiv WDJun
To 1stMarBrig
Thorp, J. C. 1302
Fr Camp Butler WDMay
To Ft Belvoir
Toelle, A. D. 0802
Fr 1stMarBrig WDJun
To MCRD SDiego
Topham, J. T. 3502
Fr 1stMarDiv
To 2dMarDiv By3Jul
Toth, J. E. 0302
Fr USNavIntelScol WDJun
To FMFLant
Tremper, W. F. 6708
Fr 1stMAW WDJun
To 2dMAW
Updyke, J. M. 0802
Fr ForTrps FMFPac WDJun
To Ft Sill Okla
Varney, R. S. 0802
Fr Ft Sill Okla
To PgScol Monterey By31Jul
Vogt, R. L. 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDJun
To MB NAS PaxRiv
Watson, J. D. 7333
Fr Kingsville Tex WDJun
To 1stMAW
Wells, R. C. 0302
Fr 1stMarBrig WDJun
To MB Nav Sub NOrleans
Westmoreland, J. H. 0302
Fr 1stMarBrig WDJun
To Clarksville Tenn
Wever, J. B. 7102
Fr 1stMAW WDJun
To 3dMAW
Whitehouse, M. L. 7333
Fr 1stMarDiv WDJun
To 3dMAW
Whitmer, G. M. 7304
Fr 2dMAW WDMay
To 1stMAW
Wiebrecht, D. A. 9901
Fr 1stMarBrig WDJun
To 1stMarDiv
Wile, W. A. 0802
Fr 2dMarDiv WDJun
To Rodman Canal Zones
Wilkerson, M. V. 1302
Fr MB NM Subic Bay WDJun
To 1stMarDiv

Permanent Promotions

Anderson, H. F., Jr. Apr
Jezsik, L. C. Apr
Morris, D. L. May
Shafer, R. L. Apr
Watson, J. L. Apr

Temporary Promotions

Clarke, F. J. Apr
Hannel, A. G., III Apr
Martin, R. C., Jr. Apr
Massey, B. R. Apr

Temporary Promotions, Reserve

Abadie, C. J., Jr. May
Abbott, J. C. May
Ackerman, S. H. May
Adair, J. R. May
Adams, R. R. May
Adelizzi, R. F. May
Alberigi, R. A. May
Alford, D. F. May
Allan, J. F. May
Allen, D. R., Jr. May
Allen, R. N. May
Allen, W. H., Jr. May
Alligood, E. L. May
Andersen, W. G., Jr. May
Andler, H. E. May
Angele, N. J. May

Appzzato, R. J. May
Arrington, J. B. May
Arroyo, R. A., Jr. May
Ascher, S. Y. May
Avella, M. G. May
Avery, C. F. May
Ayers, J. C. May
Baker, E. L. May
Baker, W. E. May
Bank, R. H. May
Barclay, W. P. May
Barrett, J. R. May
Barron, B. D. May
Bart, D. P. May
Barton, D. A. May
Beach, J. W. May
Beattie, L. J. May
Beatty, L. V. May
Bebo, N. F., Jr. May
Bellis, G. G. May
Bellows, K. F., Jr. May
Bennett, J. B., Jr. May
Bentley, R. D. May
Berenato, P. W. May
Berghorn, B. K. May
Berry, D. L. May
Beveridge, A. L. May
Birtcil, D. L. May
Blair, D. D. May
Blanton, R. D. May
Block, R. M. May
Bloomfield, R. D. May
Boggan, J. M., Jr. May
Brackin, T. S. May
Bradshaw, E. L. May
Brandewiede, G. C. May
Breau, R. F. May
Briggs, F. F. May
Brown, E. W., III May
Brown, R. E. May
Brownrigg, R. A. May
Bryan, R. B. May
Bryant, C. E., Jr. May
Buchanan, P. M. May
Buck, L. E. May
Bullard, B. F., Jr. May
Burke, N. E. May
Burt, T. N. May
Capetanos, T. G. May
Carbray, S. E. May
Carletti, P. S. May
Carlson, L. A. May
Carlton, C. T. May
Casey, J. P. May
Casterlin, H. R. May
Caufield, D. C. May
Cavellier, D. B. May
Celata, J. D. May
Chandler, F. I. May
Charlton, A. C. May
Cherubini, R. P. May
Chiesa, R. F. May
Clark, J. E. May
Clarke, E. P., II May
Clasen, D. L. May
Clevenger, T. R. May
Clubb, T. B., III May
Collins, J. S., Jr. May
Conley, A. F., Jr. May
Contreras, E. J. May
Conwicke, G. K. May
Copen, N. P. May
Cosgrove, W. L., Jr. May
Costa, P. N. May
Coughlin, R. G. May
Courtney, D. V. May
Cousins, T. S. May
Craven, B. F., Jr. May
Crawford, P. F. May
Curran, J. P. May
Currie, L. S., Jr. May
Curtis, E. M. May
Cushing, J. D. May
Daniels, B. L. May
Dapolito, A. J. May
Davis, R. K. May
Deatrick, R. H. May
Depoali, R. O. May
Devine, J. E. May
Dix, D. C. May
Dorman, J. V. May
Dowling, C. R. May
Doyle, J. A. May
Doze, G. C. May
Dueweke, D. G. May
Duffy, J. P. May
Duke, H. A., Jr. May
Dulay, V. D., Jr. May
Dupier, D. J. May
Duquette, N. J. May
Dworakowski, R. D. May
Fanes, K. H. May
Edic, B. E. May
Edwards, G. A. May
Eibler, J. F. May
Elliott, A. W. May
Elliott, G. E. May
Elmer, R. G. May
Emens, R. F. May
Engs, S. R. May
Fanning, T. F., Jr. May
Fay, H. May
Felsburg, R. B. May
Ferguson, J. R. May
Ferries, D. W., Jr. May
Ficken, J. S. May
Fitzgerald, B. P. May
Flanigan, T. E. May
Fleming, J. E. May
Flynn, B. A. May
Flynn, H. T. May
Folliard, J. P. May
Forbes, P. L. May
Fortenberry, J. H. May
Foti, J. G. May
Fournier, Jr., A. E. May
Foxley, W. C. May
Franceschi, L. May
Francis, J. C. May
Freeman, D. R. May
Furqueron, E. A. May
Gaden, Jr., R. J. May
Gaffney, J. F. May
Gallagher, G. M. May
Galvin, J. L. May
Gamelin, R. T. May
Gardiner, F. H. May
Gardner, R. F. May
Garner, P. C. May
Garrison, L. S. May
Garvey, P. J. May
Gazda, Jr., E. J. May
Gentry, J. R. May
George, S. L. May
Geraghty, P. G. May
Germanos, N. J. May
Gibbons, J. C. May
Gibson, H. J. May
Glass, Jr., W. Q. May
Gluck, R. J. May
Glynn, C. R. May
Goldstock, H. L. May
Gorgone, V. P. May
Gorham, C. K. May
Graser, III, R. N. May
Greenup, H. W. May
Grillo, Jr., P. M. May
Grindrod, Jr., J. J. May
Guerrera, F. P. May
Gury, W. E. May
Gustin, J. K. May
Gwin, A. F. May
Hagan, J. R. May
Haidet, B. K. May
Hale, B. May
Hall, Jr., A. E. May
Hall, R. B. May
Hall, W. P. May
Hamilton, A. L. May
Hammack, W. L. May
Hammer, Jr., T. E. May
Hammond, J. C. May
Hamor, R. M. May
Hanley, J. J. May
Hannon, J. F. May
Harless, Jr., C. J. May
Harper, L. R. May
Harris, P. C. May
Harrison, G. B. May
Hatchett, D. W. May
Reece, J. K. May
Wittmer, Jr., A. E. May

Temporary Promotions, Reserve

Aldhizer, III, J. T. May
Babcock, S. L. May
Baker, D. L. May
Barsky, Jr., C. A. May
Bell, J. H. May
Bloser, J. R. May
Casey, J. L. May
Chew, A. B. Apr
Cooper, J. R. May
Craig, H. E. Apr
Davidson, J. May
Everett, W. E. May
Graham, II, A. A. May
Hughen, L. H. May
Jenkins, W. A. Apr
Kater, J. M. May
Kogerman, W. G. Apr
Lee, D. C. May
Mason, K. May
McClain, B. L. Apr
McGruder, C. R. May
Oldham, G. H. Apr
Paulson, H. Q. Apr
Pepper, J. R. Apr
Rauscher, R. J. Apr
Roberts, H. L. May
Rost, T. O. Apr
Runnels, Jr., O. B. May
Schaper, L. E. May
Seaman, J. F. Apr
Summe, R. C. Apr
Sweeney, R. C. May
Wilson, Jr., D. E. Apr

Deaths, Active Duty

Andre, J. S. 7333
1stMAW 3May
Mason, J. L. 7305
NAS Atsugi Japan 24Apr

Deaths, Retired

Rohloff, C. A. 7335
USNH Bethesda Md 3May

Samsonoff, I. K.
Washington Conn 25Apr

2d Lieutenants

Transfers

Acosta, L. 2715
Fr MB, NTC, GLakes
To 3dMarDiv WDJun
Alexander, J. H. 1801
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 1stMarBrig
Butsko, F. 9901
Fr USNA Annapolis WDJun
To MCS Quant
Cazares, A. F. 0301
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 1stMarBrig
Clark, Jr., M. T. 0301
Fr MCS Quant
To 1stMarDiv By1Jul
Coolican, J. J. 0301
Fr MCS Quant
To 1stMarDiv By1Jul
Cox, L. C. 0301
Fr MCS Quant
To 1stMarDiv By1Jul
Dunham, A. W. 9901
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 1stMAW
Fischer 2715
Fr MB, NTC, GLakes
To 3dMarDiv WDJun
Fletcher, F. B. 0301
Fr MCS Quant
To 1stMarDiv By1Jul
Friend, G. E. 0301
Fr MCS Quant
To MAD, NAS, Pncla By12Jul
Giordani, F. S. 0301
Fr MCS Quant
To 1stMarDiv By1Jul
Hanson, C. E. 1801
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 3dMarDiv
Hearn, Jr., G. C. 0802
Fr 1stMarDiv
To COMTHIRTEEN By25Jul
Joyner, A. R. 9901
Fr USNA Annapolis WDJun
To MCS Quant
Kaye, R. S. 2501
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 1stMarDiv
Kent, C. D. 9901
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 1stMAW
Loving, F. L. 0301
Fr MCS Quant
To 1stMarDiv By1Jul
Lynch, E. A. 0201
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 1stMAW
Messick, J. H. 0201
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 2dMAW
Mullen, J. L. 0201
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 1stMAW
Osgood, W. H. 0301
Fr MCS Quant
To 1stMarDiv By1Jul
Piper, M. L. 0301
Fr MCS Quant
To 1stMarDiv By1Jul
Prichard, J. L. 9901
Fr USNA Annapolis WDJun
To MCS Quant
Reilly, J. P. 0301
Fr MCS Quant
To 1stMarDiv By1Jul
Richardson, P. C. 0201
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 3dMAW
Riesen, R. A. 0301
Fr MCS Quant
To 1stMarDiv By1Jul
Saylors, W. P. 0201
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 2dMAW
Shea, R. M. 0301
Fr MCS Quant
To 1stMarDiv By1Jul
Tangren, M. B. 0201
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To 3dMAW
Trice, Jr., W. H. 9901
Fr USNA Annapolis WDJun
To MCS Quant
Worrell, W. K. 0301
Fr MCS Quant
To 3dMarDiv By13Jun
Zensen, R. 0301
Fr MCS Quant
To 1stMarDiv By1Jul

Death, Active Duty

Welz, R. S. 7302
MAG-33 3dMAW 28Apr

Warrant Officers

W-4

Permanent Promotions

Adams, R. K. May
Amos, W. H. May
Gibbon, E. E. May
Harper, J. A. May
Sweetser, W. B. May
Wightman, G. F. May

Temporary Promotions

Dupre, Jr., E. H. Apr
Schlesinger, L. Apr

Retired

Franson, C. E. 6402
3dMAW 30Apr
Kohler, A. G. 2502
MCB CamLej 31May
Lord, A. W. 3402
MCB CamPen 30Apr
Smith, E. O. 3025
MCSFA SFran 31May
Warthen, M. H. 0130
MCB CamLej 30Jun
Wrenn, J. B. 2502
Ft Meade Md 30Apr

W-3

Transfers

Doyle, D. R. 0202
Fr 1stMarDiv
To Ft Holabird Md By25May
Hazen, C. E. 3502
Fr MCRD SDiego WDJun
To NAG Korea
Wallis, L. P. 0130
Fr Yokohama Japan WDJun
To 2dMarDiv

Permanent Promotions

Herriotts. C. I. May
McGrath, C. P. May

Retired

Beard, G. M. 0130
NAS Anacostia 31May
Crosby, H. L. 3402
1stMarDiv 30Jun
Hughes, D. J. 3010
FMFLant 30Apr
Lilley, J. W. 4602
2dMarDiv 31May
Sharp, W. T. 3010
2dMarDiv 30Apr

W-2

Transfers

Anderson, F. A. 3102
Fr MB Pearl WDJun
To MCRD SDiego
Duer, A. M. 6602
Fr 1stMAW WDJun
To MCAAS Yuma Ariz
Ferguson, T. V. 1360
Fr 1stMarDiv WDJun
To 3dMarDiv
Morgan, L. H. 3302
Fr MCB CamLej WDJun
To MCSC Albany
Nahhas, G. A. 2010
Fr NAD Oahu WDMay
To 1stMarDiv
Smith, A. J. 3025
Fr MCSA Phila
To 3dMarDiv By24Jul
Stein, M. 0302
Fr MCRD SDiego WDMay
To Seal Beach
Tinsley, J. E. 3060
Fr Univ of Houston
To NAS Atsugi By17Jul
Williamson, R. V. 4002
Fr MCSC Albany Ga
To MB NS SFran By1Jul

Retired

Robinson, M. E. 1320
MCB CamLej 30Apr

W-1

Transfers

Borgomainerio, R. 5802
Fr MB NTC GLakes WDJun
To FltActy Yokosuka
Capjelle, P. W. 6602
Fr 1stMAW
To MCRD SDiego WDJun
Garrett, S. E. 3102
Fr 3dMarDiv WDJun
To MCB CamPen
Georgia, B. J. 4106
Fr HQMC WDJun
To MCRD SDiego
Perry, L. E. 4102
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To MCAS Beaufort
Pointek, E. 2715
Fr MB NTC GLakes
To 1stMarDiv WDJun
Targett, D. H. 6130
Fr MCS Quant WDJun
To ForTrps FMFLant

Report From the Ready Forces

MARINES AT WORK:

CamPen, 29 Palms, Quantico, CamLej—and Borneo—had one thing in common during May. In each place were working Marines who told the *Gazette* what they were doing.

PONY EXPRESS

SPECIAL TO GAZETTE—"Marines will be happy to have beside them the British Commandos, a splendid group of professionals in any fight," said **MajGen D. M. Weller, CG, 3dMarDiv,** after returning from Borneo where he observed Operation PONY EXPRESS.

He said impact of joint effort was stronger than any he has seen on Okinawa.

The international amphibious exercise by members of South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) ended 7 May. Adm C. D. Griffin, Commander, Seventh Fleet, praised professional ability of PONY EXPRESS forces, their flexibility to adapt readily to rapidly changing positions.

US and British Marines landed in North Borneo in an area about 40 miles north of Jesselton, over the beach and from helicopters. **BGen T. F. Riley** was Commander, landing Forces.

Main landing force was **Col W. A. Stiles'** 9th Marines, and British 42 Commando, with attached Australian infantry company.

For problem, 9th Marines were composed of **LtCol T. T. Grady's** 1/3, **Lt Col J. D. Smith's** 3/9 and a constructive BLT. Other 3dMarDiv Marines were **LtCol W. J. Kohler's** 2/12 (artillery), and **LtCol J. K. Hogan's** 3dRecBn who conducted four-day recon exercise prior to D-Day, acted as aggressors during exercise. **LtCol M. O. Sadler** was CO of Brigade's Landing Force Logistic Support Group.

5th MEB Staff

BGen T. F. Riley	**CG**
Col S. G. Cortelyou	**C/S**
LtCol C. F. Zingheim	**G-1**
Capt R. H. Dent	**G-2**
LtCol L. V. Corbett	**G-3**
LtCol J. T. Smith, Jr.	**G-4**

Participating forces: United States, United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand and Philippines.

- US Forces: 1 AGC, 3 APA, 2AKA, 3 LSD, 1 LPH, 5 LST, 1 RLT, 1 HMR, 1 Patrol VQ, 1 VMO, a Logistic Support Group, 4 DD, 1 SS, 1 Attack Carrier Strike Group (1 carrier, 4 destroyers), and 1 Recon Bn.
- British Forces: Commando Carrier (*HMS Bulwark*, GAZETTE: Nov '60); Commandos, 1 carrier, 1 cruiser, 3 subs, 7 frigates, 12 Logistic Support Ships, aircraft.
- Australian Forces: 1 carrier, 3 frigates, InfCo, patrol bomber.
- New Zealand Forces: 1 cruiser.
- Thailand Forces: UDT (Underwater Demolition Team) and Recon Team.
- Philippines Forces: UDT and Combined Staff officers.

GREEN LIGHT

SPECIAL TO GAZETTE—Operation GREEN LIGHT ends 4 June in the high desert at 29 Palms. There a gigantic FIREX involving supporting arms available to 1st MarDiv—M-1 to 8" How of **Col G. B. Thomas'** 1stFAG—will close out massive Pacific Fleet exercises which since April have kept busy 40,000 Marines and Navy men, 70 ships, 300 aircraft.

For the Marines, GREEN LIGHT began 11 May when all elements of Amphibious Task Force began loading at San Diego, Coronado and CamDel Mar, Calif. Task Force sailed, formed at sea 15 May. Landing Forces embarked: **Col C. T. Hodges'** RLT-1 who would hit Green Beach (San Onofre), and **Col A. Arsenault's** RLT-7 who would split, go ashore at Red Beach 1 (Las Pulgas) and Red Beach 2 (Aliso).

Defending would be **LtCol P. H. McArdle's** Hawaii-based 1/4, and units of **Col W. D. Sawyer's** Fifth Marines.

D-Day landings were to be 20 May. 76 LVTP5s, 280 LCMs spearheading beach assault, performed in column of BLTs. 1stReconBn would land over Red Beach 1, along with 11th Marines, 1stAntiTk Bn, VMO-6.

Planned exercise highlights:

- Supplies delivered by air from El Toro, forwarded to front line troops via parachute from aircraft operating off MCALF, (Marine Corps Auxiliary Landing Field) CamPen.
- Aggressor air was actual, operated from El Toro and Miramar. Warning systems kept all units informed of aggressor tank and air threats.
- Helicopters were used repeatedly to shuttle troops and gear into battle zone, lift Marines to high ground positions overlooking avenues of approach.
- Movement of entire MEF (Marine Expeditionary Force) from Case Springs to 29 Palms via helicopter, truck, LVT.

GREEN LIGHT training objectives were seven: amphibious intelligence, tactical deception, entry of recon units, coordinated air control, integrated anti-air warfare system, support by SeaBees, Troop Test programs.

Making logistic Troop Test, division supply units were grouped in FSR (Force Service Regiment). At 29 Palms it is planned to employ supply units as separate battalions in support of division.

PACKARD XII

Nine months hard labor bore fruit on CamLej beaches in late May when 2dMarDiv Marines carried out a major amphibious exercise planned from scratch by 306 Junior/Senior School students.

BGen J. C. Miller, Jr., DirMCEC, controlled PACKARD, with his staff introduced reports, fresh situations to keep problem moving. **LtCol H. S. Sabatier,** SenSch student, commanded the paper 1stMarPhibCorps.

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